Strategic Security : A Constructivist Investigation of Critical Security and Strategic Organisational Learning Issues : Towards a Theory of Security Development by Mäkinen, Kalevi
Publication Series: 2  
Research Reports N:o 15 
ISBN: 951-25-1637-3 
ISSN:  1237-3680 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kalevi Mäkinen 
 
 
STRATEGIC SECURITY 
 
 
A Constructivist Investigation of Critical Security and Strategic Organisational Learning Issues: 
Towards a Theory of Security Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINNISH NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE 
Department of Education  
Research Centre for Action Competence, Identity, and Ethics 
ACIE 
Helsinki 2005 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this research has been to study security phenomena in the framework of a learning or-
ganisation. The ‘critical security approach’ is the basis of the intervention, along with the help of 
the strategic planning perspective. The goals of this research are to construct both a strategic secu-
rity model and a strategic security leadership model. By examining the conceptions of the personnel 
of the Finnish Ministry of Defence, models are constructed, tested, and further developed. The lit-
erature review is the basis of conceptualising the challenging field of this theoretical framework. 
The conceptual extent of the study may be a bit unusual for a dissertation, but outlining the research 
area from the literature review perspective clarifies the challenge. 
 
The research emphasises the construction of security models in strategic planning and the learning 
organisation framework and concentrates on analysing and explaining the interaction between these 
key pillars. The key question in this research is: what is the role of strategic security in the changing 
environment of a learning organisation. Thus, this study may be seen as both descriptive and pre-
scriptive. 
 
The social constructivist approach combines mind-centred, interaction-centred, and experience-
centred theories into one framework of strategic security leadership. Depending on individual pref-
erences, situational factors, and the phase of the learning process, experiential, interactive, and 
transformative learning methods can be applied. Although the practices of strategic leadership are 
not the focus of this research, the social constructivist approach ensures that the frameworks, con-
cepts, and models presented here may optimally support organisational and individual learning and 
efficiency of performance.    
 
When the theoretical elements and practical efforts are unified in an organisation, the result is a 
wide-range security improvement program. Because of its strong connection to the education and 
leadership performances of the whole society in the framework of cultural entity, this kind of pro-
gram is actually an organisational change-agency system. In order to function well, it has to be able 
to develop systematically according to the comprehensive feedback produced by an on-going 
evaluation process. Considering the modelling of strategic security, a review of previous research 
suggests that the model and the particular approach taken have to be constructed to fit the whole 
organisation and culture, as well as the surrounding national and international society. 
 
The concept of strategic security is an attempt to do justice to the complexity of this multi-
dimensional phenomenon. Strategic security leadership is a sub-concept of strategic security. Stra-
tegic security is a concept with horizontal and vertical variables. Changes in the complexity of the 
environment affect the balance of the respective sub-concepts and clusters; thus, maintaining an 
optimal balance is the key challenge of strategic security on all levels of an organisation. 
 
The review of the performance progress towards the strategic security model suggests strategic se-
curity along with leader selection, education, training, change agents, and overall experience. This 
observation leads to the conclusion that the new security approach in the organisation does have the 
effect of changing the organisational culture in the Finnish Ministry of Defence. The task of secu-
rity is to set some basic standards and to enhance the positive aspects that already exist. 
 
From the starting points of the new strategic security paradigm, the following basic assumptions 
have been formulated: (1) a phenomenon called strategic security exists; (2) excellent strategic se-
curity can be modelled for any learning organisational environment; (3) excellent security leader-
ship can be modelled for any organisational environment; (4) an effective organisational strategic 
security program with supplementary frameworks can be built around modelled strategic security; 
(5) strategic security can be credibly and reliably measured on the basis of the principles of a full 
range of feedback; and, (6) the development of the productivity of an organisation is based on the 
development of the capabilities of strategic security, which should be seen as a lifelong process. 
 
At the level of scientific theory, elements of the constructivism theory were defined ontologically, 
multidimensional security was defined epistemologically, and the phenomenographic approach was 
defined methodologically. At the theoretical level, three essential frameworks were defined and 
analysed: (1) the framework of critical security; (2) the framework of strategic planning; and, (3) 
the framework of the learning organisation in the 21st century. At the level of concepts, several core 
concepts were studied and defined: (1) the concept of the scientific paradigm; (2) the concept of 
strategic security; (3) the concept of security leadership; (4) the concept of strategic planning; (5) 
the concept of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC); (6) the concept of individual learning; and, (7) the 
concept of organisational learning.  Regarding models, three essential models were created: (1) the 
conceptual cluster model of the strategic security model (SSM); (2) the strategic security leadership 
(SSL) model; and, (3) the concept of the security of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The results of the empirical part of this research support the basic assumptions and the structure of 
the strategic security model. According to the results, the structure of the strategic security model as 
well as the six-factor structure of the leadership model are both consistent with the data. The analy-
sis of overall transferability and credibility did not reveal any serious threats to the applicability of 
the strategic security model.  
 
This research is most effective when considered holistically, where each part supports the other 
elements and, on the other hand, as creating a new analytic basis in the hierarchy of science. The 
phenomenographic approach used strongly implements a qualitative perspective and creates new 
information about strategic security in a learning organisation. The results of the empirical part of 
this work are important. However, even more important is the development in the security system 
of the Finnish Ministry of Defence. Still, several needs for further research exist. Theoretically, it is 
possible to formulate a constructivism theory of strategic security in which the concepts of learning 
and security tend to merge and coincide. This remains an inspiring challenge for the future. The 
new strategic security model should be studied from the points of view of scientific paradigms, 
other than the new paradigm of security. 
 
Keywords: Social constructivist approach, phenomenography, critical security, strategic planning, 
learning organisation, strategic security model, strategic security leadership. 
FOREWORD 
 
 
This study was born and has been developed as a result of a two-step process. The framework of the 
process was the learning organisation and change leadership studies in the University of Helsinki 
since 1997 in its entity. The final push for this study came from the MOD, where I became the Se-
curity Officer in 2002. The concrete renewal of the security system of the MOD was a change that 
has, in practice, made possible the extensive execution of the development of the strategic security 
model. 
 
The framework of this study has especially been supported by the opportunity to participate in the 
development of the comprehensive security and readiness progress of the MOD. The added value I 
have obtained from the cooperation with different domestic and international sectors has been a 
significant part of the whole process. When it comes to the scientific level of this research, I cannot 
overestimate the importance of feedback I have received from the domestic and international com-
munity, especially concerning the development of the modelling strategic security.  
 
The previous years also include various separate projects and events that have provided new infor-
mation and even new understanding, especially, on the strategic planning and critical security per-
spectives related to them. Questions relating to the concepts of strategic planning, the learning or-
ganisation and critical security are an interesting and necessary change agent from the viewpoint of 
strategic security leadership.  
 
The arrangement of studying along with working as the Head of Security could have made possible 
the application of several approaches to a doctoral dissertation: for example, action research, the 
narrative approach, experiences-based produced by the process could all have been possibilities. 
However, the immensity and complexity of the research subject and the phenomena behind it are 
such that I decided to proceed with the current research orientation. Nevertheless, being a part of an 
extensive organisation at work meant that not all of the phases of the development process were up 
to me to decide.  
 
Co-operation with the directors and supervisors up to the actual dissertation stage has from my 
viewpoint been seamless. Professor Hannele Niemi understands the life of an adult who studies and 
works at the same time. Professor Kauko Hämäläinen was the second director of my dissertation. 
He was not only an authority but also a fellow human when he entered the process at the empirical 
data evaluation phase of the study. Professor Sari Lindblom-Ylänne, the third director of my disser-
tation, entered the process at the finalisation phase. Professor Jarmo Toiskallio, as a supervisor, is 
the one who, from the time we first met gave faith in the success of the entire process. Since he is 
an important military pedagogical scientific authority, his guidance and encouragement has had a 
great significance in my coping. Docent Marco Krogars had an important role in the step-by-step 
guidance and finalisation of the empirical part of this research in the MOD. However, with Profes-
sor Paul Ilsley I perhaps had the most inspiring experiences and the most self-confident creative 
phases during the process, both in Finland and in the United States of America. Docent Mikko 
Valkonen, as security expert and authority in Finland, receives my special thanks for his support, 
co-operation and pragmatic support orientation over the security obstacles. Without the persistence 
of Professor Tomas A. Regelski I would hardly have been able to write my dissertation in APA 
Style English.  
 
I owe my deep gratitude to each of my superiors and colleagues, because in a different atmosphere 
this process would never have progressed past the beginning. Nevertheless, I will not even attempt 
to describe the utmost importance of my family, Eija and Janne, in making it possible to cope men-
tally through this process.  
 
As a learner and a security leader, I think ahead in life, with an organisational strategic security 
portfolio in my backpack. I value the training and experiences that I have received and know that I 
am able to further develop as a strategic security leader and as an individual in my civilian duties. 
To the young strategic security leader, personal feedback is not a curse word or a four-letter word 
but a means to continuous lifelong learning. I want to learn and during my strategic security leader-
ship period I have learned to learn. Encouraging feedback has supported me in this process, where 
the term strategic has the meaning of the learning of a leader. 
 
Helsinki, Finland, November 08, 2005 
 
Kalevi Mäkinen 
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PART  I 
 
 
THE WORLD OF RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
“Here lies the bones, of lieutenant Jones 
 
He died the first night, 
 
of the fight 
 
by using, 
 
a school solution.” 
 
An unknown author 
Lake Balaton 
Hungary, Europe (2001) 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to attempt to understand and interpret security in the framework of a 
learning organisation from the viewpoint of critical security. The conceptual field of the study’s 
theoretical framework is challenging and multi-dimensional. The conceptual extent of the study 
may be a bit unusual for a dissertation, but this is the case with the practical implications of the 
study on the security of the Finnish Ministry of Defence (MOD) as well. Outlining the research area 
in other ways would have been possible and would even have helped in the writing of the report. 
However, at its current extent this study can function as basic research providing justification for 
further development of the safety and security of the MOD, the defence establishment, and can even 
be applied to the entire Finnish public and private sector administration. 
 
In Finland the concept of security has traditionally been understood instrumentally while the inter-
national concept of security is moving towards a more abstract phenomenon. The criterion for look-
ing at the security paradigm through educational research comes from the international field, since 
the new security paradigm affects the Finnish society as a whole. The demands of international in-
stitutions, national legislative duties and the tasks of the Government correspond to the status of 
security in Finland and to that of the MOD. This effect launches the need for change both in secu-
rity thinking and in the practices of organisations. Continuous learning and development are needed 
in order to successfully change security processes. Thus, education in the changing situation is 
needed. However, in order to change conceptions of security new modelling (Anderson & Burns, 
1989) for structuring the security concept at the MOD level is needed. On the other hand, as part of 
the Government the MOD is at a strategic level in society and therefore this approach opens the 
possibility for more general use of the model. (Anderson & Burns, 1989) The aim of the present 
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research challenges the defence establishment to a different approach and aims to promote discus-
sion on the concept of security. 
 
This study is built on a broad-spectrum of research tradition in the social academic world, and espe-
cially, in the educational academic world. The academic interest of the research is directed towards 
the development of security in a Learning Organisation (LO) (Senge, 1990) in the 21st century on 
the basis of modelling strategic security. This approach also divides the theoretic foundation of the 
study into three pillars of the learning organisation (Alasoini, 1999), strategic planning (Paris, 
2003), and security (Krause & Williams, 2003). The area of safety and security follows the theoreti-
cal assumptions of the critical paradigm of security (Buzan, 1991). The area of education refers to 
the conceptions of constructive learning, also in the area of organisation, and the area of strategic 
planning applies the balanced scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). These concepts are dis-
cussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
 
The basic theoretical choices mentioned above became more and more obvious as the research 
process progressed. Further research will bring to the surface the inherent assumption of this study’s 
orientation. The deep structure of critical security, the learning organisation, and the constructive 
concept of learning is one efficient collective mechanism that the tools of academic research have 
not yet been able to comprehensively describe. Neither have the advantages of conducting compre-
hensive security as a learning mechanism in developing the organisation to be more effective at the 
strategic level been widely identified. The concept of strategy is generally understood to mean a 
plan designed for a particular purpose, or the process of planning something. (Krogars, 1998b) 
 
International research that falls into the sphere of the new paradigm of security is surprisingly ex-
tensive while; on the other hand, national research surprisingly lacks academic studies concerning 
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the new paradigm.  The Finnish Government has chosen ideas of strategic planning as a basic the-
ory in the form of the BSC when developing the Finnish administration to meet future challenges. 
The LO is a phenomenon that has been intensively studied internationally in the last two decades 
and is an especially widespread and well-known spectrum of research in Finland.  
 
 
1.1 Research framework  
 
The theoretical “recovery” of the study is based on the rise of the new paradigm from the 1980s 
with the emergence of new threats. As a manifestation of the criticism inside the paradigm, studies 
that specially called for deeper theoretical anchoring on the framework of vast practical-empirical 
research began to surface. Epistemologically focusing change from abstract individualism and sov-
ereignty to stress culture, civilisation, and identity including the role of ideas, norms, and values 
involves moving away from the realist, objectivist, and rationalist approach towards more interpre-
tive modes of analysis. On methods Haftendorn (1991) concludes that the goal of security studies is 
“to construct an empirically testable paradigm” for a “progressive” research program.  
 
In the philosophy of science, problems of the study of security already become concrete at an early 
stage. The basic challenge is that the concept of security is unclear. The reason for this conceptual 
ambiguity may be the complexity that results from the multi-dimensional and multilateral concept 
and from our ability to perceive and understand such a phenomenon. This phenomenon is parallel to 
the ambiguity of the concept of the learning organisation. At the same time as we move into the 21st 
century an organisation must create a constant learning environment, a non-threatening working 
environment where people can communicate and collaborate with one another, a diversified envi-
ronment for people to think differently and value each other’s thinking, new ways of looking at 
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problems, and a culture that effectively leverages talent. Figure 1 presents the framework of the 
research orientation. 
 
Figure 1.  The framework of the research orientation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, through their practices both public and private organisations have perceived the im-
portance of security (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998) and the learning organisation (Alasoini, 
1999) including the use of strategic planning (Paris, 2003) on success and productivity. This prem-
ise has given researchers the possibility of introducing their own models. Although this may often 
have a practical application and bring practical importance to the basis of security and development 
of an organisation, the foundation in academic context may be forgotten. 
 
The new critical paradigm of security (Buzan, 1991) connected with strategic leadership (Nissinen, 
2001) in the learning organisation (Senge, 1990) is very promising because of its academic possi-
bilities. On the basis of new research the new paradigm of security connected with strategic leader-
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ship (Niven, 2003) in the learning organisation may have possibilities to expand into the construc-
tion of a general theory of security with a general theory of strategic leadership in the development 
of the learning organisation. Connections to the constructive concept of learning (Shank, 2002), the 
qualitative approach (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003) and the strategic planning model (Paris, 2003) in 
the theory of the learning organisation (Senge, 1990) may also create a multidimensional and multi-
level concept of structure on the basis of which the formation of a theory would be possible.  
 
The prominence in debates over the nature of theory in the study of international organisations, 
epistemologically, involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach and towards 
more interpretive modes of analysis (Krause & Williams, 2003, p. 49). In epistemological relativ-
ism, “no cross-framework judgements are permissible for the content, meaning, truth, rightness, and 
reasonableness of cognitive, ethical, or aesthetic beliefs, claims, experiences or actions can only be 
determined from within a particular conceptual scheme” (Fay, 1996, p. 77). Airaksinen (1994, pp. 
10-12) states that in epistemology, the meaning of theory and practice is questioned. There are 
many different types of scientific information: practical knowledge, process knowledge, informa-
tional knowledge and theoretical knowledge (Turunen, 1990, pp. 68-83). Furthermore, the concept 
of scientific knowledge is changing; the complexity will remain. (Niiniluoto, 1996, pp. 54-66).  
  
Personal epistemology in this research follows Kvale’s ideas. Kvale (1999) states that epistemo-
logical development makes it possible to clarify the forms of validation taking place in research; a 
move from knowledge as correspondence with an objective reality to knowledge as a social con-
struction of reality involves a change in emphasis from the observation of, to a conversation and 
interaction with, a social world (Kvale, 1995). Method as a guarantor of truth dissolves; with a so-
cial construction of reality the emphasis is on the discourse of the community and communication 
of knowledge becomes significant because of aesthetics and rhetoric entering the scientific dis-
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course. Kvale’s (1999) statement is that with the modern legitimation mania receding, there is an 
emphasis on pragmatic proof through action. 
 
The concept of constructivism (Lincoln & Cuba, 2003) is still incoherent and unclear, and thus the 
social constructivist (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003) approach is a means of research, which also follows 
the study orientation throughout this research. At this stage it is reasonable to claim that using the 
social constructive concept of learning (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003) as the main idea of the analysis of 
learning does not exclude the usefulness and even necessity of other methodologies. The concept of 
constructivism is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
In the concept of the learning organisation Alasoini’s (1999, pp. 1-2) definition describes the ap-
proach of this study. Concepts and principles of the learning organisation include multiple skilful-
ness, the ability to perform multidimensional tasks by the personnel which includes rotation of tasks 
so that it supports professional and personal development, team and network-integrated ways of 
working and an empowering management practices, because those principles also include the ex-
tensive participation of personnel in the processes of development with solid and integrated co-
operation in the development of processes and products along with other organisations, clients, re-
search and educational institutions. These principles of the learning organisation also include an 
emphasis on bonus systems linked to skills: know-how, effectiveness and quality.    
 
The definition of strategic planning by Paris (2003) is a structured approach by which to anticipate 
the future. The strategic plan should chart the broad course for the entire institution for the next five 
years and it should be a process for ensuring that the budget follow the plan rather than vice versa. 
(Paris, 2003, p. 1) Strategic planning determines where an organisation is going over the next year 
or beyond, how it is going to get there and how it will know if it got there or not. The focus of a 
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strategic plan is usually on the entire organisation, while the focus of a business plan is usually on a 
particular product, service or program. (McNamara, 1999) 
 
The critical security paradigm defines security as a quality actor that is injected into issues by secu-
ritising them, which means to stage them on the political arena in a specific way, and to have them 
accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves. (Buzan, Waever & de 
Wilde, 1998, p. 204) This study combines both secure and safe, and security and safety, and uses 
the terms secure or security. This definition is broad, and as it is wider than either of the above 
mentioned separately it gives a new approach to matter at hand. This wider perspective of security 
makes it possible to combine it with strategic planning, and the learning organisation in a new way. 
 
 
1.2 Structure of the study 
 
The study is constructed both conceptually and concretely in the form presented in Figure 2. The 
world of theory has four chapters including this introduction. The world of empiria is made up of 
five chapters. This chapter views the social constructive concept of learning that defines the re-
search orientation throughout the study. This approach is justified by the academic interest of the 
study, which is directed towards the development of critical security in a learning organisation. The 
constructivist approach links the study scope to the qualitative methodology of phenomenography, 
which is discussed in chapter 6. This chapter is important for understanding the challenging triangu-
lar framework of this study, and it links this study to the theoretical context. 
 
The second chapter forms an entity from the basic assumptions of the concept of the learning or-
ganisation. This entity is examined as a learning system, referring to the volume of the leadership 
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and culture of the MOD and its indirect impacts on the entire Finnish society. This chapter includes 
the definition of the most central operating concept. The chapter also takes a look at the deep lead-
ership model and leadership as an agent of change in an organisation. This chapter is important for 
the overall scope of the study’s theoretical perspective. 
 
Figure 2. The structure of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third chapter focuses on the definition of strategic planning and seeks a framework for inter-
pretation from the latest international and traditional Finnish research fields on the relationship of 
strategic planning, thinking and management. The main components of strategic planning are sepa-
rated from each other so that strategic planning can be seen to consist of the vision, the mission, the 
position of the leader, and of decision-making. The definition of the concepts also comes close to 
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generalisation from the general concept of cluster thinking. The importance of this chapter is essen-
tial in the sense of giving the vague definition of the learning organisation a clearer and more organ-
ised form. Thus, this chapter is essential to the study for characterising the theoretical framework. 
 
The fourth chapter presents the entity of critical security, which is one of the basic foundations on 
which this research is theoretically based. The chapter begins with the definition of the concept of 
security and deals with different concepts of security while pointing toward to the new paradigm of 
security. This crucial part of the study will bring new things into sight and makes it possible to 
model security in a learning organisation, which is one of the main goals of this study. This chapter 
links the theoretical world to the empirical world of the study. 
 
The last five chapters of the research project provide the world of empiria. Chapter five begins the 
empirical part of the report and explains the study scope. The chapter shortly introduces the episte-
mological basis for the empirical part of the study. Additionally, presentation of the MOD will 
guide the continuum to the empirical world of the study. Research questions are presented in this 
chapter, and thus the chapter is a central link to the methodology. Chapter six presents the method-
ology of the study. The chapter describes data collection and analysis methods and shows the char-
acteristics of the data collection with a literature review, security surveys, interviews and observa-
tions of the study. The data analysis process with systematic analysis and phenomenographic 
evaluation deepen the academic approach. The research procedures, the method of information col-
lection and the heuristic hypotheses related to the data are presented. Bracketing data implements 
the hierarchic and structural nature of the findings and information, which is described in the next 
chapter. The methodological approach as previously explained provides the results, which are the 
aim of the study. 
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The seventh chapter presents the results and outcomes of the empirical research with responses to 
the research questions. Reflecting to the previous chapters and to the contents of the world of the-
ory, result interpretations from the findings are reported. Modelling of security on the basis of theo-
retical research forms the SSM and enables re-modelling from the basis of empirical research as one 
of the key outcomes. The summarising section creates the justification for the structural formation 
of the SSM and its empirical testing. The modelling as well as interpretations with the academic 
approach justify qualitative research, and direct the study towards the conceptions of participants. 
The developed SSM is re-modelled placing the model in a more extensive framework that supports 
organisational strategic planning needs and the personal development of the individual leader. The 
structure of the model and its contents are described in detail in this chapter. 
 
The praxis of the empirical research ends in chapter eight with observations and discourse that have 
accumulated throughout the entire research project. The chapter also includes critique on the appli-
cation of the model with reflection on the research questions. This chapter practically shows the 
constructivist orientation of the research in modelling security with the help of perceptions of MOD 
personnel. The study report ends with a discussion in chapter nine. The discussion combines the 
observations of the research process and briefly introduces the most important results. In order to 
honour the paradigmatic approach the first part of the discussion is built on the basic assumptions. 
The discussion includes a look at further research relating to strategic security and the SSM. The 
next section considers the social constructive concept of learning that defines the research orienta-
tion throughout the study. 
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1.3 The concept of constructivism 
 
Constructivism is a multidisciplinary approach that combines different academic trends from the 
viewpoint of education. Educational psychology is learning-wise a central field of the academic 
world. Through progressive pedagogics (Dewey, 1927/1954), behaviorism (Anderson & Burns, 
1989, pp. 10-34), cognitivism (Niiniluoto 1983, pp. 71-100), the humanist concept of learning (Nis-
sinen, 2001, pp. 37-38) and experiential learning (Kolb, 1984, pp. 4-19) goes the road of construc-
tivism. (Puolimatka, 1995, pp. 127-133) 
 
The constructivist approach is categorized as belonging to the qualitative research heritage. Qualita-
tive research is a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning (Shank, 2002, p. 5). Denzin 
and Lincoln (2003) define qualitative research as:  
“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It 
consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These 
practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, in-
cluding field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to 
the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic ap-
proach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natu-
ral settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, and phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them. … Qualitative research involves the studied use 
and collection of a variety of empirical materials – case study; personal experience; 
introspection; life story; interview; artefacts; cultural texts and productions; observa-
tional, historical, interactional, and visual texts – that describe routine and problematic 
moments and meanings in individuals’ lives.” (2003, p. 5).  
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The term uninvolved observer signifies an epistemological relationship between the interpreter and 
the object of the interpretation in which the interpreter is unaffected by the act of interpretation and 
thus, understanding is interpretation. (Schwandt, 2003, pp. 300-301 and p. 322) Constructivism 
considers a subject as active, and reality is formed as a result of the cognitive processes of the indi-
vidual. This view does not exclude the existence of reality outside the subject, but notes that to us it 
manifests itself in the form of the experimental structures of science. (Niemi, 1999, p. 216) 
 
Constructivism adopts relativist ontology and relativism, a transactional epistemology, and a dialec-
tical methodology, and the user of this paradigm is oriented to the creation of reconstructed under-
standings of the societal world. (Lincoln & Guba, 2003, p. 247) Social perspective theories bring 
the entire social environment, including culture and society, into the centre of the cognitive equa-
tion. The constructivist paradigm assumes “a relativist ontology (there are multiple realities), a sub-
jectivist epistemology (knower and respondent co-create understandings), and a naturalistic (in the 
natural world) set of methodological procedures” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 35). Acting and 
thinking, practice and theory, are linked in a continuous process of critical reflection and transfor-
mation. (Schwandt, 2003, pp. 294 – 295) In the constructivist paradigm terms such as credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and conformability replace the positivist criteria of internal and exter-
nal validity, reliability, and objectivity. (Denzin &Lincoln, 2003, p. 35) 
 
The basic assumptions of the constructivist approach emphasise key concepts. In constructivism the 
learner constructs knowledge and cognitive strategies, and, learning involves qualitative restructur-
ing and modification of schemata. (Lonka, 1997, p. 20; Sinkkonen, Kuoppala, Parkkinen & 
Vastamäki, 2002, p. 269) According to constructivism reality can be known by our cognitive struc-
tures. (Sinkkonen, et al., 2002, p. 269) Constructivists seem to be divided between those who ad-
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here to the possibility of an emancipatory critique and those who, in adopting the antipoetic ap-
proach, defend the value-freedom of science as a closed system. (Nissinen, 2001, p. 33) 
 
However, the concept of constructivism is incoherent. Constructionism is also called constructiv-
ism, especially in political science. In the constructionist view, the learning process is not the pas-
sive reception of a preexisting, objective reality but a process of creation in environment. Our un-
derstanding of the world is not an interpretation of what is, but a summary of attitudes formed by 
social interchanges within the present historical context. (Bandura, 1977; 1986; Rohmann, 2000, pp. 
363-364; Vygotsky, 1962; 1978) 
 
The reason for selecting constructivism as an approach in this study is that it is a critical engage-
ment with society and the academic world and their interlinked systems of knowledge. The empha-
sis is on how social actors construct their reality and the implications for social science. For con-
structivists social reality is not something outside the discourse of the academic community but is 
partly constituted by it. The critical security paradigm views systems very much in constructivist 
terms. “Defining security as a self-referential praxis must constitute radical constructivism, on the 
security axis” (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 203-204). The critical security approach is 
radically constructivist regarding security, which is a specific form of social praxis and the core 
phenomenon of this study.  
 
 
1.3.1 The constructivist concept of learning 
 
The phenomenon of human learning can be approached from many conceptual directions, with a 
number of research methods. The question is whether we are able to construct a synthesizing 
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framework in order to exploit all of these theoretical approaches, not what is right or wrong. A con-
ception for the added ability to evolve, feel, and adapt is required. Even though these theories have 
merits in explaining definite aspects of knowledge acquisition, no approach adequately addresses 
the issues of consciousness, self-awareness, and self-reflection. (Reynolds, et al., 1996, p. 93) The 
process of self-directed learning is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Boyatzis’ theory of self-directed learning (Boyatzis and Taylor, 2003, p. 231). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adults learn what they want to learn, and even if acquired temporarily, soon forget things. (Specht 
& Sandlin, 1991, pp. 196-210) “Learning is the process whereby knowledge is created through the 
transformation of experience” (Kolb, 1984, p. 38). It appears that the most sustainable behavioural 
change is intentional. Self-directed change is an intentional change in the aspect of who you are, the 
real, or who you want to be, the real, or both. Self-directed learning is self-directed change in which 
 
Discovery #1: 
My Ideal Self-
Who do I 
want to be? 
Discovery #2: 
My Real Self-
Who am I? 
Discovery #2: My 
Strengths – Where 
my Ideal and Real 
Self are similar 
Discovery #2: My 
Gaps – where my 
Ideal and Real Self 
are different 
Discovery #3: My Learn-
ing Agenda – building on 
my strengths while reduc-
ing gaps 
Discovery #4: 
New behaviour, 
thoughts, and 
feelings through 
Experimentation: 
Discovery #4: Creat-
ing and building 
new neural path-
ways through Prac-
ticing to mastery 
Discovery #5: 
Trusting Relationships that 
help, support, and encourage 
each step in the process 
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you are aware of the change and understand the process of change. (Boyatzis and Taylor, 2003, p. 
231) This perspective was chosen, because it supports the critical security approach and the strate-
gic learning perspective.  
 
This is an enhancement of the earlier models developed by Kolb, Winter, Berlew, and Boyatzis. 
(Kolb & Boyatzis, 1970a, pp. 267-289: Kolb & Boyatzis, 1970b, pp. 439-457; Kolb, Winter & Ber-
lew, 1968, pp. 453-471) The description and explanation of the process is organised around the five 
points of discontinuity. An individual might begin self-directed learning at any phase in the process, 
but it will often begin when the person experiences a discontinuity and a related epiphany, or an 
instant of consciousness, and a sense of urgency. (Boyatzis, 1994, pp. 304-323; Boyatzis, 1995; pp. 
50-94; Boyatzis & Taylor, 2003, p. 232) This model can be analysed so that: (a) knowledge is a 
transformation process, being continuously recreated, (b) knowledge is not an independent entity to 
be acquired or transmitted, (c) the process emphasises adaptation and learning as opposed to con-
tent or outcomes, (d) learning transforms experience in both its objective and subjective forms, and 
(e) leads critical aspects of the learning process. 
 
People can change on a complex set of competencies that we call emotional intelligence. These 
competencies distinguished outstanding performers in leadership and professions, and the im-
provement lasted for years. (Boyatzis, Cowen & Kolb, 1995) Learning is a self-centred process in 
which the learner selects, interprets and analyses information based on earlier information and ex-
periences. This learning process has always been connected to the situation and culture. “The inter-
active process and schemes of the learner form the basis of new structures of meaning” (Rauste-von 
Wright & von Wright, 1994, p. 15). The art of learning qualitative inquiry starts with refining basic 
skills that an individual already has (Shank 2002, p. 3). 
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A theory of self-reflection with transformative learning is needed to give an explanation on how an 
adult learner gives meanings to his own experiences and solves conflicts of meaning; how an adult 
structurally constructs his experiences and produces meanings for things. The concept of situational 
learning means a change that takes place in our way of interpreting situations. In these interpreta-
tions people may supplementarily develop their capability to deal with experiences. (Mezirow, 
1991, pp. 70  – 94) Three different types of learning are described. First, instrumental learning con-
trols and manipulates the environment. Second, communicative learning understands the meaning 
of what is being communicated. Third, reflective learning understands oneself and one’s perspec-
tives. The transformation of meaning perspectives always involves the critical reflection of the 
process of becoming critically aware of how and why our assumptions have come to restrict the 
way we observe, understand, and feel about our world and making choices upon new understand-
ings. (Mezirow, 1991, p. 167)  
 
Constructive learning from the individual’s perspective involves the most effective internalisation 
as learning is connected with continuous change and development, practice and experiments, 
evaluation and feedback. In an open process evaluation and feedback act as motors for re-
development and change.  (Vesalainen & Strömmer, 1999, pp. 113-115) Even one simple concept, 
phenomenon or thing can be interpreted, analysed and understood in many different ways and this is 
what happens in connection with learning. When analysing the results of learning, one should con-
centrate on finding out what kind of interpretations have been taken in (Patrikainen, 1997, p. 256). 
This phenomenon is an entire context in itself, from the micro level to the macro level, i.e. from the 
level of a single emotion, situation and choice of words through social interaction to a wider cul-
tural context. 
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In cultural learning there are three types of learning: imitative, instructed and collaborative. The 
theory of the importance of social cognition in the theory of cultural learning is based on under-
standing others as intentional, mental and reflective agents. In cultural learning the child does not 
learn from the adults’ actions, but through the adults’ perspective in a truly inter-subjective fashion. 
(Kruger & Tomasello, 1996, pp. 369 – 372) 
 
In the Finnish defence establishment equivalents to the constructive learning approach may be 
found in military pedagogy (MPED) defined as pedagogy for and within the armed forces. Its goal 
is the goal-oriented leadership, training and education of soldiers. The philosophical basis of MPED 
may be found in the European cultural and philosophical tradition and in American pragmatic phi-
losophy and pedagogy, which holds that in the process of human growth every experience and re-
flection form the basis for new experiences. This approach may also be called constructive learning. 
(Kangas, 1999, pp. 11-20; Rauste-von Wright & von Wright, 1994, pp. 17-20 and p. 33; Toiskallio, 
1998a, p. 16 and pp. 33-35; Toiskallio, 1998b, pp. 8-9 and 12-13; Toiskallio, 2000a, pp. 11-17) 
 
Learning to learn is an ability that must be developed alongside “normal” learning. The emotional 
dimension of an individual’s personality has to be fully taken into consideration, because develop-
ing as a leader and as an individual is a comprehensive growth process. In developing cognitive 
capabilities, an individual and a leader need thorough meta-affective capabilities as well. Everyone 
can develop the skills in learning and thinking, and the best learning methods are frequently the 
simple ones.  Looking at social change, many say that it is increasingly important to understand and 
control how to learn, rather than what to learn. (Dryden & Vos, 1997, pp. 8 – 12) 
 
In the study framework situated cognition stresses both the process that occurs in the mind, as well 
as the affordances within the environment that contribute to the formation of mental models. The 
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situation and the frequency of engagement in the situation are important variables in security 
knowledge acquisition in the MOD. Security knowledge, both everyday and academic, as a con-
struction shaped by its context is the characteristic principle for constructivism. 
 
Changes take place among values, appreciations and attitudes. Experiencing competence related to 
development influences the development of personal capabilities. (Nissinen, 2001, pp. 47–48; Tois-
kallio, 1998a, p. 29) Knowledge control in the definition of cognitive processes is tied to the entity 
of the human personality. They are not separate parts of human activity or that of security leader 
development. Acquiring competence experiences requires having opportunities for independent 
activities, and thus positive feedback related to personal development encourages the individual 
towards supplementary active duties. This connects individual knowledge and learning to organisa-
tional security learning. Thus, the creation of individual knowledge as a part of contextual organisa-
tional learning has its relevance in this study.   
 
To understand learning and the nature of knowledge is critical. Conceptions of learning and knowl-
edge are difficult to separate from each other when the research is based on a constructivist ap-
proach. (Lonka, 1997; Schwandt, 2003, pp. 294-295) The concept of learning may indicate the ba-
sic assumptions made about the nature of the learning process, or the scheme formed at the individ-
ual level about learning that directs the activities of an educator. A paradigmatic dichotomy distri-
bution of the concept of learning is based on either the empirical-behaviouristic or the cognitive-
constructive approach, and additionally, a humanist concept of learning may be distinguished by 
emphasising the importance of experiential learning.  
 
The constructive conception of learning sets new requirements for any organisation, such as the 
MOD, to apply these principles. The constructive learning process is attached to the each setting 
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and culture. The quality of social interaction in the learning process contributes to the process in 
which the individual’s meaning perspectives are constructed. This perspective means that educa-
tional planning should also envelop the circumstances under which the constructive conception of 
learning can be useful as a function of change in individual meaning perspectives. The defence es-
tablishment follows similar development in Finnish society (Kalliomaa 2004, pp. 20-21). 
 
 
1.3.2 Social constructivism 
 
Social construction is interested in how utterances work as a matter of understanding social prac-
tices and analysing rhetorical strategies in discourse. Thus, how utterances work is neither a matter 
of cognitive analysis of mental versions of the world nor a matter of the empirical analysis of con-
tent and logical analysis of relations of words and sentences. (Schwandt, 2003, p. 306) The argu-
ment that “the world is constituted in one-way or another as people talk it, write it and argue it” 
(Potter, 1996, p. 98) explicates critique for a representational theory of language and knowledge. 
Constructionism is nothing more or less than a “form of intelligibility, a selection of propositions, 
arguments, metaphors, narratives, and the like, that welcome inhibition” (Gergen, 1994a, p. 78). 
Social constructionism merely invites one to play with the possibilities and practices that are made 
coherent by various forms of relations, because: “It is human interchange that gives language its 
capacity to mean, and it must stand as the critical locus of concern” (Gergen, 1994a, pp. 263 – 264). 
 
The meaning realism is the view that meanings are fixed entities that can be discovered and that 
exist independent of the interpreter. In this respect, Gergen (1994a) and Potter (1996) with their 
social constructionist views share with philosophical hermeneutics the broad critique of meaning as 
an object, and they display an affinity with the notion of the coming into being of meaning. In epis-
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temological relativism, “no cross-framework judgements are permissible for the content, meaning, 
truth, rightness, and reasonableness of cognitive, ethical, or aesthetic beliefs, claims, experiences or 
actions can only be determined from within a particular conceptual scheme” (Fay, 1996, p. 77). 
 
It is only a short step from epistemological relativism to ontological relativism. If all we can know 
about reality depends on our particular conceptual scheme, is it not the case that reality itself can 
only be how it seems in our conceptual scheme. (Fay, 1996; Smith, 1997; Schwandt, 2003, p. 324) 
All of the presented views take the issue called meaning realism, i.e. the view that meanings are 
fixed entities that can be discovered and that exist, regardless of the interpreter. In this respect, these 
social constructionist views critique meaning as an object, and they display an affinity with the no-
tion of the coming into being of meaning. Potter (1996), Taylor (1995) and Gergen (1994a) endorse 
an expressivist-constructivist theory of language, in which language is understood as a range of 
activities in which we express and realise a certain way of being in the world. Language is seen 
neither as primarily a tool for gaining knowledge of the world as an objective process nor “as an 
instrument whereby we order the things in our world, but as what allows us to have the world we 
have. Language makes possible the disclosure of the human world” (Taylor, 1995, p. ix). 
 
Radical social constructionists, such as Gergen (1994a, 1994b) and Denzin (1997), apparently sup-
port the idea of forms of life and yet simultaneously claim that social constructionist philosophy 
leads to an improvement of the human condition. Denzin (1997) discards a realist epistemology, 
one that “asserts the accurate representations of the world can be produced, and that these represen-
tations truthfully map the worlds of real experience” (Denzin, 1997, p. 265) and defends the stand-
point of epistemologies that study the world of experience from the point of view of the historically 
and culturally situated individual. Longino (1990, 1993a, 1993b, 1996) provides a modest version 
of social constructivism, and criticises traditional epistemology for ignoring methods of discovery, 
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or heuristic biases. Longino (1993b) challenges the view that knowledge is the production of an 
individual cognitive process. If we perceive the practices of inquiry and knowledge production as 
social and accept the view that objectivity is a function of social interactions, then we can begin to 
explore how to criticise background assumptions effectively. (Longino 1993b; Schwandt, 2003, pp. 
308-309) All philosophers do not consider social constructivism as an ontological doctrine, and thus 
take no position on what sorts of things exist and what their status are. Instead the question is how 
is it that a descriptive utterance is socially or interactionally, made to appear factual, neutral, inde-
pendent of the speaker, and merely mirroring some aspect of the world. (Schwandt, 2003, p. 306) 
 
Social constructionist epistemologies aim to “overcome” representationalist epistemologies in a 
variety of ways. In a sense, we are all constructivists if we believe that the mind is active in the con-
struction of knowledge; knowing is active, which means that the mind does something with impres-
sions, forming abstractions or concepts at the very least. In this sense, constructivism means that 
human beings do not find or discover knowledge so much as we construct or make it. An individual 
invents concepts, models, and schemes to make sense of experience, and continually tests and 
modifies constructions in the light of new experience. The construction of interpretations takes 
place against a backdrop of shared understandings, practices, language, and so forth. (Schwandt, 
2003, p. 305) Social inquiry is a distinctive praxis meaning that a person makes up “theoretical” 
concerns about what constitutes knowledge, i.e. how it is to be justified, and about the nature and 
aim of social theorising. (Schwandt, 2003, pp. 294 – 295)  
 
The concept of social constructivism is incoherent, as was mentioned in chapter 1.3. Rohmann 
(2000) clarifies the unclear concept of constructivism as follows: “Social constructionism is also 
called social constructivism, especially in political science; it is thus often confused or conflated 
with constructivism, a related psychology theory associated primarily with Jean Piaget, which as-
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sumes an objective reality that we apprehend through the construction of cognitive patters in re-
sponse to environmental influences” (2000, p. 363). Social constructionism locates the mind not 
within the individual but in the individual-in-social-interaction. (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 56) 
 
However, social constructivism is an ontological doctrine, and thus, takes a position on what sorts 
of things about security exist and what their status is. Thus, in this study a descriptive utterance is 
not socially and inter-actionally made to appear stable, factual, neutral, or independent of the 
speaker, but instead a communicative and interpretive aspect of the world. Social constructivism 
with socio-cultural tendency supports our understanding with the impact of the social and cultural 
context on both individual and organisational learning. Activity is typically linked to participation 
in culturally organised practices in society, whereas constructivist perspective gives priority to indi-
viduals’ sensory-motor and conceptual performance. In general, participants of an organisation 
should have enough opportunities to interact with peers and with their more-experienced col-
leagues. An active, involved learner in a specific context is a key component in the successful learn-
ing situation. Individual centred approaches such as strategy instruction, meta-cognition, and selec-
tive attention become important aspects of successful organisational security development pro-
grams. Constructivism means that an individual as a part of an organisation does not discover 
knowledge, but instead constructs or makes it by inventing concepts, models, and schemes, by mak-
ing sense of experience, and continually testing and modifying constructions in the light of experi-
ences. The construct of interpretations reflects against a setting of shared understandings, practices, 
language, and other learning experiences. Socially an individual makes up “theoretical” concerns 
about what constitutes knowledge, i.e. how it is to be justified and about the nature and aim of so-
cial theorising.  
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The motive for selecting constructivism for the study is that constructivism involves a critical en-
gagement with society and science and their combined systems of knowledge. That is why reality is 
socially constructed with the approach of social constructivism. Social research is a practice, not 
simply a means of knowing. Hence, the practice of social research is not immune to effects of the 
central forces in the culture of modernity, such as professionalisation, technologisation, and secu-
ritisation. Thus, the terms constructionist and constructivism in this study discuss the social end of 
the continuum, because the object of the study, the MOD, is a part of Finnish society and thus is 
influenced by the changes in both the international and national environment. In the next chapter the 
learning organisation paradigm is analysed in the context of social constructivism. 
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2 THE LEARNING ORGANISATION CONTEXT 
 
 
The European Union (EU) has outlined visionary aims for developing a “knowledge based econ-
omy” (Nyhan, Cressey, Tomassini, Kelleher & Poell, 2003, p. 9) and for constructing “a European 
area of lifelong learning reality” (Nyhan, et al., 2003, p. 9). Many European development projects 
have taken place that focused on the renewal and co-operation of different participants from voca-
tional education, human resources and adult education backgrounds. European society has been 
challenged to build efficient organisations, and effective places to learn, in other words learning 
organisations (LO). (Alasoini & Kyllönen, 1998, pp. 17-45; Nyhan, et al., 2003, pp. 9-37) 
 
Technical and social development in the Western world has led, through a technological revolution, 
to an increase in information. A characteristic of this development is a continuous, accelerating 
change that is hard to predict. (MTC 4/2004) People attempt to control change in numerous ways, 
for example, with networking systems, by lowering organisations, by focusing on research, and by 
changing their management. Researches have shown that learning organisations and development-
oriented individuals have the most success in controlling change. (Nissinen, 2001, p. 125; Tichy & 
Devanna, 1986, pp. 271-280)  
 
Changes in the public sector have resulted in decentralisation, delegation, and increasing autonomy 
on a global level together with reforms in monitoring, management, financial administration and 
budgeting. The aim has been a greater orientation towards customers, flexibility, effectiveness, 
quality and savings. (Arnkil, Arnkil & Eriksson, 1998, p. 214) Organisations must emphasise two 
things: talent and environment. Innovating and changing faster than the toughest competitors 
 49 
achieve sustainable competitive advantage.  The talented driver is the leader who maintains the 
winning combination of continuous development. (Chowdhury, 2003, pp. 1 – 2) 
 
The Finnish defence establishment participates in the above-mentioned trend because the Govern-
ment has emphasised the principles of the LO and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has decided to 
be one of the pilot organisations within the public administration. The LO paradigm has a strong 
Finnish theoretical background and it has a European context. (Nyhan, et al., 2003, pp. 9-37) Thus, 
the LO is a general theoretical framework.  In order to outline the concept of a LO it is necessary to 
deal with learning, organisation, leadership and culture in relation to the environment. To support 
the formation of the concept, the micro concept of the environment must be analysed. The follow-
ing paragraphs deal with the concept of the LO environment by describing four basic dimensions in 
the complexity of conceptualising the LO. 
 
 
2.1 The concept of the learning organisation 
 
Organisation means an organised group of people, or the activity of organising something, and 
maybe even a condition or state of being organised, “organisation is an artefact of the mind that 
views it” (Culbert, 1996; Culbert & McDonough, 1985). The division of organisations by function 
shows the huge variety of possibilities of defining organisations, e.g. as human facilitators, as soci-
ety, as spiritual institutions, as political institutions, as instruments of system maintenance and en-
hancement, as change agents, as culture and counterculture, as tools of policy description, as tools 
of development, as destructive forces, as instruments of repression and domination, as alienators, as 
tension-management systems, as threats to individual rights, as the administrative state of govern-
ance, and organisations as instruments of globalisation. (Farzmand, 2002a, xv-xxvii) 
 50 
Organisations may be divided to four distinctive organisational forms: network, mercenary, frag-
mented, and communal (Goffee & Jones, 2003). In an open environment there is a direct contact to 
external change. Success takes place in relation to an organisation’s ability to anticipate, control and 
even direct that change (Kettunen, 1997, pp. 10-14). Systematic support for learning and the devel-
opment of its members is characteristic to the LO. (Jarnila, 1998, p. 132-136) 
 
Organisational theories may be categorised according to the instrumental rationality of the classical 
and neoclassical traditions; the systems theory pointing to the broader concepts of organisations 
with their rational and environmental determinism; and the critical and interpretive theories which 
focus on process and change-orientations leading to improvements in human life and society inter-
twined by organisational rationality of modern capitalism and bureaucratic order. The core of all 
these theories is the fight between organisations and individuals, as well as the organisations’ 
changing environments. (Farazmand, 2002b, p. 49)  
 
In Finland as well as abroad the LO has widely been analysed. The theory of the LO includes per-
sonnel developing their own potential capacities which are required under the meaning of learning, 
i.e. in the art and practice of collective learning. (Senge, 1999) In the 21st century the strategic de-
velopment of the LO emphasises talent and environment. (Chowdhury, 2003) The organisation 
should create a stable learning environment embracing positive challenge and a non-threatening 
setting where persons can communicate and collaborate with one another. Three capabilities are 
required from modern organisation and public services leaders: vision, dialogue, and the quality of 
communication between senior management and the organisation. (Kakabadse, 2003, pp. 56 - 57) 
  
The critical self-evaluation process in the Finnish defence establishment has analysed strategic 
change and the LO paradigm in the MOD directing the change process and generating guidelines 
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for the reorganisation process of the MOD. The result of this process showed that there was a great 
will for change, and civil servants also had the principal ability to describe the change process with 
emphasis on the three crucial elements towards the LO: openness, diffusion of innovation and learn-
ing capability. (Krogars, 2001) 
 
It is possible to speak about LOs where the characteristics are creativity, innovativeness, situation 
sensitivity, low hierarchical structures, networks, great individual freedom of action and flexible 
organisational structures and routines. (Sarala & Sarala, 2001, pp. 53-59) The needs for growth of 
the members of the organisation are satisfied more than in other environments. (Bass, 1985, pp 20-
24; Nissinen, 2001, p. 126) The widest definition of the LO used by Moilanen is: 
“A learning organisation is a consciously managed organisation with “learning” as a 
vital component in its values, visions and goals, as well as its everyday operations and 
their assessment. The learning organisation eliminates structural obstacles of learning, 
creates enabling structures and takes care of assessing its learning and development. It 
invests in leadership to assist individuals in finding the purpose, in eliminating per-
sonal obstacles and in facilitating structures for personal learning and getting feedback 
and benefits from learning outcomes” (Moilanen, 1999). 
 
“A learning company is an organisation which facilitates the learning of all of its members and con-
tinuously transforms itself” (Pedler, Burgoyne & Boydell, 1991). The key concept in the LO is 
“that of inquiry, interaction with one another on behalf of the organization to which they belong in 
ways that change the organization’s theories of memories and programmes” (Argyris & Schön, 
1978, p. 191). The LO may also mean “a system of improvement and self-improvement (enhance-
ment of competence) of individuals, groups, and the whole organisation, including their formal and 
informal purposes, structures, rules and values” (Franz, 2003, p. 64). A new agenda of the LO is 
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moving towards cross-disciplinary theories, trying to find a structure around the idea of learning in 
socially situated collective contexts. Figure 4 presents an overview of the way in which different 
strands of learning and organisational thinking might interconnect in promoting cross-disciplinary 
thinking of the LO. (Nyhan, et al., 2003, pp. 79-80)  
 
Figure 4. Making connections between “organisational” and “learning” strands of thinking (Nyhan, 
et al., 2003, p. 80). 
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The opportunity for lifelong learning provided for every participant is one of the basic criteria of the 
learning organisation. Lifelong learning covers all aspects of the individual’s personal development 
and learning throughout his the entire life, where it implies an eagerness to participate in the proc-
ess of change, an open attitude, and active pursuit of fresh knowledge. (Otala, 1998, pp. 173-176) 
Otala (1998, p. 173) characterises the learning organisation as including; (1) a shared vision and 
objectives known by every participant as a basis of all internal development, (2) participants 
knowledge and expertise to grasp the situation and the path to the organisation’s objectives, and (3) 
shared values, which guide all activities and success is based on behaviour according to the values.  
 
The concept of the LO includes the individual’s opportunity for lifelong learning covering all as-
pects of his personal development and learning, implying an enthusiasm for participating in the 
process of change and an open attitude. The definition of the LO includes: a shared vision, objec-
tives known by every participant, knowledge and expertise to take hold of situations, and shared 
values guiding activities. Success is based on behaviour according to the values. Simultaneously, 
critics explore that the LO is an untested theory-no empirical results exist and that it is idealism 
with broadness and holistic aim. Cultural dimensions affect the learning organisation’s leadership 
style, as well as its followers’ wishes, motivational needs, values, beliefs, and attitudes. 
 
Even though the viewpoint is individual-oriented to the concept of the organisational environment, 
the environment is the physical and intellectual-cultural environment in which an individual leader 
functions. Observations influence the formation of meaning perspectives, where the environment, 
activities and the consciousness of the leader are in continuous interaction. The level of interaction 
is connected to the influence of his environment. The concept of environment includes not only 
external factors but also situational and contextual factors, i.e. the meaning perspectives are tied 
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together as broader operating schemes. Thus, the next chapter will handle the concept of leadership 
in more detail, also for the reason that it is a vital phenomenon in the concept of organisation. 
 
 
2.2 The concept of leadership 
 
Leadership is a personal issue about the use of oneself to be influential, persuasive, and embody the 
organisational vision. (Burke, 2003, p. 296) “Leadership is an influence process that is non-coercive 
in nature and produces acceptance or commitment on the part of organizational members to courses 
of action that contribute to the organisation’s effectiveness” Vroom (2003, p. 70).  
 
The interpretations of leadership may be listed. First, leadership is seen, as a distinct kind of effort 
that may, or may not, be required according to the demands of the conditions. Second, leadership is 
similar to a strong drive that spurs the human being to act, and consequently has nothing to do with 
position, authority, or holding office. According to the third interpretation, leadership is not always 
essential, as good management can likewise accomplish gradually achieved success. Fourth, leader-
ship is linked to the execution of power, and a vision can be realised throughout the mobilisation of 
resources. According to the fifth understanding, the effective exercise of leadership requires broad 
potential, in that the knowledge of products, services, and markets, and the application of functional 
skills must be matched by drive, power, and a wide-ranging intellectual competence for problem 
solving. Sixth, effective leaders need to be powerful motivators of people. The seventh claim is that 
being an effective leader call for developed and accustomed conceptual skills, so that one can mark 
potential possibilities, analyse and express them, and roll them into future opportunities. The eighth 
version stresses effective leaders as having evolved sound judgement, concerning concentration to 
detail, conceptualisation, and intuition, all of which are attributes that do not easily co-exist. The 
 55 
ninth says leadership demands the progress of key aspects of character and assessment aim with 
conscience, so that the individual can connect drive with the wish to be held fully in charge of his or 
her words and actions. According to the tenth interpretation effective leaders need to possess suffi-
cient humility so as to foster the wisdom that will enable them to work their way through the ambi-
guities and paradoxes that they will inevitably face. (Kakabadse, 2003, p. 52) 
 
Exceptional leaders aim towards controlled extroversion and have a great deal of physical energy. 
(Goleman 1998; Hogan, Curphy & Hogan, 1994, pp. 493-504) Most successful leaders also feel 
that they have control over the events in their lives - internality. (Kets de Vries, 2000) The new 
view of leadership in the LO centres is vital. Leaders are designers, stewards, and teachers respon-
sible for building organisations where people continually expand their capabilities to understand 
complexity, clarify vision, and improve shared mental models. This means that leaders are respon-
sible for learning. (Senge, 1990, p. 340) The leader’s responsibility is to ensure that a sound plan-
ning process occurs, and thus the leader’s role is to create a structure for planning, and to participate 
fully in the process. (Paris, 2003, pp. 9-10) 
 
Leadership is connected to context and culture. Change is related to the reshaping of at least prag-
matic values, and conceptually movement from the behaviourist concept of learning to the critical 
constructivist approach. The old paradigm of leadership describes how to lead, and the new para-
digm of leadership describes how to learn to lead. (Nissinen, 2001, pp. 25-26) The new Deep Lead-
ership Model (DLM) concept in military command attempts to move the emphasis of leadership 
from ordering and strict control of those orders to leadership, under which subordinates commit 
themselves to the task at hand. The DLM consists of the constructivist framework of leadership 
behaviour, and includes those dimensions that can be evaluated in a reliable manner with external 
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feedback. The structure of the DLM involves three main dimensions and 10 factors. (Nissinen, 
2001, pp. 218-225) The DLM is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The Deep Leadership Model (DLM) (Nissinen, 2001, p. 219). 
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feedback must in his own development process become aware of the demands presented by the 
feedback on the reviewing of his values and attitudes. (Malmivuori, 2001, pp. 139-149) 
 
From the main factors of deep leadership building trust and confidence offers a behavioural model 
to the subordinates. Trust is built by putting the needs of their subordinates above his or her own 
needs and that risks are considered as shared. The ethical and moral basis is strong and it empha-
sises honesty, fairness and impartiality. Thus, the deep leader rarely uses his or her legitimate power 
only and never does so to seek his own advantage. With inspirational motivation from the leader 
gets the subordinates find new meaning, new features and challenges in their work. Subordinates 
are included in goal visioning and confidence in the future coupled with optimism strengthens their 
ability to function. Intellectual stimulation encourages creativity and supports innovation. The 
leader shows this by questioning the basic assumptions, by seeking new possible solutions to prob-
lems and by showing new approaches to work. Individualised consideration shows the positive con-
ception of people, genuine interest in subordinates as human beings. In the end the leader is a coach 
with individual interaction, recognising the individual’s needs and developing growth while also 
accepting individual differences. (Nissinen, 2001, pp. 219-222) 
 
Leadership is a process that has constructive change as its role, while management is considered a 
process responsible of achieving results in key sectors. Leadership usually includes a vision and a 
strategy to achieve that vision, both of which are communicated to people in an comprehensible 
manner so that they believe in it. Encouraging and motivating working conditions clear obstacles 
from their way towards the goal. Efficient leadership creates change benefiting the entire organisa-
tion. (Kotter, 1988, pp. 7-12; Senge, et al., 2002, pp. 65-68; Puolamäki, 2004, pp. 43-53) 
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Success in an open environment sets demands on an organisation’s leadership culture. Changes in 
the defence establishment mean partially that more and more leaders have to meet the requirements 
of an open environment. An increase of expertise, structural changes, globalisation and the demand 
for social transparency are some of the elements in an open operating environment. (Krogars, 2000, 
pp. 25-26) It is also argued that leadership is a non-hierarchical concept; leaders can and should be 
found throughout organisations. Furthermore, a key leadership mission is the maintenance and 
modification of culture to an organisation’s changing environment. Finally and consequently, the 
role of leaders is to be the embodiment of the organisation’s culture. Their behaviour will be closely 
observed so as to see if they merely pay lip service to the key values of the culture or whether they 
practice them. (Goffee & Jones, 2000; 2003, p. 274) These ideas link this study’s approach to the 
culture of the LO, and, hence, culture is analysed in the following paragraph. 
 
Consequently, the definition of leadership concentrating on describing the significance of leadership 
in relation to organisational effectiveness (Kotter, 1988) is presented. Leadership can be understood 
as a personal issue using oneself influentially, persuasively, and representing organisational vision. 
Leadership is seen as an authority process that produces acceptance and commitment from the or-
ganisation’s members to contribute to the organisation’s effectiveness. 
 
The use of the term the leadership instead of management, even though in Finnish they are both 
translated as “johtaminen”, describes the development process of an organisation. As thus, devel-
opment of an organisation is defined as the learning process of the individuals, groups, leaders, or-
ganisation and partners. Additionally, strategic level planning combines strategic leadership and a 
wide range security approach within the learning organisation. Despite military leadership levels 
(Nissinen, 2001), policy making at a political level is above the military. The DLM can also be 
criticised for including control and correction with passive leadership in the structure, which should 
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not be a part of the model. There may be alternatives for the model, but not for parts of it, and they 
may even be considered as non-leadership. Additionally, satisfaction with outcomes is an idealistic 
hypothesis, because on the basis of personal experience this is not at all the case. Many things other 
than leadership may influence satisfaction, and by itself, satisfaction is thus not necessarily a direct 
consequence of either good or bad leadership. It is especially unclear whether or not satisfaction 
should be achieved at every level of the organisation, because new developments and critical 
awareness of them typically cause dissatisfaction at the very beginning of the process of change. 
Additionally, the theoretical connection of the DLM to constructivism is unclear, as was mentioned 
in chapter 1.3. Instead of a constructivist approach, the context of social constructionism (Roh-
mann, 2000, 363-364) could be more suitable to the DLM. The DLM is used as a foundation for 
modelling the leadership of security in chapter 7, because the DLM: being used in the Finnish De-
fence Forces (FDF); based on the constructivist approach; developed through the scientific process; 
empirically tested and developed; having international relevance; expanded outside of the military 
to both the public and private sectors in Finland, is useful both at the strategic and the operational 
levels.  
 
 
2.3 The concept of culture 
 
Culture is a complex concept and because it is sometimes too elusive for stressed employees to 
grasp there is a need to develop a framework for the analysis of organisational culture. This frame-
work is based on the view that shared values, attitudes, behaviour, and assumptions are shaped by 
different sets of organisational relationships. Consequently, mainly from the classical sociological 
literature, a response has emerged to the widespread division of work associated with the emer-
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gence of modern societies, and so, the key concepts are those of sociability and solidarity. (Goffee 
& Jones, 2003, p. 274)  
 
An organisation’s culture is defined as including those habitual, taken-for-granted assumptions 
about how things get done around the workplace, which is the single most sustainable sources of 
competitive advantage. (Goffee & Jones, 1998.) “Culture is the collective expression of human 
needs and actions, so it sits like a landscape over the bedrock of our psychology” (Sperber, 1996). 
Organisational culture is the most stable and deepest structure of the environment. Structural re-
forms do not necessarily lead to a designed result if the ways of thinking of the people working in 
an organisation and the functioning culture do not change (Schein, 1992, pp. 211-213). 
 
The communal culture is seen where innovation requires extensive and multifaceted working as a 
team across functions and locations. Teamwork is geared towards achieving quantifiable synergies 
and possibilities across organisational sub-units. Strategies are long-term and developing rather 
than the amount of assessable stages. In the communal culture the environment is energetic and 
complex, requiring many interfaces with the setting and a higher ability for internal organisational 
information processing. (Goffee & Jones, 2003, pp. 280-282)  
 
In the organisational cultural context sociality refers, above all, to affective relations between indi-
viduals, who are likely to see one another as friends. Thus, individuals tend to share certain ideas, 
attitudes, interests, and values and are inclined to associate on equal terms. In essence, sociability 
represents a type of social interaction, which is valued for its own sake, and it is typically main-
tained through ongoing, face-to-face relations characterised by high levels of implicit reciprocity. 
There are no pre-arranged “deals” and individuals help each other “with no strings attached”. (Gof-
fee & Jones, 2003, p. 275) Solidarity, in contrast to sociability, describes task-focused, mission-
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oriented co-operation between individuals and groups, but it does not necessarily depend upon 
close friendship or even personal acquaintance, nor do continuous social relations necessarily sus-
tain it. Solidarity is displayed instrumentally and discontinuously, as when a perceived need arises. 
By contrast to sociability, solidarity expression is both intermittent and contingent. (Goffee & 
Jones, 2003, p. 275) 
 
Many victoriously fast-growing organisations have been built in the order of a communal culture. 
Such cultures may be prone to what is identified as the “paradox of success” meaning the tendency 
to carry on with behaviours even when they cease to be suitable to the context. (Audia, Locke & 
Smith, 2000, pp. 837-853) Promoting a learning culture in an organisation entails the approval of a 
new form of leadership, which raises intangible resources such as willingness to collaborate in shar-
ing knowledge throughout the organisation. This has to be forwarded in the course of winning peo-
ple’s commitment rather than the mere establishment of structures. (Nyhan, et al., 2003, p. 71) 
 
Concept of culture has two misconceptions. The first is thinking that there are correct cultures, be-
cause there are only appropriate cultures. This means that no generically correct culture exists, only 
such ones that are suited to the particular environment of a business and to the complexity of its set 
of values. The second, is believing that organisations on their own can develop certain cultural 
characteristics, because if that were the case then an organisation’s success would be assured.  
(Goffee & Jones, 2003, p. 274) 
 
In spite realism in fragmented organisational culture in some contexts, the communal organisation 
may be viewed as idealistic. This is because solidarity alone constructs a very instrumental organ-
isational orientation. Co-operation may be engaged the very instant when it is not potential for par-
ticipants to identify the communal advantages. On the contrary, organisations that are characterised 
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foremost by sociability may lose their logic or reason. Critics emphasise organisations’ capability to 
be overly tolerant of poor performance and probably content with it, and thus, the communal or-
ganisation has much to improve. The idealistic approach shapes the narrative on innovative, high-
performance learning organisations. Idealistically, it is seen as the culture at the core of the success 
of the LO, because it is strictly connected to the leadership of the organisation, to the performance 
of the organisation, to the development of the organisation and to the productivity of the organisa-
tion. Consequently, culture is a key pillar in the LO and in this study process, too. 
 
However, the learning culture may be an unachievable goal for many organisations. Those attaining 
the learning form often find it too complex to sustain due to a number of probable explanations. 
High levels of solidarity are often created around owner-founders or leaders. The learning culture 
may be hard to sustain in the condition of expansion, diversification, and internationalisation. A 
fundamental anxiety may exist between the relationships of culture that makes the common corpo-
ration essentially uneven, and in effect, friendships can weaken effective efficiency  or vice versa. 
 
 
2.4 Challenges for the learning organisation 
 
The thinking around the learning organisation (LO) in Europe has developed towards a European 
social model focusing on educational and humanistic dimensions. The intention is to create com-
petitive activities by enabling organisations to become more effective and to enable members of 
organisations to find meaning in what they are doing. Allowing individuals to gain benefits and to 
enhance the quality of people’s learning also creates competitive activities. The LO must constantly 
be sustained through developmental processes involving all parts of an organisation and its partners, 
because it is socially constructed.  
 63 
 
The LO, as the emerging paradigm, is criticised from the rapid miracle perspective. This criticism 
includes the thinking of leaders that believe following a programmed formula is all they have to do. 
(Brown & Keep, 2003) The reality is, however, different because leaders need to build a vision for 
an organisation, which is based on commonly accepted aims, shared meanings and values and to 
take into consideration the contextual environment supporting the sense of organisational identity 
both within and outside the organisation. The task of the leader is to provide a learning space, a con-
text for the necessarily repeated reinterpretation of goals so that structures can become accustomed 
to the space. However, there is a risk that leaders’ focus shift from one externally proposed struc-
tural change to another in a hopeless attempt to get better competence. (Kotter, 1988) Implementa-
tion of change and learning in an organisation is diagrammed in three levels in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Three interdependent levels at which learning must take place to implement organisational 
learning (Nyhan, et al., 2003, p. 47). 
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flects the realism of an organisation that is not agreeable to change. The competitiveness and effi-
ciency of an organisation is closely determined by a multidimensional network of contextual influ-
ences, with a mix of the old and the new, of harmony and the uneven.  
 
The LO’s collective body of knowledge has nearly everyone’s contribution in the organisation, be-
cause this knowledge comprises the collective thinking of all persons who have created it, or who 
are sustaining it. This culture forms a collective mindset. The LO attempts to deal with social objec-
tives in a balanced way by catering to the needs of different interests within an organisation, where 
the balance has to be created between the interests of the individuals and the interests of the organi-
sation. A “both/and” strategy for leaders is that they must notice the informal, intangible and sub-
jective dimensions in an organisation as well as the formal, tangible and objective aspects.    
 
Critics (Nyhan, et al., 2003, p. 12) view the learning organisation as being embedded in a dogmatic 
business-school management concept that is founded on unsympathetic economic principles of or-
ganisational value. They criticise the use of cultural and psychological theories for modern man-
agement to maximise reimbursement. Management is not interested in ensuring individual learning 
profit for the members of the organisation. Nyhan, et al. (2003, p. 12) toughens this criticism into a 
sense of being let down by the non-fulfilment of the positive forecasts concerning the emergence of 
more human-centred organisation that would improve the quality of life for everybody. They indi-
cate that the reality for many people is a rebirth of the old culture possibly masked in the form of 
“lean-production” or “flexible working”. (Nyhan, et al., 2003, p. 12) The LO approach is also criti-
cised by claiming that the supporters build a vision-based or a holistic learning organisation.  
“This group is neither a group of tested theories nor self-evident empirical results, and 
the ideas categorized in this group seem to be more idealistic than realistic because of 
their broadness and their holistic aim. It is hard to prove that these types of learning 
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organisations exist, but it does not decrease the value of the thoughts categorized into 
this group” (Moilanen, 2001a, 16). 
 
Extreme critics (Sennett, 1998) regard it as being nothing more than an effort by management to 
deceive people into becoming “organisational men and women”. For these it is a discredited con-
cept and merely a controlling device (Sennett, 1998). This aspect is related to a sense of disap-
pointment for not being allowed to create more autonomy and freedom of performance. It is also 
forecasted of being used as a tool for the introduction of new types of control. 
 
Some critics reject the learning organisation concept as nothing more than a de-contextualised the-
ory, which has been popularised in management literature as a recipe for immediate success (Fisher, 
2003). There may also be critics from whom the lack of evidence of examples of organisations in an 
empirical confirmable manner (Fischer, 2003) and the execution of learning organisation theory is 
cited as a motive for discrediting the conceptual validity or usefulness of the concept (Cressey & 
Kelleher, 2003). Despite the arguments about the validity of the learning organisation concept, it is 
seen to be out of date with regards to the interest in it and it is being replaced by theories of knowl-
edge management (Brown & Keep 2003). The LO paradigm may be argued to be such a holistic 
concept that it “can easily remain at the level of a good guess or, then, become a valuable construct” 
(Moilanen, 2001a). The learning organisation needs to be some kind of a systematic whole.  
 
Organisational human sustainability is the involvement of the organisation in developing the capa-
bilities of its workforce members, employees, creating a just, equitable, and healthy workplace. 
Those members who have some stake in the future of the organisation contributes to the welfare of 
the outside neighbourhood. Organisational performance, rather than job security or work satisfac-
tion, has become the central drive of organisation change agents. The new challenge for change 
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agents is to make available organisation leaders with a design for the way forward as we redesign 
organisations for the 21st century. As a change agent an organisation leader explores the possible of 
sustainable practices for improving organisational performance, construction of human capability, 
and contributing to society development. This is the new task for change agents; to help reshape the 
organisation to attain outstanding performance that in fact contributes to the execution of human 
needs on a healthy globe.  
 
Creating the paradigm of leadership inside an organisation means educating leaders who learn lo-
cally, but act globally. From this perspective, it is not so easy to separate the organisation mind and 
bulk extended out over the globe. However, most organisations need to pursue both horizontal and 
vertical synergies; therein lays the paradox. In spite of this paradox, this wide range approach is 
useful in the strategic security modelling procedure, because these are the features met in critical 
security, strategic planning and learning organisation aspects. Consequently strategic planning is 
analysed in chapter 3 and critical security is presented in chapter 4. 
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3 STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE MOD 
 
 
This chapter reviews aspects on strategic planning. A variety of perspectives, models and ap-
proaches are applied in strategic planning, but in this study it is considered from the framework of 
the learning organisation (LO). Strategic planning might be started by articulating the organisation's 
vision and values and then by planning how to achieve the vision while adhering to those values. 
Some plans are scoped for one year, many from five to ten years into the future. Some plans include 
only top-level information and no action plans. (McNamara, 1999) 
 
The need for strategic thinking has been increasing in the public sector, because more and more 
customer service and qualitative aspects have been required. Domestic and international, public, 
private and non-profit, and educational and economic policies are examples of formerly distinct 
arenas that are now very much interconnected (Bryson, 1988). The blurring of these distinctions 
means that although many organisations and institutions are involved, no one is fully in charge. 
These findings emphasise strategic thinking from a cluster perspective as never before.   
 
The way a strategic plan is developed depends on the nature of the organisation's leadership, culture 
of the organisation, complexity of the organisation's environment, size of the organisation, and, for 
example, on the expertise of planners. Strategic planning models (Niven 2003; Paris 2003) may 
include goal-based (McNamara, 1999), issue-based (McNamara, 1999), organic, and scenario, even 
though scenario planning (Krogars, 1998b) is more a technique than a model. Goal-based planning 
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(McNamara, 1999) is probably the most common one and starts by focusing on the organisation's 
mission, vision and/or values, goals which function toward the mission, strategies by which to 
achieve the goals, and action planning in the meaning of who will do what and by when. Issue-
based strategic planning (McNamara, 1999) often starts by examining issues facing the organisa-
tion, strategies to address those issues, and action plans. 
 
One of the major reasons for going through a planning process is to help focus the efforts of an or-
ganisation. In a representative democracy model (Krogars, 1998b; Mintzberg, 1994) everyone can 
participate in some phase of the process of planning even though every individual in an organisation 
cannot participate in every phase of the planning process. In this model a sample of personnel se-
lected to represent the whole group is charged with developing the strategic plan. In strategic plan-
ning it is constructive to prioritise strategic directions and goals on an annual basis, focusing first on 
the actions that tend to drive the others, because there may be a lot of interactivity among them. 
Strategic planning requires a willingness to focus resources, and thus it is unlikely that an organisa-
tion would continue doing everything it had done in the past in the same way if the organisation was 
serious about planning strategically. The core in the model is the strategic vision of the organisa-
tion. All perspectives must support the strategic vision, and each perspective relates to the others 
through the central vision driving the organisation.  
 
 
3.1 The concept of strategic planning    
 
Strategy is a “plan”, which includes the concept or the idea of how the organisation aims to achieve 
its goals. (Kuitunen, Ilomäki, Simons & Valjakka, 2003, p. 47) Planning, in the English language, is 
understood to mean: an action or process of an idea; or a method that has been thought about in 
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detail in advance; or an outlined drawing of a structure, showing the position and size of the various 
parts in relation to each other. (Crowther, Kavangh & Ashby, 1999, p. 881) “Planning is a formal-
ised procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions” 
(Mintzberg, 1994, p. 12). This approach links the strategy of the MOD to this study. A comprehen-
sive definition of strategy is defined: 
“strategy determines and reveals the organisational purpose in terms of long-term ob-
jectives, action programs, and resource allocation priorities; selects the businesses the 
organisation is in, or is to be in; attempts to achieve a long-term sustainable advantage 
in each of its businesses by responding appropriately to the opportunities and threats 
in the firm’s environment, and the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation; iden-
tifies the distinct managerial tasks at the corporate, business, and functional levels; is a 
coherent, unifying, and integrative pattern of decisions; defines the nature of the eco-
nomic and non-economic contributions it intends to make its stakeholders; is an ex-
pression of the strategic intent of the organisation; is aimed at developing and nurtur-
ing the core competencies of the firm; is a means for investing selectively in tangible 
and intangible resources to develop the capabilities that assure a sustainable competi-
tive advantage” (Hax & Majluf, 1996, p. 14).  
 
The concept of strategy is generally understood to mean a plan designed for a particular purpose, or 
the process of planning something. It has been also used in the meaning of carrying out a plan in a 
skilful manner. The concept of strategy is especially connected to the military in the meaning of the 
art of planning and directing military activity in a battle or war. (Krogars, 1998, p. 30)  
 
Strategic planning is a structured approach to anticipating the future and “exploiting the inevitable” 
(Paris, 2003, p. 1). The strategic plan should chart the broad course for the entire institution for the 
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next five years, and it is a process for ensuring that the budget follows the plan rather than vice 
versa. A strategic plan can guide retrenchment and reallocation, thus strategic planning is not just a 
plan for growth and expansion. (Koivisto, 2004, pp. 57-61; Paris, 2003, p. 1) 
Strategic planning may also be defined as an ongoing non-stop learning process; and an organisa-
tional discourse extending beyond attaining a set of predetermined goals; aiming to change the way 
an organisation thinks and operates; and creating a learning organisation. (Lerner, 1999) Conse-
quently, an argument may arise that no organisation can remain static for long. (Paris, 2003, pp. 2-
4) Learning may be connected to the strategic planning process as showed in Figure 7. This educa-
tional interpretation on defining strategic planning is a challenging effort in the traditionally ori-
ented defence establishment ruled by military strategists and social politicians. 
 
Figure 7. The strategic planning process model (Lerner, 1999). 
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A prescriptive school of thought divides strategy formation into three groups: design, planning and 
analytical. (Mintzberg, 1994) The design school is known for its SWOT tool, identifying internal 
strengths (S) and weaknesses (W), and external opportunities (O) and threats (T). (Mintzberg, 1990, 
1994; Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999) The planning school allocates most of the design school’s 
grounds, but relies more on formal procedures of planning and concentrates more on the process 
than on the substance of strategies. (Ansoff, 1988) The analytical school known as the positioning 
school emphasises the content of the strategies typically using matrices. (Porter, 1980) Krogars 
(1998a, 1998b, 2000) has analysed strategic change and leadership in the Finnish defence estab-
lishment. There must be more and more networking between the Finnish defence establishment and 
other international and national organisations. These results get support from the research con-
ducted by Krogars and Ojala (1999).  
 
In strategic planning the group strives for consensus beginning with individuals, small groups, and 
then with a cluster as a whole. Philosophically this support is based on the individual belief that by 
supporting this option there is sufficient chance to express one’s own opinion during conversations 
and thus, this alternative is the best one for us. A skilled facilitator can assist the group by refusing 
to conglomerate too many ideas. (Paris, 2003, p. 9; Sädevirta, 2004, pp. 116-118) “It is strategic 
thinking and acting that are important, not strategic planning” (Bryson, 1988, p. 2). 
 
There are differences between strategic planning and long-range planning, because conventional 
planning tends to be oriented toward looking at challenges based on current understanding; or an 
inside-out mind-set; or tends to maintain the status quo over time. (Arnkil, Arnkil & Eriksson, 1998, 
pp. 214-242; Paris, 2003, pp. 4 – 5) Strategic planning is much more sensitive to the external envi-
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ronment than long-range planning. The model in Figure 8 particularly relies on information from 
internal and external stakeholders regarding their needs, expectations and requirements as the foun-
dation for planning. (McNamara, 1999; Paris, 2003, pp. 4 – 5) Strategic planning allows the organi-
sation to focus on dynamic, continuous activities of self-analysis processes. (Lerner, 1999; Koivisto, 
2004, pp. 57-61) The humanistic feature is also the focus of this study, and consequently the model 
in Figure 8 reflects optimistic confidence in intellectual synthesis where people of good will plan 
together in a given structure. The results are far superior to what any individual alone in the group 
could generate.  
 
Figure 8. The strategic planning model (Paris, 2003, p. 3). 
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Strategic planning creates a broad decision-making group, which actively involves operational lev-
els of management. (Sädevirta, 2004, pp. 116-118) The security strategic planning process is an 
integrated part of the holistic organisational strategic process. “Improving an organisation’s per-
formance is not just a matter for top management” (Warren, 2003, p. 10). Being involved in the 
planning process contributes to employees’ commitment to mutual goals and a sense of organisa-
tional unity creating similarly external advocacy for the organisation. (Åberg, 1997, p. 47 and p. 
153) From the information point of view strategic planning needs a human being, “a situation offi-
cer”, and between different organisations and different information contents common processes and 
knowledge structures are essential. (Kuusisto, 2004, pp. 99-110) 
 
Five ingredients for an effective strategic planning process are: the right people, good data, prepara-
tion, a structured process, and adequate resources of time and economical resources. (Paris, 2003, p. 
7) The strategic planning process includes the working processes of planning, documentation, ex-
periencing and evaluation. (Kuitunen, et al., 2003, p. 47) 
 
Strategic planning is the process of identifying common directions for the organisation, based on 
needs of the external and internal stakeholders, and in a quality environment, where all participants 
share some common understandings and commitments relative to what they wish to accomplish 
together for their stakeholders. However, this does not mean that entrepreneurial activity cannot 
take place, but it does mean that there is some minimal level of shared effort and some common 
directions. Greater collaboration can yield enormous benefits for the individuals in the organisation.  
 
From the strategic leadership point of view strategic management may be summed up as an incor-
porated management (Koivisto, 2004, pp. 57-61) approach joining all the individual elements in-
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volved in planning, implementing and controlling an organisation strategy. It demands an under-
standing of the long-term goals and objectives of the organisation, so to say where it wants to go. It 
needs a broad analysis of the current and future environment in which the organisation operate, so 
as to say where it is. The analysis contains all existing and potential internal operations and re-
sources of the organisation, but equally importantly, aspects of its environment. One of the connec-
tions between strategic planning and continuous quality improvement is reliance on data as founda-
tion for decision-making. On the other hand, strategic planning is more likely to result in a deliber-
ate shift in direction, or refocusing of mission in light of changes, actual or anticipated. Strategic 
planning, however, is developed around a vision of success, or a vision of the desired future. Thus, 
this idealised word picture represents the best possible situation for the organisation and the plan 
helps to make this shared vision a reality. (Koivisto, 2004, pp. 57-61; Paris, 2003, pp. 4 – 5)  
 
However, strategic planning has pitfalls containing false arguments, because, according to many 
studies, in many cases planning does not contribute to the commitment, plans do not promote 
change and plans are inflexible. Due to the fact that planning may be seen as a political process, not 
objective and neutral, planning supports the illusion of control. Assumptions about predetermina-
tion of the future, detachment of the strategy from operations, and formalisation of strategy proc-
esses are still prevailing mistaken beliefs. The fallacies are implemented by organisations when they 
use existing planning procedures by arguing that organisations engage in formal planning not to 
create strategies but to program the strategies they already have. Thus, the organisations formally 
elaborate and operationalise their consequences. (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 333).  
 
Because of the external context the MOD is vigorously changing, including security aspects, and 
because strategic planning is more sensitive to the changes than long-range planning, this approach 
affords proper support to this research. Thus, strategic planning is applied in the MOD. Addition-
 75 
ally, the principle of strategic planning where the process is more important than the plan itself is 
similarly modified as one of the basic philosophies of modelling security in chapter 7. This chapter 
will certainly provoke debate in the traditionally oriented defence establishment ruled by military 
strategists and social politicians, due to the educational interpretation on defining strategic planning. 
 
 
3.2 What is the Balanced Scorecard? 
 
The balanced scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) is a theory of strategy based on measure-
ment and leadership. However, with a vague theoretical background it is more a tool or a model 
than a theory. (Anttila & Paavola, 1998) The MOD selected the BSC for its approach in strategic 
leadership for the development of efficiency of the organisation. The use of the BSC as a tool for 
strategic leadership in the ministries in Finland has been analysed, and it was found that the BSC 
has generated more concrete strategies and added several dimensions for the functions of the minis-
tries, even though ministries are just in the beginning of the implementation of the BSC process 
(Kinnunen, 2000). However, the Finnish defence establishment does not have enough capabilities to 
begin to apply the BSC as a leadership tool for the whole organisation (Kangaste, 2002). 
 
Strategy is at the core of the BSC system. Strategy is about the broad priorities an organisation 
plans to pursue in order to achieve its mission. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, pp. 29 – 32; Niven, 2003, 
p. 2) This approach links both strategy and the BSC of the MOD to this study. 
 
Strategic learning is the capacity for organisational learning at the executive level (Kaplan & Nor-
ton, 1996). This is seen as the most innovative aspect of the BSC, because strategic learning means 
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the use of the scorecard as a strategic management system (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, pp. 261 – 268). 
Thus the BSC is modified with strategic planning in this study. 
BSC modelling provides an opportunity to evaluate the tasks of the MOD, and is also seen as a 
comprehensive approach with new effects on the organisation (Määttä & Ojala, 2000). Previously, 
strategic planning and the theory of the LO were combined (Salonen, 2002). The theory of the LO, 
strategic planning and critical security thinking are combined in this research.   
 
The BSC is a tool to help an organisation and a leader translate strategy into action; it is a means to 
align the strategic actions and strategic plans by integrating it to the organisation’s control system. 
(Puolamäki, 2004, p. 68) The BSC starts from the organisation’s vision and strategies, where criti-
cal success factors are defined. Measures are constructed aiding target-setting and performance 
measurement in areas critical to the strategies. Hence, the BSC is a performance measurement sys-
tem, derived from vision and strategy, and reflecting the important aspects of the business. The BSC 
concept supports strategic planning by federating the actions of all parts of an organisation around a 
common understanding of its goals, and by facilitating the assessment and upgrading of strategy. 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996, pp. 1-20; Niven, 2003, pp. 1-4) The real power of the BSC is transforming 
from a measurement to a management system. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, pp. 1-20)  
 
The BSC recommends broadening the measures to include four different perspectives: 1) Financial 
perspective, how do we perceive our shareholders? How is our financial performance? 2) Customer 
perspective, how do we perceive our customers? How do we monitor our customer knowledge? 3) 
Process perspective, in what processes should we excel to succeed? How do perform our internal 
business processes? and 4) Learning and innovation perspective, how will we sustain our ability to 
change and improve? How do we provide learning and growth? (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, pp. 1 - 20; 
Niven, 2003, pp. 1 - 4) 
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The BSC is a very useful tool for target setting and performance follow-up for government organi-
sations (Koistinen, 2002). Consequently, there is a modification of the generic BSC model for cen-
tral government organisation levels, from the ministry and its departments to agencies and local 
offices or local government units (Koistinen, 2002). This study emphasises potential government–
specific adaptations of the BSC, because the study’s object is the MOD, as a part of the Govern-
ment and its status in the public sector.  
“Usually the government organisations tend to prefer operational excellence strategy. 
This means that the BSCs are often used as critical success factor scorecards for moni-
toring the operations in a balanced way. Strategy maps for government organisations 
are similar to strategy maps for private companies with the difference of having im-
pact to the community as the final goal of financial results” (Koistinen 2002). 
 
In the profit model all of the measures appearing on the BSC should lead to improved bottom line 
performance, and improving shareholder value is the end game (Kaplan, 2002). An organisation, 
such as, the MOD exists to serve a higher purpose, for example: “increasing public safety and secu-
rity” (Niven, 2003, pp. 1-2). A public actor will not necessarily achieve its mission overnight, and 
in fact may see only periodic movement, thus the other perspectives of the BSC are so vital. Moni-
toring performance, and learning from the results, in the customer, internal process, employee learn-
ing and growth, and financial perspectives will provide an organisation with the short to medium 
term information required to guide an organisation ever closer to achievement of the mission. (Kap-
lan & Norton, 1996, p. 21; Niven, 2003, p. 2) 
 
Impact perspective presents the results of a government organisation, and this is comparable to the 
financial results of the private sector (Koistinen, 2002). The “customer” perspective may include 
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several different stakeholders, for example, citizens or other government organisations, depending 
on the operations of the government organisation. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, pp. 26 – 28; Kaplan, 
2002; Niven, 2003, p. 3) Organisational learning and growth come from three sources. These 
sources are people, systems, and organisational procedures. Non-profit and public sector agencies 
operate as mission-based organisations. Thus, they rely heavily on the skills, dedication, and align-
ment of their staff to achieve their socially important goals. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, pp. 28-29; 
Niven, 2003, p. 3)  
 
Figure 9 displays a general example of the BSC model, which is applicable to public and non-profit 
enterprises. This diagram is useful to differentiate private and public or non-profit sector use of the 
BSC. 
 
Figure 9. The Balanced Scorecard for the Public and Non-profit Sectors (Niven, 2003, p. 1). 
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Critical success factors (CSF) of government organisations are quite similar to the private sector: (a) 
the personnel perspective: innovation, motivation, employee skills, staffing levels and co-operation 
meaning cross-government, international, private sector; (b) the processes perspective: productivity 
and cost-efficiency; (c) the customer perspective: customer orientation, customer satisfaction, and 
awareness among citizens; and (d) the impact perspective: fulfilling mandates as a direct impact and 
positive effect on the community as an indirect impact. (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, pp. 147-166 and 
pp. 306-307; Lumijärvi, 1999, p. 12; Lumijärvi & Jylhäsaari, 1999, p. 240; Määttä & Ojala, 1999, 
p. 53; Olve, Roy & Wetter, 1998, p. 225) 
 
 
3.3 Differences of the BSC and Total Quality Management 
 
The BSC is often mixed with total quality management (TQM) (Franz, 2003). However, clear dif-
ferences exist, but when implemented together they can develop the performance of the organisa-
tion. Quality may be defined “as meeting the needs and exceeding the expectations of stakeholders” 
(Paris, 2003, p. 10). Quality circles have succeeded as a part of a broader change in managerial-
employee relationships, meaning focusing on meeting customer needs, stabilising production rates 
and sharing benefits with valued suppliers. (Senge, 1999, pp. 99-102; Senge, et al., 2002, p. 453)  
 
TQM is “a theory of learning linked to a quest for quality” (Franz, 2003). TQM defines an organisa-
tion from the moment its raw materials arrive to the moment its finished products leave the prem-
ises. The European Foundation for the Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence Model is a non-
prescriptive of the TQM framework based on nine criteria. Five of these are “Enablers” and four are 
“Results”. The “Enabler” criteria cover what an organisation does. The “Results” criteria cover 
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what an organisation achieves. “Results” are caused by “Enablers” and feedback from “Results” 
help to improve “Enablers”. (EFQM TQM, 2004a) 
 
The EFQM Model is a non-prescriptive framework, which recognises that there are many ap-
proaches to achieve sustainable excellence, and thus the concepts that underpin the EFQM Model 
are: (1) Results orientation: achieving results that delight all the organisation’s stakeholders; (2) 
Customer focus: creating sustainable customer value; (3) Leadership and constancy of purpose: 
visionary and inspirational leadership, coupled with constancy of purpose; (4) Management by 
processes and facts: managing the organisation through a set of interdependent and interrelated sys-
tems, processes and facts; (5) People development and involvement: maximising the contribution of 
employees through their development and involvement; (6) Continuous learning, innovation and 
improvement: challenging the status quo and effecting change by using learning to create innova-
tion and improvement opportunities: (7) Partnership development: developing and maintaining 
value-adding partnerships; (8) Corporate social responsibility: exceeding the minimum regulatory 
framework in which the organisation operates and to strive to understand and respond to the expec-
tations of their stakeholders in society. (EFQM TQM, 2004a) 
 
The EFQM Model’s keys in four self-assessments are: (i) as a framework which organisations can 
use to help them develop their vision and goals for the future in a tangible, measurable way; (ii) as a 
framework which organisations can use to help them identify and understand the systemic nature of 
their business, the key linkages and cause and effect relationships; (iii) as the basis for the European 
Quality Award (EQA), a process which allows Europe to recognise its most successful organisa-
tions and promote them as role models of Excellence for others to learn from; (iv) as a diagnostic 
tool for assessing the current health of the organisation. Through this process an organisation is bet-
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ter able to balance its priorities, allocate recourses and generate realistic business plans. (EFQM 
TQM, 2004b)  
 
Implemented together, strategic planning and continuous quality improvement can dramatically 
improve the ability of the organisation to meet the needs of its internal and external stakeholders. 
(Paris, 2003, p. 11) It is significant that basically all strategic planning models begin with review-
ing, refining or creating the mission statement based on stakeholders and their needs; the mission 
statement that becomes the foundation upon which all subsequent planning builds. Self-evaluation 
of the strategic planning process can be done by various methodologies in an organisation about the 
strategic and annual planning process. However, it is important to notice that the BSC is directed to 
the future, but the EFQM as a quality model measures the existing situation. These two measure-
ment tools have different bases, but when simultaneously used they support each other.  
 
 
3.4 Evaluation of the Balanced Scorecard 
 
The introduction of the BSC in the defence establishment is a strategic level change that requires 
controlled change in leadership and the creation of preconditions for its successful introduction. The 
possible move to process management together with the redefined strategy processes and the goals 
of development brought forward in the strategies of both the MOD and the FDF will lower the 
threshold for the future introduction of the BSC in the whole defence establishment. The BSC pro-
vides the leadership system for organisations to invest in the long-term; in customers, in employees, 
in new product development, and in systems, rather than managing the bottom line to pump up 
short-term earnings. The BSC will change the way to measure and manage performance. Simply 
through interpretation of the results of the measurement an organisation is able to claim any real 
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difference in the lives or circumstances of its constituents. Particularly public sector organisations 
may easily be hesitant to air lofty objectives, for example: “increasing public safety and security” 
on the BSC’s claims. Especially employee learning and growth perspective is the driver of the BSC 
to the government administration (Määttä & Ojala, 2000). Even though the BSC is multidimen-
sional its basic idea is simple enough. The importance of the degree of knowledge and skilfulness of 
the personnel has increased due to the knowledge-management of the expert organisations thus 
supporting the implementation and introduction of the BSC.  
 
The BSC in government organisation shows many benefits: improved effectiveness and efficiency, 
transparency of government operations, customer focus in government operations, and personnel’s 
commitment to the organisation’s objectives. The BSC helps to reveal the essentials data from the 
vast amount of information the organisation’s information technology systems produces. (Koisti-
nen, 2002) The benefits of applying the BSC can be summarized at all levels of an organisation as 
follows: (1) The BSC helps align key performance measures with strategy; (2) The BSC provides 
management with a comprehensive picture of business operations; (3) The methodology facilitates 
communication and understanding of business goals and strategies; and (4) The BSC concept pro-
vides strategic feedback and learning. (Koistinen, 2002; Puolamäki, 2004, p. 68; QPR, 2004)  
 
The risks of the BSC should be recognised, because an organisation tends to get what it measures 
for and since people will work to achieve the explicit targets which are set (Kaplan & Norton, 
1996). Even so, people will work to achieve their BSC goals, and may ignore important things; or, 
if the BSC is not revitalised often enough, what looked like an important goal in the beginning of 
the year may not be very relevant today. An important point about the BSC is the lack of a relation-
ship to the variety of provider report cards that are being promulgated by third party players. (Kap-
lan & Norton, 1996) Additional risks that the BSC includes may be argued to be that the commit-
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ment of the top management is not strong enough, huge amounts of data are collected, short term 
and day-to-day metrics are overemphasised, an organisation chooses the wrong measures, an or-
ganisation sets unrealistic goals, the data to be measured is difficult to collect, an organisation lacks 
communication, the BSC as a change agent raises an enormous amount of resistance, the change is 
performed too slowly and an organisation may have too many overlapping systems. The BSC may 
be seen to increase inequality in an organisation’s performance, when it is not used in its every sec-
tor. From the individual’s point of view the BSC may seem difficult, and difficulties may also occur 
with the language used and, thus, the entire issue should be explained clearly to people.  
 
Management by results and control of the holistic spectrum of the defence establishment has been 
challenging. The result evaluation shows that the management is fragmented, and focus on single 
project implementation and statutory task performance. The most challenging aspects of manage-
ment by results in the defence establishment are the lack of strategic management, the lack of the 
relationship between long term planning and short time goal setting, and fragmented single subject 
management. Management challenges at the sub-organisation level are the insufficient delegation of 
the power of decision-making and the small of amount feedback used in decision-making and man-
agement. To fulfil the above-mentioned shortcomings the defence establishment, as a part of the 
state administration, has launched process management projects and implemented the BSC thinking 
besides management by results. The MOD is one of the first pilot organisations in the Finnish pub-
lic sector to use the BSC. (Määttä & Ojala, 1999) The reason why the BSC is a part of this study is: 
to reflect the research results from the perspective of the BSC so as to support the overall develop-
ment direction of the MOD.  
 
These perspectives of the BSC public adaptation make it relevant for this study, and add to the 
value of this study. The perspective of the importance of strategy links the BSC to the strategic 
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planning philosophy. Additionally, the decision made in the MOD to be one of the first pilot or-
ganisations in Finland’s state administration gives an even more important role to this study, be-
cause these findings can be used in developing the BSC to meet the needs of the administration, and 
evaluate the progress in the MOD. According to Varjonen (1999) and Kangaste (2002, p. 120-121) 
the BSC basic assumptions of management do not essentially differ from the organisational culture 
currently prevailing in the defence establishment and thus, no major problems and borderline crite-
ria are present for the introduction of the BSC.  
 
However, the basic assumptions of the BSC differ significantly from those of the defence estab-
lishment’s organisation culture. The greatest borderline criteria have to do with the individual’s 
position in the organisation, the decision-making process, people’s involvement, the organisation’s 
relationship to power, and attitudes toward change and environmental changes. Because of these 
things the successful introduction of the BSC requires controlled leadership of change that has in-
fluence on all levels of the organisation, and especially on the inner levels of the basic assumptions. 
 
The BSC way of processing things may be new and meet with resistance because it differs from 
leader-lead decision making. Some organisations have found the BSC to be too abstract and thus 
difficult to understand. Commitment may be difficult if only a few people in an organisation par-
ticipate in the process. Also, all new trends, which the BSC may be seen as, and –isms may cause a 
frustration because there are so many of those. One problem for the BSC is that it is not possible to 
copy it straight from one organisation to another, not even within departments in the same organisa-
tion. On the other hand, this may also be seen an advantage, because then every organisation, in-
cluding the MOD, needs to establish its own BSC.  
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As tactics are described, the data collected in the BSC reflects the organisation's progress toward 
achieving the delineated goals. Security should be a part of this process, not a separate one. Addi-
tionally, the BSC also is a supportive tool for implementing strategic security, especially as this 
study understands strategy in the meaning of learning by the executive top leaders in the organisa-
tion. The framework of strategic control expands the traditional concepts of diagnostic control sys-
tems to the usage of interactive, beliefs and boundary systems.   
 
The learning and growth perspective of the BSC is the most important perspective in this study, 
because the educational approach is social in the LO. This perspective includes employee training 
and corporate cultural attitudes related to both individual and corporate self-improvement. In the 
LO, people, the only repository of knowledge, are the main resource. In the current climate of rapid 
technological change, it is becoming necessary for knowledge workers to be in a continuous learn-
ing mode. Government agencies often find themselves unable to hire new technical workers and at 
the same time are showing a decline in the training of existing employees. This is a leading indica-
tor of  “brain drain” that must be reversed. Metrics can be put into place to guide managers in focus-
ing training funds where they can help the most. In any case, learning and growth constitute the 
essential foundation for the success of any organisation.   
 
 
3.5 Cluster combines knowledge 
 
Many of the features previously described implement aspects in an organisation that are limited 
together, so to be successful with this kind of interaction between different aspects they must in-
clude both co-operation and competition at the same time. One solution for this kind of situation is 
to study a system where participants achieve advantages in co-operation, where cluster is a possibil-
 86 
ity due to its flexible and fluently renewing qualitative development trend. Cluster means a number 
of things of the same kind growing closely together; or a close group of people, animals or things. 
(Crowther, Kavangh & Ashby, 1999, p. 213) Security may form a cluster round information or se-
curity may surround information closely. In this study cluster is understood to combine knowledge. 
(Krogars, 2001, pp. 34) 
 
Cluster is a number of organisations close to each other operating in the same area; in interaction 
they both compete and co-operate with each other. Interaction implements applicable advantages 
for all of the participants. Cluster features make possible the renewal of the resources used and 
qualitative development. The combining power and its strength vary and all participants in interac-
tion do not necessarily share the idea of the holistic entity. (Javanainen, 2003, p. 6; Porter, 1990) 
 
Clusters may be understood as networks of networks, which affect their hierarchical implementa-
tion. (Paija, 1999, pp. 10-11) The networks of networks cluster approach is used in practice when 
systematically network co-operation between regional firms and communal authorities have been 
developed (Javanainen, 2003, pp. 4-10). Cluster discursion especially emphasises the clusters as the 
basis of long-term competitiveness and knowledge greater of organisations (Kässi, 1996, p. 246). A 
typical feature of clusters is their ability to live in close connection with their environment, which 
leads to developing a time framework (Mannermaa, 1999, pp. 166-178). At state level administra-
tion this means pro-activity of the society to fulfil and ensure the needs of citizens, and thus the 
state can be considered to consist of one cluster. The changing environment challenge in existing 
knowledge paradigms and the ability and willingness to share common knowledge are always basic 
dimensions of developing a cluster in security administration. This emphasises the operational and 
structural flexibility of the clusters. (Krogars, 2000, pp. 35-37) 
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Cluster is vision oriented with clear goals, an operational plan for action, and a systematic feedback 
system. The aim is sharing, exchanging and delivering knowledge and capabilities between cluster 
partners and thus increase knowledge, competitiveness, and productivity. Cluster thinking empha-
sises the importance of co-education and co-training during the active action phase. (Javanainen, 
2003, pp. 17-19) Cluster networks share a similar philosophical framework with learning organisa-
tion thinking. (Ojala, 1996, p. 133) 
 
Cluster means a number of people or organisations operating closely together and their interaction 
includes both co-operation and competition with each other. All participants receive advantages; 
cluster is the flexible and fluently renewing qualitative development in the framework of the chang-
ing environment. Force combining participation varies and all members of the interaction do not 
necessarily share the idea of the holistic entity. These features are also typical for the conceptions of 
different sectors of security. Consequently, this approach makes it possible to study the security of 
the MOD in a dynamic, changing environment. Security, too, may be analysed with this approach, 
and thus security theory is analysed in the next chapter.  
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4 THE NEW PARADIGM OF SECURITY 
 
 
In the Finnish language the terms security and safety share the same translation, “turvallisuus”. In 
the English language “secure” has the meanings of not feeling worry; or doubt; or not likely to be 
lost; or to fail; or even to have certain guarantees. “Secure” may also mean to have something pro-
tected; or firmly fixed; or not likely to fall; or to be broken. The term “Secure” is also used in the 
meanings to obtain something; sometimes with difficulty; or to fix something firmly; or fasten 
something firmly. The term “Secure” is also in use to mean making something safe or to protect 
something. (Crowther, Kavanagh & Ashby, 1999, p. 1062) 
 
The term “Security” in the English language has the meaning of freedom or protection from danger 
or worry. “Security” is also used when measures are taken to guarantee the safety of country, per-
son, thing or value. “Security” is used as a thing of value that can be used to make sure that one will 
keep a promise. A person can be a “security risk” and this exists when a person may be a danger to 
a country or an organisation because of her or his political beliefs, personal habits or the revealing 
of secrets to an enemy. (Crowther, et al., 1999, p. 1062) 
 
The word “Safe” in the English language is defined as protecting from a danger and harm, and to 
secure things. “Safe” also means that something is not damaged, hurt or lost; or is not likely to 
cause or lead to damage, injury or loss. “Safe” is also understood as a condition of a place or pro-
viding security and protection. “Safe” can also mean the situation of a person, with the meaning that 
the person is unlikely to do dangerous things and is cautious. “Safe” shows a cautious attitude; or is 
based on good reasons or evidence and credibility. The term “Safety” is used to mean a state of be-
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ing safe or of not being dangerous. “Safety” also means the ability to keep or make something or 
somebody safe. (Crowther, et al., 1999, p. 1036) 
 
These examples show the diversity of areas explained in different aspects of security, and research-
ers use of these sectors emphasise the important dimensions of the subject. The development in or-
ganisational security in Europe and in Finland has increasingly followed the critical security ap-
proach.  Thus critical security is applied in this study as a basic perspective when modelling secu-
rity in chapter 7. To get an academic basis for modelling the concept of security, it is more deeply 
analysed in this chapter. 
 
 
4.1 The concept of security 
 
Security is a complex and relative concept, and the subject is defined personally by feeling of secu-
rity, even though one would have a commitment to the collective defence society. Complexity can 
be found from the multidimensional definitions of security sectors and security conditions; always 
from the possibility of measuring security. (Rantapelkonen, 2000, p. 93) Security is defined from 
the basis of subjectivity, inter-subjectivity or objectivity. Security means the feeling of being and 
the situation of being without risk and hazard, meaning that security is a subjective feeling or a 
situation according to ones perception. (Rantapelkonen, 2000, pp. 59-60) Risk is “the probability 
that a particular adverse event will occur during a stated period of time” (Wyllie, 2000, p. 6). Haz-
ard means “an individual adverse event to which one may be exposed” (Wyllie, 2000, p. 6).  
 
What threatens security? Full threat assessments respond to the presented question with the threat 
formula presented in Figure 10. Impact “of an event may be measured in terms of money, life or 
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business continuity, amongst other scales” (Wyllie, 2000, p. 6) Thus, the greater the threat or the 
impact of the probability of the realisation of the threat, the more comprehensive the needed coun-
termeasures to reduce the risk will be. (Wyllie, 2000, p. 7)  
 
Figure 10. The formula of threat (Wyllie, 2000, p. 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
The term risk is connected to the security of society when attempting to protect the individual and 
risk insurance through social security. (Niemelä, 2000, p. 23) The experience of risks has different 
dimensions such as the observation of risks, the threat of risks, the scale of risks and the possibility 
to control and demolish risk. (Pentti 2003, pp. 117-148) The influence of a risk on a person is de-
scribed via the scale of risk. The map of risks is a tool to predict the threat of risk and the possibili-
ties of controlling it. (Raivola & Kamppinen, 1991, p. 13 and pp. 31-33)  
 
In the concept of security the realistic school (Waltz, 1979) emphasises the state and threat can be 
recognised as a military one. In the traditional military-political understanding (Rantapelkonen, 
2000) security is about survival when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a desig-
nated referent object. The liberal school (Moravcsik, 1997) emphasises international organisations 
and threat signifies limitation of individual freedom. Thus, significant values are individuality, 
equality, freedom and democracy. The constructivist school (Katzenstein, 1996) recognises threat as 
non-compliance with the observance of norm or as immortalisation and emphasises common values 
and actors who define norms and response to cultural factors inside a certain, defined identity. In 
 
THREAT = HAZARD x IMPACT x RISK  
   COUNTERMEASURES 
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constructivism, the basic factor behind insecurity is the lack of identity. (Lahikainen, 2000, p. 77; 
Pentti, 2003, pp. 13-25) In the fields of engineering and technology security is linked to manufac-
turing machines and the security, reliability and safety of constructions. (Evers and Novotny, 1987)  
 
The content of security is descriptively defined in a conflict situation and a security paradox is an 
example of complexity while including also the concept of security complex and the concept of 
security dilemma. (Rantapelkonen, 2000, p. 93) Security complex means such complex relationships 
between states that regional security problems between states cannot be separated from each other. 
(Buzan, 1990, pp. 186-229) The threat is centrally connected to the security dilemma, which can be 
broadened outside the military-political sector. (Hopf, 1998, pp. 171 – 200) The security dilemma is 
a central corner stone of the realistic tradition and the paradigm of realism. States live in anarchy 
and they try to amend their security by improving military capability and by making others feel in-
secure. This way of thinking and behaviour leads to an endless circle between security and insecu-
rity. (Herz, 1954, pp. 2 - 16 and pp. 23 – 25) This leads to the security paradox meaning that the 
more powerful military a state has the more secure the situation is for it, but simultaneously the 
more threatening the situation becomes for other states. (Baldwin, 1997, pp. 15-16) Especially real-
istic security tradition includes a problem of the concept of the security dilemma by the circle rea-
soning. (Rantapelkonen, 2000, pp. 171 - 172.)  
 
The concept of information security highlights that security is not just a feeling, but also addition-
ally a mathematical parameter or part of the risk analysis process. People are not able to calculate 
and be analytical. Security is often a matter of trust in the psychological sense, not the technical. 
Trust is essential for organisations and presents organisational security according to the four-sector 
model. (Virtanen 2002) The model is presented in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. The four-sector model (Virtanen, 2002, p. 41). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On corporate security the statistical approach to security by standards has maintained its position in 
Finland for a decade. (Pesonen, 1993) However, security leadership has been studied and applied 
very little in Finland. The analysis of the functionality of safety management systems in installa-
tions in Finland, which run the risk of a major accident, is one of the few safety leadership studies. 
(Levä, 2003) The corporate security model by Tuominen (2004) is presented in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. The corporate security model (Tuominen 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In social politics insecurity is connected to the terms status, well-being, security of society and so-
cial welfare, while in political science and in social politics security is considered to be a national 
and international question (Laitinen 1999). Security and insecurity is studied from the approach of 
psychological phenomenon from the social psychological and psychosocial point of view. (Nie-
melä, 2000) Studies, which observe the social relations of individuals and the quality of these rela-
tionships, belong to sociology.  (Niemelä, 2000) Human security is defined as existing in 23 dimen-
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sions. (Niemelä, Kainulainen, Laitinen, Pääkkönen, Rusanen, Ryynänen, Widgren, Vornanen, 
Väisänen & Ylinen, 1997) The human concept model of of security is presented in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. The human concept model of security (Niemelä, 2000, p. 27). 
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At a personal level for all individuals security is a basic human aspiration. Insecurity means that 
basic human aspirations cannot always be fulfilled in every circumstance. (Niemelä, 2000, p. 22) 
“Security or insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that 
threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both terri-
torial and institutional, and regimes” (Ayoob, 2003, pp. 128 – 130). Security and insecurity can be 
approached objectively and subjectively. (Niemelä, 2000) Security and insecurity are considered to 
be dimensions, which go through all of the different sectors of life, and are connected to everyday 
life, indicated in their own way as the quality of life of a person. Security and insecurity are cer-
tainty and uncertainty of the continuation of good. (Niemelä, et al., 1997; Niemelä, 2000, p. 24)   
 
Security can be seen as a need as noted by, for example, Maslow (1987), Aldefer (1972), Riihinen 
(1979) and Pentti (2003). Security as a need may be defined in three different ways. First: security 
described as a need for protection and defence against outside dangers. Second: security imple-
mented as a need for continuity and order. Third: security interpreted as a trial to achieve inner 
mental balance. (1970, pp.  24 – 27) Security is considered to be a significant humanistic and social 
value in the sense of certainty and safety. The absence of different kinds of dangers such as acci-
dents is a value itself. Security as a value may also mean reliability in the sense of predictability and 
psychological comfort. As a value, security is described at multiple levels. (Kaufmann, 1970, p. 
340) To fulfil these needs is the basis of well-being for all individuals. This theory of needs defines 
a human being as a dynamic alien who tries to achieve needs and to fulfil his intentions. (Aldefer, 
1972; Maslow, 1987; Niemelä, 2000, p. 22; Pentti, 2003, pp. 121-125; Riihinen 1979)  
 
The experience of insecurity and identity both arise from the same ground, and both delineate the 
human relationship with the world, both have the same ontological root even though the relation-
ships occur in different perspectives in the experience of security, insecurity and identity. (Lahi-
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kainen, 2000, p. 62) These general remarks are basic to the sociology of security. The issue of iden-
tity is inseparable from security. (Booth, 2003, p. 88; Bowlby, 1978; Lahikainen, 2000, pp. 62 – 63) 
The feeling of security as an adult is based on the view where your own action is seen as conse-
quentially meaningful from the standpoint of your own history and where the future is connected to 
the past. The aim is to construct a whole, intrinsically managed and complete life and the danger of 
this possibility not happening is experienced as a crisis. Belief in the continuity of your own iden-
tity is a critical factor for security. (Lahikainen, 2000, p. 77; Pentti, 2003, pp. 13-25) 
 
The ontology and epistemology of knowledge on the concept of security leads to the term civilised 
nation, where in an open society, and in an open culture the right to knowledge, to the access of 
knowledge and neutral communication is an essential part of the factors establishing security. In the 
so-called information society it is assumed that people will act willingly to understand and con-
struct their surroundings, life and the whole world where they live, and the access to knowledge can 
be either via education or some other resource. (Niemelä, 2000, p. 30)   
 
The human concept model can be seen supporting the efforts of the Finnish defence establishment 
towards the learning organisation due to that fact that both highlight the same aspects of develop-
ment. Niemelä’s model of human security can be seen as breaking barriers of the defence estab-
lishment because the traditional way of national security thinking is regarded as a narrow model and 
the human security model is wider and more comprehensive in all dimensions, levels and sectors of 
society. Internationally, the United Nations (UN) (Ogata, 2003), the Organisation for Security Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) (OSCE, 2003) the European Union (EU) (Kaldor, et. al., 2004) and 
also some researchers in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Cohen, 
2002, pp. 13-20) have presented the humanistic security perspective.  
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4.2 The concept of critical security 
 
The concept of the critical security paradigm defines security as a quality that actors inject into 
issues by securitising them, which means to stage them on the political arena in a specific way, and 
to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves. (Buzan, 
Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p. 204) Securitisation is an essentiality inter-subjective process where 
defining security meets the problem of measurement due to the fact that nations and states have 
different thresholds for defining a threat. Security can be understood as a social phenomenon that 
can be handled only between subjects. (Buzan, 1990) “Security is a derivative concept; it is in itself 
meaningless. To have any meaning, security necessarily presupposes something to be secured; as a 
realm of study it cannot be self-referential” (Williams & Krause, 2003, p. ix).  
 
Securitisation is inter-subjective and socially constructed, where the quality is not held in subjective 
and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of a discursive, socially constituted, inter-subjective 
realm. The audience of the security speech act decides successful securitisation, and thus, security 
rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects. (Buzan, Weaver & de 
Wild, 1998, p. 31) Securitisation is an extreme version of politicisation and it needs the acceptance 
of the audience. According to liberalism, threats linked to securitisation can effectively be coun-
tered with cooperation. Different sectors of security, such as military, can be securitised. The aim of 
co-operation is to respond to common threats and also to reduce negative effects of one’s own ac-
tivities towards the other partners. Securitisation is always linked with legitimate rights. (Buzan, 
Weaver & de Wild, 1998, pp. 21 – 26 and p. 49)  
 
The term critical in security studies is used in the meaning of implying more of an orientation to-
ward the discipline than a precise theoretical label, and a small “c” is adopted for the definition of 
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critical for both practical and intellectual reasons. A broad definition allows many perspectives of 
the discipline outside of the mainstream to be brought into the same forum, with attendant benefits 
for intellectual dialogue and debate. The critical approach may also adopt the position of a stranger, 
but not of an outsider. “Yet although a critical distance may be invaluable in allowing us to step 
back from the claims of security studies, it is also incomplete” (Williams & Krause, 2003, p. xiii). 
 
There are several levels and actors in security, where the upper most one is a global system, or the 
world, and the second level can be seen as a sublevel of the global level, such as international or-
ganisations and associations. The third level combines units such as states, nations and trans-
national companies, and at the fourth level there are organised groups inside these units and they try 
to affect the behaviour of individuals. Finally, individuals are the fifth level of security. (Baldwin, 
1997, pp. 5-26; Buzan, 1991, pp. 27-29; Buzan, Weaver and de Wild, 1998, pp. 5-6 and pp. 163-
164; Hopf, 1998, pp. 171-200; Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 1-32) The critical security agenda of security 
is presented in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. The critical security agenda of security (Buzan, 1991). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical security agenda of security 
 
Security Levels:    Security Sectors: 
1. Individual level           1. Political sector 
2. Regional level           2. Military sector 
3. System level           3. Societal sector 
4. National level           4. Economic sector 
.            5. Environmental sector 
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In the critical approach security is equated with emancipation (Booth, 1991, pp. 313 - 326) meaning 
that nations should be released from factors preventing them from freely doing what they want to 
do. According to Booth (1991): 
“Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical 
and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to 
do … Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not 
power or order produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security” 
(Booth, 1991, p. 319). 
 
Scientific security is anxious to know how people live, and a practical interest with policy relevance 
is surely part of what is involved in being a security specialist. Abstract ideas about emancipation 
will not be sufficient: it is important for critical security to engage with reality by suggesting poli-
cies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its 
structural wrongs. (Booth, 2003, p. 114; Gal, 1985) Thus, security dilemma as an essential part of 
the security is seen as the quintessential dilemma:  
“Rather than seeing the security dilemma as the quintessential dilemma, however, a 
critical perspective might regard it as a sometimes-important phenomenon in relations 
between states, but fundamentally as an epiphenomenona of fatalistic and hegemonic 
reasoning and practices through time. The latter need to be understood in order that 
self-constituting human societies and society can learn new practices to help mitigate 
and then perhaps one day transcend the traps of security dilemmas” (Booth, 2003, p. 
108). 
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Politicians and the military have their own ideas of security that are not always shared by those for 
whom they supposedly speak. Thus, the growth of the civil society is important for security and this 
is why the role of critical security could be defined as follows:  
“to provide new knowledge and more helpful accounts of world affairs and human 
lives; to look at old facts in new ways; to unsilence the silenced; to help give longer 
term perspectives than decision-makers concerned with the next election; to expose 
the hypocrisies, inconsistencies, and power plays in language, relationships, and poli-
cies; to provide a more sophisticated language with which to analyse events and prob-
lems; to engage in dialogues with policy makers in order to try to pen the latter’s 
imaginations and minds about the ways in which concepts might be translated into 
better policies; to expose false ideas and reveal the instated assumptions of policies; to 
pen up space for thought and action; to help students think for themselves; to develop 
new and more rational theories about global security; to cast a critical eye on all theo-
ries and all exercises of power, including one’s own; and to speak for cosmopolitan 
values and to speak up for those who do not have a voice” (Booth, 2003, p. 115). 
 
Criticism to the critical approach (Ayoob, 2003, p. 126) claims that emancipation is a utopistic real-
ism and emancipation the other way round would increase political intolerance. The problem with 
semantic jugglery is that by a sleight of hand it totally obfuscates the meanings of both the concept 
of security and emancipation, and that Booth’s definition refuses to acknowledge that a society or 
group can be emancipated without being secure and vice versa.  (Ayoob, 2003, pp. 121 – 146)  
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4.3 Challenges for critical security 
 
A school of critical security develops from “global moral science”, rather than the traditional secu-
rity theory, and sees as crucial the relationship between theory and its historical/social/political con-
text. Critical security is more interested in the search for meaning than the endless accumulation of 
knowledge; and it believes that social and political science cannot be separated from life, but in-
stead are inseparable from social and political criticism, replication, and practice. Critical security 
believes that theory is constitutive rather than explanatory; invention of an emancipatory future is 
more urgent than the discovery of ultimate philosophical foundations; and the role of academics is 
that of organic intellectual, or of socially engaged philosopher. The foundation of critical security is 
based on the belief that politics on a global scale is open-ended rather than determined; and is based 
on ethical choices rather than on natural instincts. (Booth, 2003, pp. 106-107) 
 
New challenges have been united by a common desire to treat the object of security as the individ-
ual, and not as the sovereign state. In this approach security is a condition that individuals enjoy, 
and they are given primacy, both in the definition of threats and of who or what is to be secured. 
Concentrating on individual security exposes the ways in which this may conflict with claims of 
state security rather than presuming an identity by means of sovereignty of the individual with the 
security of the state. (Krause & Williams, 2003, pp. 43 – 46; Mannoni, 1987)  
 
New basic re-orientation emerges three overlapping arguments that treat individuals as right-
bearing persons, as citizens or members of society, or as members of a transcendent global commu-
nity. Focusing on individuals qua citizens illustrates a central dynamic in contemporary life that is 
consistently obscured by neo-realism. This is the way in which the most direct threats to individuals 
can come from the institutions of organised violence of their own state. Individuals as the objects of 
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security chance, treats individuals as members of a transcendent human community with common 
global concerns. Paradoxically, shifting the focus of security from the state to the individual allows 
an engagement with the broadest global threats. (Krause & Williams, 2003, pp. 43 – 46) 
 
The familiar narrative with false premises goes, that it is necessary to move from a state of frag-
mentation to a state of greater integration: to broaden out toward co-operative, or common, or world 
security. Thus, any attempt to broaden understanding of security by taking the inside outside, by 
extending the upside static community to the world of conflict outside, is fundamentally misguided. 
(Walker, 2003, p. 76-78) To broaden understanding of what security involves need to make a move 
from the particular to the general, from the territory to the planet, from the citizens of states to the 
citizens of the world. (Walker, 2003, p. 77-78) 
 
There are, nevertheless, reasons that suggest a certain degree of caution about some accounts of 
what it means to develop alternative accounts of security. The first reason is that there has been sig-
nificant progress in working through some of the more fruitful implications of moving from as-
sumptions about the inevitability of conflict to the possibility of co-operation given the logic of the 
so-called security dilemma. The second reason is that the ideas about political realism serve as a 
crucial reminder that accounts of imminent historical transformation are invariably overdone. The 
third reason is that to develop alternative accounts of security may be read, as expressions of a 
hegemonic normative commitment to the way the world must be. (Walker, 2003, pp. 70-71) On the 
other hand, ideas about national security can be interpreted as expressions of the legitimating prac-
tices of modern states more easily than as empirical explanations of the practices.  
 
A broader conception of security, with a wider agenda and changed practice, or “alternative de-
fence” means new thinking about strategy and international security, which has gradually expanded, 
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particularly in Europe. In place of the traditional static and militarised perspective on international 
security, alternative thinkers emphasised no offensive defence, common security, democracy, hu-
man rights, disarmament, confidence building, and civil society. (Booth, 2003, pp. 85-86) Attempts 
to rethink the notion of broadened security pose significant problems, because some fear that once 
the concept begins to open out, it encompasses new accounts of what security means, or to whom it 
refers, and it will cease to have any specific framework at all. (Walker, 2003, pp. 75-76) 
 
Difficulties arise with the kind of broadening that is envisaged, and from the control of uncertainty. 
From this perspective broadening the concept itself is not the challenge; but change of thinking is. 
Uncertainty is a problem because the critical security approach of established accounts does not 
permit us to interpret, create concrete threats and risks, identifiable dangers, and bodies who do 
things. However, no matter how insistent the voices of military and defence establishments might 
be, in fact it has never been possible to pin security down to concrete practices. 
 
From references it is important to emphasise that the thinking on critical security should not ignore 
or play down the state and the military dimensions of world politics. What are challenged is the 
moral and practical status of realism, its ideology of necessity and limited possibility, and its propa-
gandist common sense about this being the best of all worlds. There is an important place in critical 
security studies for the study of the threat and use of military force, but the study of military strat-
egy should no longer be synonymous with security studies (Booth, 2003, p. 107) Military strategy is 
a subject area within critical security studies, but it is only one aspect of a wide agenda.  
 
The traditional realist definition of security is inadequate to explain the multifaceted and multidi-
mensional nature of the problem of security. (Ayoob, 2003, p. 121) However, unsystematic expan-
sion of the definition of security threatens to make the concept too elastic, and thus useless. Critical 
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security favours emancipation, while traditional theories emphasised power and order as the bases 
for security. The notion of emancipation gives traditional security theorists quite a bit of irritation. 
Emancipation in critical security studies means freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the 
political, economic, physical, social, and other constraints that discontinue them from carrying out 
what they would without restraint choose to do. 
 
Making the individual the object of security provides the conceptual shift that allows these perspec-
tives to take their place as central elements of any comprehensive understanding of security. 
(Krause and Williams, 2003, p. 43-46) That approach is the fundamental philosophical basis for the 
conception of security in this study even with the disadvantages of the approach. Making the indi-
vidual in various guises the focus of security is also a double-edged sword, one that risks simply 
replicating the difficulties it seeks to overcome. One danger lies in treating individuals as un-
grounded in any social or historical context; hence their meaning is purely abstract. This problem 
leads to the often-stated criticism that if we regard individuals qua persons as abstract actors, then a 
return to a contract theory of the state is almost inevitable. Even more critical is the statement of 
human-rights standards as culturally specific, or as being an attempt to impose Western standards 
on others. Epistemologically, (Krause & Williams, 2003, pp. 43 – 46) making the individual the 
object of security involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach toward more in-
terpretive modes of analysis. 
 
The critical security perspective easily evolves into this research for studying the security of the 
MOD and for the modelling of security. The nature of this approach, by seeking new findings, and 
by seeking change with interaction of subjects from the individual point of view is crucial for this 
study to succeed. Thus, with multifaceted and multidimensional features it is a challenging but also 
rewarding attempt, especially, because this research evidently presents the reader an opportunity for 
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interaction and for making his own interpretations along the study procedure of this report. Thus, 
the next paragraph leads us to the modelling of security and to the empiria of this study. 
 
 
4.4 Modelling security 
 
The term “Model” in the English language has the meaning of a representation of something; or a 
design of something that is made so that it can be copied in another material; or a design of product. 
“Model” also means a simple description of a system, used for explaining or calculating; or a sys-
tem used as a basis for a pattern. “Model” can also mean a person or thing regarded as an excellent 
example to copy. “Model” also means to work as a model with the meaning to display clothes by 
wearing them; or to make a model of something from a material with the meaning for example to 
shape clay or wax. The word “Modelling” in the English language is defined as the art of making 
models; or working as a model. (Crowther, et al., 1999, p. 749) 
 
Anderson and Burns (1989) consider modelling in research as an important source of theorizing. 
“We can consider models as well-developed descriptive analogies used to help visualize, often in a 
simplified and imitative way, phenomena that cannot be easily or directly observed. Each model is 
thus a projection of a possible system of relationships among phenomena, realized in material, ver-
bal, or symbolic terms. Replica models are usually material or pictorial representations made with a 
change in spatial or temporal scale. Symbolic models tend to be intangible, using abstract verbal, 
graphic, or symbolic representation to stand for conceptual systems. (Anderson & Burns, 1989, 30)”  
 
Modelling security helps people to understand the meaning and content of the term. On the basis of 
the previous chapters it became apparent that none of the security models described in the theoreti-
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cal part of this study comprehensively meets the demands of the security of a learning organisation. 
None of those security models fully response to the new threats in the changing security environ-
ment as is necessary. Neither do they especially consider the Government level and the MOD as its 
subordinate organisation. 
 
From the point of view of the defence establishment the present situation where the level of threats 
is low is interesting, because the MOD can be threatened intentionally, or by accident. In this study 
the content of both secure and safe, and security and safety have been combined, and the term se-
cure or security is used. This definition is broad and, as wider than either of the above mentioned 
separately, gives new approach to the matter at hand, as also defined by Crosby (2004). This wider 
perspective of security makes it possible to model it with strategic planning and the learning organi-
sation in a new way.  
 
The critical security theory is the core of this study because of the nature of the theory and the clear 
differences with the traditional realistic security thinking in the Finnish defence establishment. 
Thus, new information is gained from the study. Additionally, it has essential similarities to the 
theoretical background of this study: the qualitative approach with the use of emancipation; con-
structivism; constructivist learning; the learning organisation and strategic planning. The essence of 
the critical approach is that it expects change, and one of the attractive features of the critical di-
mension in security is also that it never settles into the complacency of what it seeks to overthrow. 
 
The new security model will be presented in detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8. Consequently, it is con-
structed from the point of view of critical security to respond to the challenges of conceptualising 
the security of the MOD. Nevertheless, the basis of the model is quite much theoretically empha-
sised. Thus, testing through security surveys and interview interventions in the MOD deepens the 
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model, i.e. its reliability, credibility and transformability. However, because the MOD is a sub-
organisation of the Government, the heuristic hypothesis is that this tested model may also be ap-
plied elsewhere among the state organisations and perhaps in the private sector as well.  
 
Group categorisation, contextual reference and sociality bind the defence establishment to the secu-
rity thinking of the learning organisation. Ideas and principles of the learning organisation and of 
human security are in many aspects suitable for the basis of development of the hierarchic culture 
and organisation of the defence establishment. The danger is that all of the personnel cannot be 
committed to its development and that development objectives will remain at the level of apparent 
changes. However, this approach is worth studying for the basis of modelling security in the MOD. 
As a matter of fact, the critical security theory provides much guidance for modelling especially 
from the point of view of wide-range and the horizontal approach as well as connections to society 
and to the global environment by breaking boundaries. Additionally, data from Finnish society with 
comparison to international dimensions inevitably possess extra importance, and add to the trans-
ferability of the reference in this study. 
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PART  II 
 
 
         
 THE WORLD OF EMPIRIA 
 
 
 
 
“The wicked flee 
 
when no man pursueth: 
 
 but the righteous are 
 
 as bold as a lion.” 
 
Proverbs 28:1 
The National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial 
Judiciary Square, Washington, D. C. 
The United States of America (2005) 
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5 STUDY SCOPE 
 
 
Internationalisation and structural changes in society greatly affect Finland’s ability to secure the 
vital functions to society. In addition, the Government’s Finnish Security and Defence Policy re-
ports of 2001 and 2004, respectively, paid particular attention to the threats associated with further 
international integration. This also raised the need to study the security of the Finnish Ministry of 
Defence (MOD). Examining the conceptions of the personnel of the MOD is both a focus and a 
means for developing the constructed models. Furthermore, the study process has an influence on 
both modelling security and on the security of the MOD. The heuristic hypotheses is that there is a 
need for a qualitative approach in the name of security at the MOD, and that developing the security 
of the MOD according to the strategic security model (SSM), as presented in chapter 7, is a change 
agent actor for better efficiency. However, the principle of maintaining the organisational functions, 
structures and procedures the same in normal situations as well as in exceptional situations does not 
make a crucial difference for the perspective of this research. Reporting during the procedure shows 
the theoretical relativism and develops the deepening of understanding of the content of the phe-
nomena at hand. This means incorporating new terms into our lexicon. 
 
The qualitative approach has been chosen because communicative co-operation is reflected through 
all levels of the new security thinking, from an individual level to a group and an organisational 
level and to a global level as well. Social constructivist perspectives are often referred to as “reflec-
tivism” or “interpretivism” (Wendt, 1992, pp. 391-425). From the perspective of social constructiv-
ism international co-operation has to be analysed in the framework of norm change and new norm 
creation through the social and communicative practices of participants, and thus, Finland must do 
so as well. These new norms in international institutions, for example, in the Organisation for Eco-
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nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in the United Nations (UN) (Risse-Kappen, 
2003, pp. 263-265) have causal effect when participants believe in their conformability and impor-
tance through communicative processes. Additionally, social constructivism (presented in chapter 
1) has been used because the new security approach reflects from abroad to the security of the or-
ganisation of the MOD. The critical security approach is radically constructivist regarding security, 
which is the specific form of the structure of this study in the MOD.  
 
The structure of this report does not accurately follow in detail the general structure of the disserta-
tion report, but according to Denzin and Lincoln (2003) this kind of exception is acceptable when 
the research process is easier to understand this way. Thinking follows time, where content and con-
text orientation of the past, present and future all have their own horizons. The method most likely 
forms a critical discourse of social reality in which the combining of various views illuminate trian-
gular and explain the phenomenon being studied from the perspectives of the philosophy of the 
academic context chosen. The relationship to social constructivism is critical because the work 
makes a clear break away from cognitivism and, on the other hand, prefers to synthesise the main 
schools of the constructivist approach as well as the educational tradition into one framework. 
 
The approach to security is critical, because the subject of security studies broadens the agenda es-
sentially in a different way. The term “critical” in security is a fairly recent discipline and signifies 
more an orientation toward the discipline than a precise theoretical label. Additionally, synthesising 
the different schools of the security approach as well as the academic tradition into one framework 
and then, on the hand, seeing significant similarities in thinking, concern both constructivism and 
security. As a performer a human being is an entire individual whose external visible activities are 
not solely based on cognitive processes (Reynolds, Sinatra & Jetton, 1996, p. 103). The author 
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agrees with the view of the concept of constructivist knowledge and with the approach to learning 
understood according to the constructive concept of learning. 
 
 
5.1 The demography of Finland’s Ministry of Defence 
 
Pursuant to the Decree of the Ministry of Defence (Puolustusministeriö, 110/2003) on the Rules and 
Procedures of the MOD it is responsible for: 1) a holistic role at the Government level in the field 
of National Defence Policy; and 2) coordination of total defence aiming at responding to all mili-
tary crises and threats with national resources, and readiness for international interoperability. 
(Government report, 6/2004) The organisation chart of the MOD (Puolustusministeriö, 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c) is presented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. The organisation chart of the Finnish Ministry of Defence, 01 Jan 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minister of Defence 
Permanent Secretary Auditing Unit (AUDU) 
Defence Policy 
Department (DPD) 
Resource Policy 
Department (RPD) 
 
Administration 
Policy Department 
(APD) 
Information Unit (IU) 
The Secretariat of 
the Security and 
Defence Commit-
tee (SSDC) 
Administration Unit 
(AU) 
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The MOD guides the defence establishment, with a totalling 17 816 personnel, including The Fin-
nish Defence Forces (FDF) and the Defence Administration’s Construction Establishment (DACE). 
(Puolustusministeriö, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c) Information on MOD personnel is in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Information on the personnel of the MOD, 01 Jan 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
Pursuant to the Decree on the Ministry of Defence its Rules and Procedures (Puolustusministeriö, 
110/2003, 7 §, 10 § and 13 §) assign emergency planning and security planning as the responsibility 
of the Establishment Unit. The Secretariat of the Security and Defence Committee has its own ho-
listic role at the Government level in the field of national defence. The Permanent Secretary of the 
MOD chairs the Security and Defence Committee. The Defence Policy Department carries the re-
sponsibility in the field of national defence policy and international defence policy.   
 
Finland’s participation in decision-making in all circumstances on the external activities of the 
European Union (EU) is nowadays a dimension concretely affecting national policy. According to 
the objectives of Finland’s security and defence policy, the securing of society’s vital functions con-
tributes to the safeguarding of national sovereignty and the population’s livelihood. The MOD is 
responsible for co-ordinating the measures for national military defence designed to counter mili-
tary threats against Finland and to provide executive assistance to control other types of threats as 
well as to permit Finland’s participation in international military crisis management. Ministries 
have been assigned responsibilities for co-ordinating functions of: Finland’s vital functions, estab-
The Finnish Ministry of Defence: Personnel  124 100 % 
  Male  66 53,1 % 
Female  58 46,9 % 
Average age of employees   44,4 years 
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lished targets, and development policies that guide administrative branches of the government in 
strategic tasks under all circumstances. (Puolustusministeriö, 2004d, 2004e, 2004f, 2004g) The di-
vision of the personnel of the MOD (N=124) into leaders, experts and others is presented in the 
personnel chart of the MOD in Figure 17. The division is used in the empiric part of the study. 
 
Figure 17. The personnel chart of the Finnish Ministry of Defence, 01 Jan 2004. 
 
Category Department/Unit Total  (%) 
 Top management SSDC DPD APD RPD AU IU AUDU   
Leader 2 1 3 5 5 5 1 1 23 18,5 % 
Expert 1 2 14 15 16 1 3 1 53 43,6 % 
Others 2 2 2 5 7 27 2 1 46 37,9 % 
 5 5 19 25 28 33 5 3 124 100 % 
 
 
Organisational security elements (Figure 19) link interaction between personnel of the MOD and 
the author. The Committee of Readiness with eight (n=8) participants at the strategic level chaired 
by the Permanent Secretary, the Security Team with seven (n=7) civil servants, and the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Committee with safety delegates and trade union representatives totalling 
12 people convenes on a monthly basis and provides permanent coverage of 25 (20 %) individual 
people actively dealing with security issues. Additionally, occasional exercise, education and train-
ing activities with the protective system add to the total of personnel involved in security issues. 
 
 
5.2 Research questions 
 
The general aim of the research is to study the security phenomenon in the framework of the learn-
ing organisation. The critical security approach is the basis of the intervention with the help of the 
strategic planning perspective. The main focus of this research is to construct a strategic security 
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model and a security leadership model. Examining the conceptions of the personnel of the MOD is 
also a sub-focus and at the same time a means for developing the constructed models. Furthermore, 
the aim is to study what effect this process has both on the models and on the security of the MOD. 
The literature review is the basis for conceptualising the challenging field of the theoretical frame-
work. The conceptual extent of the study may be a bit unusual for a dissertation, but outlining the 
research area from the literature review perspective added with the construction of survey and inter-
view outcomes clarify the challenging constellation. The key question in this research is what kind 
of role critical security has in the changing process of a learning organisation. The heuristic hy-
potheses are that there is a need for a qualitative approach in the name of security at the MOD, and 
that developing the security of the MOD according to the newly developed security model is an 
agent for change for better efficiency. Derived from the previous text the research questions are 
formulated as follows: 
 
1. How can security be modelled in a learning organisation? 
What impact does the new security paradigm have in a learning organisation with a critical security 
approach? The international environment whose main institutions are linked to Finland have more 
and more put emphasis on security and demands a more comprehensive security approach from its 
members. The academic interest is how this new phenomenon’s impact can be modelled in a learn-
ing organisation in the post-modern era? 
 
2. What are the conceptions about security of the personnel of the MOD? 
The interest is to clarify the conceptions about security of the personnel in the study context because 
the personnel of the MOD are working in an organisational environment that is aiming at becoming 
a learning organisation.  
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3. How can security models be modified through the conceptions about security in the MOD? 
The social constructivist approach in the qualitative framework as a new perspective in the MOD 
will probably create new security innovations and thus support the development of the security of 
the MOD as well as the testing of new models.  
 
4. How can security be modelled through the concept of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC)?  
The interest is to clarify the concept of security in strategic planning with the BSC. This also clari-
fies the differences of the BSC and the Total Quality Management (TQM).  
 
5. How can security models be modified through the concept of social constructivist approach?  
The social constructivist approach in the qualitative framework as a new perspective in the MOD 
will combine several different data. The data is linked to each other in time frame, which will au-
thorize the use of social constructivism. Opening the data will also clarify the procedure of con-
structing security leadership in the MOD.  
 
6. How does the new security paradigm impact the organisation of the MOD?  
The new security paradigm with the empirical research results will obviously have some conse-
quences on the MOD. What kinds of consequences is an interesting question? What should be done 
in the perspective of the new security paradigm to develop the security of the MOD? 
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6 METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 
Triangulation here means the combination of multiple data, methodological practices, theories and 
research as a strategy adding breadth, complexity, richness and depth to a study. (Flick, 1998, p. 
231) Triangulation is not a tool, or strategy of validation, but an alternative to validation. (Flick, 
1998, pp. 229-230) However, it is phenomenography (Marton, 1994, p. 4424) that is the main aca-
demic methodology, which is additionally used as ”inherently multi-method research, including 
scientific experiments, quantitative social research, and qualitative research methods from many 
disciplines as necessary to address the problem at hand,” (Greenwood & Levin, 2003, p. 144). In 
this sense the study follows more the ideas of Alasuutari (1993) than Varto (1992). Both discuss 
qualitative research but, where Varto (1992) sees that no quantitative aspects are accepted in quali-
tative research Alasuutari (1993) sees that the use of all possible means to collect information, both 
qualitative and quantitative, are acceptable. Objective reality can never be captured, as we can know 
an object only through its interpretations. 
 
This study is mainly conducted through the methodology of qualitative research, which according 
to Niskanen (2002, pp. 24-40) means an empiric approach considering and including especially 
qualitative aspects and details. Conclusions in qualitative research are not normally statistical be-
cause interpretations have a higher status. Generally speaking, qualitative research consists of the 
collection of perceptions, simplification of perceptions and the solution of the research problem. In 
practice, qualitative research is integrated using theories and methods from different sciences. 
Qualitative research means interaction between subject and researcher, where the hypothesis is 
flexible and can be considered to be value-oriented. Usually the study is horizontal, because in 
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qualitative reporting the aim is also to have interaction between the reader and the report, in other 
words the aim is to achieve double hermeneutics.  
 
 
6.1 Phenomenographic perspective  
 
Phenomenography (Marton, 1994) is a methodology which has been the basis of many approaches 
to learning and student understanding of a wide range of concepts in a variety of disciplines. It has 
developed into the investigation of how people understand conceptions. Phenomenography is an 
“empirical study of the limited number of qualitative different ways in which various phenomena 
in, and aspects of, the world around us are experienced, conceptualised, understood, perceived and 
apprehended” (Marton, 1994, p. 4424). Phenomenography seeks to identify the qualitative different 
ways in which individuals experience such aspects of their world as teaching, learning or the mean-
ing of disciplinary concepts. (Ashworth & Lucas, 2000, pp. 295-307; Marton, 1981, pp. 177-200; 
Vironen, 1999.) However, phenomenography is not developed from the phenomenological science 
heritage, but instead from the basis of empirical research and pragmatic thinking. (Järvinen & Kart-
tunen, 1997; Kallioinen, 2001, pp. 56 - 57) 
 
The aim of the phenomenographical approach is to characterise differing experiences and under-
standings “in terms of ‘categories of description’, logically related to each other, and forming hier-
archies in relation to given criteria. Such an ordered set of categories of description is called the 
‘outcome space’ of the phenomenon concept in question” (Marton, 1994, p. 4424). Ashworth and 
Lucas (2000) define the aim to be “to arrive at a structure within which the various student concep-
tualisations of the relevant concept are fitted” (Ashworth & Lucas, 2000, p. 298).  
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Conception can be compared to a picture, which is created from a certain phenomenon by combin-
ing experience and thinking. (Syrjälä, et al., 1995) Presuppositions that should be bracketed may be 
listed as (a) important earlier research findings; (b) assuming pre-given theoretical structures or 
particular interpretations; (c) presupposing the investigator’s personal knowledge and belief; (d) 
assuming, prior to acquaintance with the nature of the experience itself, specific research tech-
niques; (e) the researcher’s concern to uncover the “cause” of certain forms of person experience 
(Ashworth & Lucas, 2000, p. 298). The aim is to reveal the study participant’s experience, not the 
researcher’s expectations. (Ashworth & Lucas, 2000, p. 298) 
 
Phenomenographic research practice consists of two key issues. The first is the need to bracket pre-
suppositions in particular, setting aside initially the objective of producing categories of description 
and presuppositions about the precise thing being studied. The second issue is developing empathy 
in the meaning of involvement, imaginative engagement with the world that is being described by 
the person. However, the requirement to engage and empathise with the life world of the person 
may involve avoidance of the espoused production of categories of description. (Ashworth & Lu-
cas, 2000, p. 299 and p. 307)  
 
Marton (1986) considers it an important aspect to also create a pool of meanings. The researcher 
studies and compares the differences and the similarities of the pool of meanings and this procedure 
clarifies special features of the categories. Every category gets its criteria and bordering cases’ sig-
nificances are evaluated carefully. In the end, categories are reflected on the raw data. (Häkkinen, 
1996; Marton, 1986) However, it is in the end the decision of the researcher how and what is an 
understandable description, which also describes as well as possible the empirical material. (Jär-
vinen & Karttunen, 1997)  
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Conceptions in categories of meanings and the interpretation reveal the conceptions of people stud-
ied and this explains the contents of the meanings, based on the theory. This progression makes the 
meanings of individuals understandable, which leads to interpretation and which then is followed 
by a conclusion. Qualitative research uses the term explanation and not reason, and understanding is 
one category of explanations. From these categories the researcher makes his own theory, which is 
a model of an explanation. By building up multidimensional categories and categories on different 
levels it is possible to achieve an analytical induction. (Syrjälä, et al., 1995, pp. 123-129) 
 
The categories of description must depend upon an earlier evocation of peoples’ very own descrip-
tions of their relevant experiences. A paramount requirement for phenomenography is to be sensi-
tive to the individuality of conceptions of the world; it must be grounded in the lived experience of 
its research participants. Without this, the descriptions of peoples’ experiences will be unsound and 
the categories of description will be arbitrary. Yet, research procedures for revealing personal ex-
periences are not clearly stipulated within the literature of phenomenography. The term “bracket-
ing” indicates the methodological requirement for achieving understanding of the person’s experi-
ences and refers to the need for the researcher to set aside his own assumptions in order to register 
the subject’s own point of view (Ashworth, 1999). According to Marton (1994): “It is the researcher 
who is supposed to bracket preconceived ideas… he or she is supposed to focus on similarities and 
differences between the ways in which the phenomenon appears to the participants” (Marton, 1994, 
p. 4428). In this research the phenomenographic approach is used especially in the analysis process 
of the interviews, in the analysis processes of the open questions of the VEIVI security net survey 
and the strategic security survey. Additionally, the phenomenographic approach is applied in the 
remodelling process of security on the basis of the whole empirical data collection.  
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In the defence establishment equivalents to the phenomenographic approach may be found in mili-
tary pedagogy (MPED) that involves the principles of the cognitive-symbolic cultural tradition with 
the interpretive creation of a social world. Meanings have a major role both for the individual and 
for society, and thus the MPED develops research methods based on narratives, on open discussion 
and interaction between the researcher and the object. These stories are strictly connecting mean-
ings involved in processes of the narratives. (Florian, 2002, pp. 21-31; Kangas, 1999, pp. 18-20; 
Toiskallio, 1998a, pp. 57-59; Toiskallio, 1998b, pp. 12-13; Toiskallio, 1998c, pp. 162-165 and pp. 
178-180; Toiskallio, 2000b, pp. 45-64) 
 
 
6.2 Systematic analysis 
 
Content analysis from the data is a survey technique that has been used for the objective, systematic 
and quantitative description of the implementation of data communication.  (Kyngäs & Vanhanen, 
1999) In order to gain greater clarity on systematic analysis the core in the selection of premises, 
study framework, theoretical aspects, and the selection of texts has been described. In this way the 
analysis process gets as close as possible to the research object, and has the possibility of exploring 
the object in depth using the researcher’s insider knowledge and experience. Due to personal ex-
perience delusions may exist in the analysis, which are avoided by explicating the data in chrono-
logical order, and by reflecting on the framework. (Jussila, Montonen & Nurmi, 1989, pp. 203-204) 
In this study content analysis is applied in the analysis processes of the literature review in model-
ling security, in the analysis processes of the VEIVI security net survey data and in the analysis 
processes of the strategic security survey data. Systematic analysis can be criticised for being a sim-
ple non-academic analysis method. (Kyngäs & Vanhanen, 1999) For Berelson (1952) it is not only 
a data collecting and categorising method but it also develops our understanding of communication. 
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The data and references used in this study have a public nature, relationships and meanings and 
because the public nature of the organisations’ data may impact the credibility of the information, 
practice may differ a lot from the text. An awareness of this fact is essential in this study due to the 
sensitive character of security issues in the defence establishment.  
 
 
6.3 Narrative perspective 
 
Thinking flows between time, content and context orientation where the past, present and future all 
have their own horizons. On the other hand, the methodological approach shares aspects of narra-
tive research. Hänninen (1999) defines the narrative circle in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. The narrative circle (Hänninen, 1999, p. 21). 
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Narrative may be understood as a spoken or written account of events, a story. It may also have the 
meaning of telling the story. Academically, narrative research in this study is a story, which by 
definition has a beginning, middle, and end. The story happens at a time and place and in the middle 
when an unusual action or event occurs. (Denzin & Lincoln 2003, 3-4-,16, and 21-22.) 
 
The research has concretely changing influence in the defence establishment and clarifies the proc-
esses of security thinking from different perspectives. Additionally, procedures with different para-
digms are flexibly analysed and the active role of the author illuminates critical approach. Emanci-
pation is a useful approach because of the intention comes up with a different approach in the de-
fence establishment and to stir free discussion about the matter at hand.  
 
 
6.4 About reliability and validity 
 
In the phenomenographic approach there are criteria for reliability, both for the data and categories. 
In data reliability the critical factor is whether the data from the researcher’s perspective and from 
the object’s perspective is identical and that the data is relevant from the study premises. In the reli-
ability of the categories the critical factor is whether the categories present meanings, what object is 
meant and are the categories relevant from the study’s premises. Thus, phenomenography has been 
criticised for supporting the idea and of suspecting the thinking process to be static, and that it for-
gets the context of conceptions. (Syrjälä, et al., 1995, pp. 123-129) There is “an inevitable tension 
between being faithful to the data and at the same time creating, from the point of view of the re-
searcher, a tidy construction that is useful for some further explanatory or educational purpose” 
(Walsh, 1994, p. 19). Subsequently, in this study stages in analysis move away from the experience 
of the individual to a focus on the comparative experience, through the pooling and comparison of 
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quotations in the framework of meaning units. (Karlsson, 1993) The transcripts, recorded tapes and 
the picture of the interviewer also create an internal conformability perspective. This evidence re-
fers to the reliability of the description given by the participant. 
 
Reliability reflects on the strength and duration of the study, how cases are linked as belonging to 
the same category by different researchers or by the same researcher in different situations. (Jussila, 
Montonen & Nurmi, 1989, pp. 157-158) The analysis process is possible to evaluate in a way that 
from references and quotations in the text conclusions can be made. (Hammersley, 1992, p. 67) 
Authentic and primary reality are often more important to the qualitative research than reliability 
(Silverman, 1994, p. 10). Thus, the authentic, primary understanding was collected from the experi-
ences of the personnel of the MOD. This can be also seen as an explanation of the main object of 
the study in qualitative research terms because the ministry is small. The relationship between the 
researcher and object, in the MOD, can also be described more easily by political than scientific 
terms. (Hammersley, 1992, p. 67) The interpretations are attempted to express explicitly to extend 
reliability and to avoid the problem of the researcher not being objective in the analysis process. 
(Jussila, Montonen & Nurmi, 1989, p. 200) 
 
Validity means truth that has been interpreted to the extent where the report precisely presents the 
social phenomenon that it reflects. (Hammersley, 1990, p. 57) Face-validity as used by Cavanagh 
(1997) is described by using an evaluation group of the security experts of the Government in dif-
ferent phases of the study to evaluate and cross-check the content of the text, the material and the 
results. This procedure aims at securing credibility and dependability of the research and the report. 
A negative point for face-validity is that experts cannot understand the study in the same way as the 
researcher. The developer of the VEIVI survey used face-validity of the VEIVI security net survey 
to further improve its credibility and conformability. He reflected on and contributed to the inter-
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pretation of the results with the lifelong development process of the survey and with reflection to 
the results of other equal study archives.  
 
 
6.5 Data analysis process 
 
Interventions may have two-sided meanings: to change the reality, so that it is possible to study it, 
or to study reality, so that it could be changed. The nature of social activity explains this double 
meaning. Social activity is not static, even though it appears inconveniently to stabilise, structural-
ize and modify reality. This event includes the trend for the status quo phenomenon (Heikkinen & 
Jyrkämä, 1999).  
 
The interventions shown in Figure 18 have a vital role in this research, because they direct, guide 
and categorise the process of the inquiry. The interventions aim at change for the better, but in this 
study emphasis is on modelling strategic security and clarifying security conceptions of the person-
nel of the MOD. The aim of these interventions is to start a process, including the philosophical 
idea about lifelong change and development, where different bodies of security are in active interac-
tion. Thus, since April 2004 the Committee of Readiness, with the Directors General and Directors 
of Units chaired by the Permanent Secretary, has guided and directed the security analysis process 
of the MOD. Since February 2003, the Security Team with representatives from all departments and 
individual units has on monthly basis shared security information, evaluated and operationalised the 
security of the MOD.  These two elements of the security organisation of the MOD (n=15; 11 %) 
and other individuals actively dealing with security development procedure made up a continuous 
interaction between the researcher and the personnel. The data analysis process is presented in Fig-
ure 19. 
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Figure 19. The data analysis process. 
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Since February 2003, the Occupational Health and Safety Committee (n=12; 9 %), meeting a mini-
mum four times per year in addition to occasional exercises, education and training activities, in-
creased the added value of interaction among personnel involved in security issues. Therefore, the 
amount of responses from the elements of the inquiry was livelier than just the research activity 
itself. Due to this procedure the results of the research have a direct effect on the security of the 
MOD and add value for its development. However, the attitude of the top leadership is critical. Be-
cause of this structure of continuous interactive data collection, analysis and interpretation, the out-
come of this study is a combination of the parts of linked together like clusters. The surveys’ and 
interviews’ data collection is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
6.5.1 Data collection 
 
The continuous interactive data collection, analysis and interpretation procedure is the premise of 
the empiric research. The literature review, surveys and interview data collection is discussed in this 
paragraph in detail. The research material is mainly selected from dominant trends and partially 
from critical publications. The mainstream on security represents, for example, the ideas of Buzan 
(1990) and the social constructivist research heritage. This includes ideas about critical security and 
human security. From the defence establishment the study references have leaned on the concept of 
traditional realistic security, because it follows the dominant trends of the official Finnish security 
policy from a political perspective, especially in the military context.  The data collection process is 
presented in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20. Chart of data collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Systematic literature review for modelling security 
 
 
 
6.5.2 Systematic literature review for modelling security 
 
The systematic literature review for the modelling of security phase of the data collection produced 
17 files of organisational security information added to the theoretical security knowledge and sepa-
rate security reports on the security situation of the MOD. All data was collected from different 
perspectives and sectors of organisational security as shown in section 4.2. 
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VEIVI net survey, 22 statements per five options, and an open question, N=58 (47 %) 
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Interview week, (n=21) 
Security officer in the Defence Policy Department; research permission for the MOD, Head of 
security  
 
Occupational health and safety committee, (n=12)  
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9 
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The definitions of the learning organisation have been based on the ideas of Chowdhury (2003), 
Sarala (2001) and Alasoini (1999). Sarala and Alasoini can be found behind the trends and the con-
cept of the learning organisation produced by the Government. The Government and its guidelines 
have been used as a framework for this study because the MOD is a sub-organisation of the Gov-
ernment. The strategic planning perspective follows the ideas of Paris (2003), Niven (2003) and 
Koistinen (2002). Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) model of the Balance Scorecard (BSC) is applied as 
a tool, which is recently introduced to the MOD. The systematic literature analysis process as an 
element of the data analysis process of this research is demonstrated in Figure 21.  
 
Figure 21. Systematic literature analysis process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Previous research (Krogars 2001; Väänänen 2003) had collected data for security and thus re-
evaluation of this study was intensively linked to the re-organisation process of the MOD. Empiri-
cal data collection with surveys and interviews is applied in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
                                                 Literature review (theoretical review):  
  
• systematic analysis methodology in modelling security from the perspectives of multidi-
mensional learning (Constructivist theory), learning organisation theory, strategic plan-
ning theory and critical security theory 
• data collection (since 1997) -> systematic analysis -> coding -> categorising -> re-reading 
-> feedback -> re-coding -> re-categorising -> feedback ->re-coding -> re-categorisation -
> evaluating -> modelling the security model (implemented in chapter 7) 
 
 
                   
 
                    Security model 
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6.5.3 Empirical inquiry in the MOD 
 
The possibility to use the VEIVI -survey supported the decision making of the process. The need 
for a security survey emerged due to directives (VAHTI, 1/1999) linking it to the reorganisation of 
the MOD, as also shown in Figure 20. The MOD conducted the Security Analysis (VAHTI, 1/1999) 
according to the procedure defined by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in the VAHTI directives 
(www.vahti.fi). In practice the aim of this survey was expanded from the pure technical and physi-
cal security to include the overall security development of the MOD. This process is not appropri-
ately guided and, thus, modification for the needs of the MOD was possible. (Puolustusministeriö, 
2004h) Figure 22 clarifies the empirical analyses procedures.  
 
Figure 22. Empirical analyses procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       Empirical research - The security analysis of the MOD  
 
          
 
                     The VEIVI survey and the strategic security survey: 
- net survey -> systematic analysis -> coding -> categorising -> re-reading -> 
feedback -> re-coding -> re-categorising -> face-validity process -> feedback -
>re-coding -> re-categorisation ->evaluating to the security model -> 
evaluating reliability and validity -> interpretation with phenomenographic 
approach -> reflecting to the security model ->reporting results 
 
 
 
          
 
       Interviews: 
- separate safety and security interviews -> separate consultants -> semi-
structured interview questionnaires -> testing questionnaires in the security 
team -> re-implementing the questionnaires -> interviewees nomination by 
departments and units -> Interviews -> making notes -> taping -> daily 
debriefings -> feedback to the process -> evaluations -> rapid analysis -> 
feedback -> clarifying resercher’s intentions -> transcripting tapes -> 
bracketing meaning units -> coding -> categorisation -> face validity 
process -> feedback -> evaluation of categorisation -> renaming -> 
evaluating to the VEIVI survey results -> evaluating to the strategic 
security survey results -> feedback -> evaluating to the security model -> 
feedback -> evaluating reliability and validity ->interpretation with 
phenomenographic approach -> feedback to the security modelling ->  
reporting to the organisation  
 
 130 
6.5.4 Conducting the VEIVI survey  
 
The VEIVI safety and security survey system (Turvavironen, 2003) analysed the MOD its everyday 
settings in May-June 2003, attempting to interpret its security status in terms of the meanings peo-
ple bring to it. VEIVI is an abbreviation from the name of it’s inventor, Veijo Vironen, and its 
meaning in Finnish infers to a crank with which one can start an engine or some other process. The 
VEIVI survey is also governed academically by a phenomenographic approach. Like in the phe-
nomenografic literature (Marton, 1981, 1994; Marton & Booth, 1997) short freely written state-
ments were accepted in both the VEIVI survey and the strategic security survey. This method was 
applied to determine the conceptions of the security of the personnel of the MOD. The survey con-
sists of 22 statements, which are divided into five sectors. Those sectors are security policy of the 
organisation, security culture, security regulations, security control, and information security. The 
responses to these statements were collected on a scale from one to five:  
1) strongly disagree with the statement 
2) somewhat disagree with the statement 
3) undecided 
4) somewhat agree with the statement 
5) strongly agree with the statement 
 
Every statement offered an opportunity for the responder to insert his/her own comments. The last 
statement in the questionnaire was reserved for free personal comments, information and feedback. 
The statements of the questionnaire and five sectors of the VEIVI survey are shown in Appendix 1. 
In the MOD (N=124) 47 % (N=58) of the personnel responded to the survey. Some participants 
only partially responded and thus the number of responses per statement varies between 56 and 58 
people. The results of the responses are reported in the next chapter.  
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Using the Intranet of the MOD the commercial source VEIVI net survey was modified in order to 
promote its usability for the whole Government, and was expanded for possible future use in the 
state administration. The questionnaire was modified for the MOD two months in advance.  The 
personnel (N=124) were informed via the Intranet four weeks prior the survey. The MOD 
downloaded the questionnaire on its server, and simultaneously created a file for the data. The In-
formation Technology (IT) security personnel of the MOD downloaded the material, checked the 
programme, and piloted the functioning of the programme and the functioning of the survey on sev-
eral randomly chosen workstations. After the survey the IT security personnel downloaded the an-
swers to a disk, and delivered the disk to the commercial source. The functioning of the answer re-
cords was evaluated immediately when the survey started, and the IT security personnel any re-
paired minor faults. The period for responding to the survey was two weeks. 
 
All personnel (N=124) were sent an e-mail message via the server inviting them to complete the 
questionnaire. A link on the e-mail launched the survey, which could be completed online. After 
completing and closing the link the answers were recorded straightaway and automatically to the 
survey file in the server. The survey programme produced a coded answer and recorded the answer 
in cryptic form to the server. The MOD received the results of the survey from the contractor both 
electronically and on paper one week after sending the disk.  
 
 
6.5.5 Conducting the strategic security survey  
 
The following strategic level security survey design and questions are based on the similar theoreti-
cal, academic and methodological framework as the VEIVI survey. This phase of the survey is a 
part of a study conducted in the MOD to gain first impressions of the personnel concerning the con-
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tinuity of the reorganisation process of the ministry launched at the beginning of 2002. From the 
questionnaire (Väänänen, 2003) questions concerning strategic security were revised. The state-
ments of the questionnaire are in Appendix 2. In the MOD (N=124) 40 % (N=50) of the personnel 
responded to this survey. Some participants only partially responded and thus the number of re-
sponses per statement varies between 44 and 50 people, because 12 percent of the participants did 
not want to reveal their personal information, nor respond to all parts of the inquiry. The responses 
to these statements were collected on a scale from one to five such as in the VEIVI survey. The re-
sponse results are reported in the next chapter.   
 
For this research nine statements and one open question that are tightly connected to the security of 
the MOD were chosen from the total survey consisting of 60 statements and seven open questions. 
The open question offered the opportunity for free personal comments, information and feedback. 
The reasons for using existing material are: the content of the questions are relevant with this 
study’s goals; the timing of this survey is appropriate for the study entity; the questionnaire and this 
study share a similar basis with a five year research tradition in the MOD; these questions add value 
to this study; the analysis of this data deepens understanding of the object, and deepens the study’s 
results; this data broadens the perspective of the MOD administration to the strategic level needed 
for this study; and it takes advantage of the previous findings of the personnel of the MOD, who are 
tired of surveys due to a five year development process. The survey itself was conducted with a 
questionnaire delivered to all personnel (N=124) and responses were requested within two weeks. 
The responses of the questionnaire were analysed by the public Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) program. The study is published in the MOD Internet web site (www.defmin.fi).  
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6.5.6 Conducting the interviews 
 
Semi-structured interview methodology was chosen because the existing philosophical and meth-
odological alteration of knowledge about the personnel interaction situation makes it possible for 
the researcher in the MOD to go beyond the contrasting alternatives of uncontrolled case reports. 
The phenomenografic literature assumes that the use of interviews is the appropriate method for 
obtaining an account. (Marton, 1981, 1994; Marton & Booth, 1997) Thus, this is likely to be the 
most proper means of gaining a detailed account of the real-life world of the MOD staff.  
 
Departments and individual units were requested to select a total of 20 interviewees (Puolustusmin-
isteriö, 2004h) and to inform of their selection no later than the week prior to the interviews. All 
interviews were scheduled within a calendar week. None of those departments or individual units 
requested informed their candidates within the time period of the request. The only exception was 
the Permanent Secretary, with whom the procedure varied s that the interview time was checked in 
advance with his secretary and then scheduled. After re-requisitioning with a random sampling just 
before and during the interview on week 21 interviewees were gathered. For continuance and com-
parability reasons the categorisation of the interviewees is the same as in previous research (Kro-
gars, 2001; Väänänen, 2003). The number of interviewees, split into categories by their position in 
the organisation, is presented in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Interviewees in categories. 
 
Category Department/Unit Total  (%) 
 Top management SSDC DPD APD RPD AU IU AUDU   
Leader 1   1  3   5 23,3 % 
Expert   2 2 3 3  1 11 53,4 % 
Others     1 3 1  5 23,3 % 
 1 0 2 3 4 9 1 1 21 100 % 
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The interview data collection was separated into safety and security interviews. The semi-structured 
safety questionnaire is shown in Appendix 3. The number of safety interview participants split into 
categories by their position in the organisation is presented in figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Participants of safety interviews in categories. 
 
Category Department/Unit Total (F) (%) 
 Top management SSDC DPD APD RPD AU IU AUDU   
Leader      2   2 20,0 % 
Expert   2 1 1 2   6 60,0 % 
Others     1 1   2 20,0 % 
 0 0 2 1 2 5 0 0 10 100 % 
 
 
 
The semi-structured security questionnaire is shown in Appendix 4. The number of the security 
interview participants split into categories by their position in the organisation is presented in Figure 
25. 
 
Figure 25. Participants of security interviews in categories. 
 
Category Department/Unit Total  (%) 
 Top management SSDC DPD APD RPD AU IU AUDU   
Leader 1   1  1   3 27,3 % 
Expert    1 2 1  1 5 45,40 % 
Others      2 1  3 27,3 % 
 1 0 0 2 2 4 1 1 11 100 % 
 
 
 
The organisational procedure aimed at selecting participants so as to avoid pre-suppositional influ-
ence about the nature of the phenomenon, or about the nature of conceptions held by particular 
types of individual. However, whether departments or separate units used common-sense precau-
tions, or maintained a variety of experience, or used any other reason while selecting their partici-
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pants was not investigated. Selection of the interviewees on the volunteer basis was the only pre-
demand for the selection of the interviewees. 
 
Due to the sensitivity of the security issues in the MOD consultants were selected for the interview 
process. The position of the researcher as the Head of Security of the MOD and as an operational 
actor can have both a positive and negative effect on the interview situations. Thus, consultants 
were used to conduct the interview processes to achieve more neutrality. These procedures also 
increased the reliability and validity of the interviews. Three consultants were used for the safety 
interviews and one consultant was used for the security interviews. The consultants’ competence, 
both academic and their competence on security were confirmed from three different sources be-
cause their reputation for professionalism was the basis for their selection.  All of the selected con-
sultants accepted the request and share the respect of the main security partners of the MOD, the 
security department of the Government and the security department of the Finnish Defence Staff 
(FDS). All of the consultants used have the top-level of Finnish theoretical security education and 
several years of practical experience in the field of security surveys in the public and private sec-
tors. Interviewing and a short reports were expected of consultants, but it was the researcher who 
thoroughly analysed the data collected. 
 
One criterion for the qualification of the consultants was age seniority, because the average age of 
the personnel of the MOD year 2004 is 44,4 years, and because the consultants had to hold an equal 
physical seniority level with the top management of the MOD. The seniority of the consultants not 
only aimed at guaranteeing the quality of the consultants but also helped to achieve the trust and 
confidence of the interviewees. This is a very important aspect, especially, with the interviews of 
the top leaders of the MOD, such as the Permanent Secretary. 
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Semi-structured interview questionnaires were prepared together with the consultants on the bases 
of the VEIVI survey and strategic security survey results. Preparations were made separately with 
the consultants concentrating on the safety interviews on rescue and occupational health and safety 
issues and for the security interviews on the security leadership issues. The Security Team of the 
MOD tested both questionnaires in advance. After testing, only minor changes were needed to 
complete the questionnaires. 
 
The data was collected with semi-structured interviewing, with a time limitation of one hour per 
interview during normal office hours. The researcher took part in all of the interviews, taped them, 
and made notes on paper. The consultants were responsible for the conversation because the re-
searcher, as a participant of the organisation, was, during the preparations, considered to be too 
close to the interviewees. Nevertheless, the principle of allowing maximum freedom was agreed on 
for the participant to describe his or her conceptions and experiences of the matter at hand. This 
principle aimed at obtaining the most appropriate means of getting an account, because in obtaining 
experiential accounts the participant is given the maximum opportunity to reflect. Thus, the ques-
tions posed followed the flow of the interview situation, and emerged out of the interviewees’ inter-
ests to clarify their experiences, and were not based on the researcher’s presumptions.   
 
The interview practice noted the interviewee’s perspective, experience and conceptions and at the 
end of every interviewing day the interviewers debriefed the structure, content, context and results 
of the day. The idea of these debriefings was to act as an ongoing review of the interviewers’ skills 
and the interview practice. Another aim of these debriefings was to evaluate the questions used but 
no dramatic changes were needed.  
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6.6 Analysis process 
 
In the data analysis the research object and the MOD was studied both inductively from data prem-
ises and deductively from the strategic security conception system. The data was evaluated using 
systematic analyses and the phenomenographic approach as shown in Figures 21 and 22. The aim of 
these processes was to find the explicit messages, expressions of the documentation, and also hid-
den messages. It is here the experience, knowledge and security skills of the researcher are used, in 
the interpretation of the hidden messages. 
 
The data collection procedure presented in Figure 20 can be analysed from the perspective of Fig-
ure 3 (Boyatzis and Taylor, 2003, p. 231) so that with continuous feedback and interaction proce-
dures: (a) knowledge from data analysis is a transformation process, being continuously recreated, 
(b) collecting knowledge from data is not an independent entity to be acquired (c) the process em-
phasises learning as opposed to outcomes, (d) learning transforms experience in both its objective 
and subjective forms, and (e) lead the critical learning process of the development of security.  
 
 
6.6.1 The VEIVI survey analysis 
 
The VEIVI survey analysis is described in Figure 22. The analysis process was launched after re-
ceiving the raw data by coding the data according to the five sectors of the VEIVI survey and by 
continuing the analysis of the categorised material. Continuously re-reading the data along with the 
analyses processes forwarded straight feedback on both sides, and brought the categorised more 
towards those described in the security model compared to the VEIVI survey. After repeating this 
process, the face validation with the experts of the security sector in the Government and with the 
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inventor of VEIVI the researcher’s confidence was increased about the reliability and validity to the 
analyses processes. With feedback from face validation, evaluation of the re-coding and re-
categorisation forwarded the process to reflection on the security model (presented in chapter 7).  
 
In the VEIVI survey analysis was divided into five security sectors; personnel security, physical 
security, information security, occupational health and safety, and organisational security policy. 
These sectors and the questionnaire are presented in Appendix 1 with the statistics in Appendix 2. 
Interpretations of the results with the phenomenographic approach’s implemented findings are re-
ported separately to the organisation for use in the planning and decision making processes. Thus, 
the idea of changing the security of the MOD and learning from security as described was fulfilled 
with this analysis process. The results of the analysis process are presented in chapter 7 combined 
with the results of the other elements of the Security Analysis of the MOD.     
 
 
6.6.2 Strategic security survey analysis 
 
The strategic security survey analysis procedure was the same as the process of the VEIVI survey. 
Thus, since the VEIVI survey analysis was detailed in the previous section only the differences of 
are reported here. The coding and categorising processes more and more revealed the need for stra-
tegic level analyses, and created general categories suitable for modelling strategic level security 
better than the categorisation of the strategic security survey itself does. At an early stage the analy-
sis process added value for both modelling security and developing the security of the MOD. After 
having analysed the raw data, face validation was conducted with the experts of the security sector 
in the FDS. The findings were reported separately. Thus, the VEIVI survey analysis influenced this 
analysis, and these together influenced the findings for the preparations of the interviews. Both of 
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these analyses were presented to the Committee of Readiness of the MOD and to the Security Team 
of the MOD for feedback and comments, and to increase interaction, and expand the number of 
personnel involved in the security development of the MOD.  
 
The strategic security survey analysis is divided into four security sectors: capability to respond to 
threats, capability to react in a crisis situation, comprehensive national defence, and capability for 
rapid changes within the organisation. The analysis process background information follows the 
categories Krogars (2001) presented in Appendix 2. In the analysis of this research perspective to 
respond to change of threats was reconstructed and compared to the aim of the process of reorgani-
sation in the MOD to get the organisation to more actively follow the changes in the environment 
and to be more prepared for rapid change response. The capability to react in crisis situations was 
compared to the status of the MOD and to the tasks of the ministry as one of the key players in such 
situations in peacetime, but especially in the worst-case scenario, in other words, a military attack. 
Statutory tasks of the MOD, as a part of the Government, are to maintain readiness and to make 
preparations for leading the national defence of the nation in extreme situations, in wartime condi-
tions. In terms of comprehensive national defence one of the main intentions of the ministry’s reor-
ganisation process was to be more closely linked to the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). The results 
of the analysis process are presented in chapter 7 combined with the results of the elements of the 
Security Analysis of the MOD. 
 
 
6.6.3 Interview analysis 
 
The interview analysis process is presented in Figure 22. The analysis process was already launched 
during the interviews. The principle of allowing maximum freedom for the interviewee to describe 
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his/her conceptions and experiences about the matter at hand aimed at obtaining the most appropri-
ate means to get an account, because in obtaining experiential accounts the participant is given the 
maximum opportunity to reflect. Thus, the questions posed followed the narrative of the interview 
situation, and brought out the interests that clarify the interviewee’s experiences, not those based the 
on researcher’s presumptions about the issue. On the other hand, a paradox exists, because without 
the researcher’s pre-information, presumptions, and personal experience it is challenging to be able 
to focus on the core of the phenomenon. Another problem is the tendency of the interviewer to 
dominate and control the interview practice, and the situation, and not to adequately follow and 
interpret the participant’s responses, or to fail to follow through on the participant’s responses.   
 
After the interviews the researcher transcribed all of the taped interviews for a deeper analysis of 
the information. In the phenomenographic approach, according to Kvale (1996) research analysis of 
interviews tend to be transcribed verbatim prior to analysis. However, transcription is not necessar-
ily a neutral process, but much more than a mere clerical task. Transcription raises methodological 
and theoretical challenges, and thus the transcription procedure was followed as verbatim as possi-
ble in the interview practice. Thus, the transcription process consciously avoided, for instance, such 
things as stylistic traits, and minimised the tendency to foreclose description.  
 
After the transcription feedback stimulated recall was requested. From all of the (N=21) interview-
ees 62 % (n=13) responded to the request for stimulated recall with there only being a few minor 
corrections made in the transcriptions. This phase aimed at raising the credibility and conformabil-
ity of the survey, at giving feedback to the interviewees, at increasing interaction between the inter-
viewees and the researcher, and at expanding awareness of the strategic security of personnel. Nev-
ertheless, the author as the researcher felt he belonged to the MOD organisation, not as an outsider, 
but as a participant and as a learner. Thus, the social constructivist learning and knowledge ap-
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proach (Patrikainen, 1997; Vesalainen & Strömmer, 1999) servers as a bridge between social inter-
actions with fellow participants. Both content orientation and context orientation emphasises inter-
action between theory and practise where the past, present, and future, all have their own horizons 
and dimensions with the relativist concept of knowledge. Theoretical and methodological para-
graphs have illuminated this in more detail.  
 
With emphasis on analysis of the transcription including anything that is likely to affect the inter-
pretation of the meaning (Svensson and Theman (1983) the tapes were listened to several times 
during the initial analysis, rather than analysing the transcripts directly. The transcription phase was 
separated from the analysis phase in that the transcription stage was purely transcription. On the 
other hand, the analysis phase included anything that was likely to affect the interpretation of mean-
ing, and this aspect separated the analysis process from the transcription process. That is why tran-
scriptions are as verbatim as possible, and in the analysis phase tapes were listened to several times 
to find anything likely to affect the interpretation of meanings. In this phase coding, categorising, 
and interpreting with empathy were applied to re-transcription. 
 
While analysing, re-reading, coding, categorising transcripts, and discussing their conformability 
the multiple layers of meaning that were revealed in the embodied inter-relations were emphatically 
listened to. The kind of knowledge obtained in such interviews goes beyond the explicitly formu-
lated verbal dimension to encompass tacit knowledge. Much of the knowledge is based on intuition, 
empathy, and listening, (Kvale, 1999). Information is also provided by facial gestures and body 
postures, and is systematically employed with character analysis.  
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6.6.3.1 Bracketing meaning units of the interviews 
 
After the transcription process and the stimulated feedback of the interviewers the analysis process 
followed the guidelines set forth by Strauss and Corbin (1990) because bracketing may be an even 
more difficult issue than the interview when it comes to respecting the process of the interviewee’s 
reflection and, thus, issues of personal morality arise. In order to more properly hear the interviewee 
the researcher clarified his own intentions, bracketed the value basis of orientation, and gave his 
line of thought backed up by his judgements. These demands raise awareness of the warning signs 
that the researcher’s personal beliefs and knowledge may be intruding. 
 
To enhance the value of this significant part of the research analysis process two academic security 
experts were used for the face-validity approach. Two academic experts with years of theoretical 
and practical experience in security re-bracketed the transcriptions. On purpose the personal attitude 
of the first one was negative towards the wide range security approach and supported the realistic 
theory of security. The other expert had a positive attitude towards the wide range model of secu-
rity, similar the philosophy of this study. However, neither of them personally participated in the 
interviews but only used the transcriptions and tape recordings as sources while they together ana-
lysed the data.   
 
The emphasis was on the analysis of meaning units and bracketing was to count anything that was 
likely to affect the interpretation of meanings (Svensson & Theman, 1983). Therefore, it was useful 
to listen to the tapes several times during the analysis rather than to analyse directly from the tran-
script. In such a face-validity case as this, this was particularly important because the face-validity 
experts analysed the transcripts without being the interviewers. They were made aware that while 
bracketing and interpreting the data they had to avoid indications where their own assumptions, 
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rather than the experience of the interviewee, may have been directing the bracketing. Such poten-
tial warning signals as the feeling of impatience, or the perception of that the bracketing practice 
was being guided according to one’s own beliefs were noted when these issues where self-evaluated 
in the three process briefings with the experts. Briefings concerned the status of the re-transcription 
process, content, context and the evaluation of the data. Additionally, lively, even rigorous, random 
conversations were shared during their analysis process. However, both experts were aware of the 
possibility, so when this phenomenon was evaluated in briefings, it was kept under control. The 
face-validity results were highly equivalent to the bracketing results and the dependability and so 
add to the transferability of the results of this inquiry. 
 
Developing an empathic attitude while jumping into the flow of thought of the participants sensi-
tised the researcher to the experience of the participants. Wertz (1983) suggests that the initial 
analysis of interviews might be devoted to a “sensitisation”. From the very beginning the intention 
was to focus on the thinking and conceptions of the participants. In the beginning of the analysis 
process transcriptions were split into “meaning units” (Karlsson, 1993) identifying the shifts of 
meanings as a particular turning points. Marton (1994, p. 4428) entitled this process “bracketing”. 
Identification of the meaning units emphasised the intention to concentrate on the data, and jump 
into the transcription, and listen to the recorded interviews. During analysis it became obvious that 
there were points of focus that appeared to be central to the experience recounted by the partici-
pants. These points of focus where related to other aspects of the experience of security and learn-
ing about security. 
   
Repeated listening and reading of the data at hand produced individual pictures of the interviewees. 
These became obvious when jumping into the participants thinking and experience, and while seek-
ing similarities and differences from the experiences. This proved to be an important tool for devel-
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oping empathic understanding, as also interpreted by Karlsson (1993). On the other hand, this com-
parative process draws the researcher nearer and nearer to a new narrative as a result of the inter-
viewees’ narratives. This means that the result of the interview phase of the study was a narrative of 
the security model, in other words the strategic security model presented in chapter 7. Especially the 
content of the meaning units of the model sectors have risen from the data during the analysis proc-
ess as described in the next chapter.  
 
The analysis produced results in the orthodox way of phenomenographic findings, and does justice 
to the participants’ experience. Intentional counter arguments aided in finding the meaning units 
and in incorporating the descriptions by the interviewees into existing theoretical structures by look-
ing for discrepancies, or emphasising differences and details, as well as by debating with experts 
and professional colleagues. 
 
The first stage of the analysis process consisted of repeatedly reading the transcriptions, listening to 
the tape recordings, bracketing the meaning units, establishing mental pictures of the interviewers, 
coding and categorising the descriptions and continuing the bracketing of the categories in more 
detail. Three findings were bracketed: meaning units of threats to the MOD, five assets to be se-
cured, and six key meaning units of security. These findings are described in the next chapter.  
 
 
6.6.4 Deliberation 
 
The idea was to view the data in a new light. During the three year process traditional phenomeno-
graphic methodology was used. This included writing summaries, a total of 14 different reports 
from the previous process and three different reports from the interview data, as well as, looking for 
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commonalities, differences and for some surprises. Additionally, a variety of different imaginary 
roles in the process of listening to interviewees, or reading transcripts were adopted. The role of 
researcher according to the relativistic approach, the role of researcher according to the critical se-
curity approach, the role of desk officer in all three departments of the MOD, and the role of mili-
tary officer from the FD, international affairs were all taken and different features from the data 
were searched out. The data was reflected upon through self-interrogation, the research participants’ 
experiences were written, and pictures on paper, sampling them in different, unordered ways, were 
drawn. This study’s analysis had ecological relevance because the phenomenon was studied in the 
natural context that as it appeared in reality.  
 
However, the most stimulating way of reviewing the data was to engage in conversations with ex-
pert colleagues and, especially, with the academic experts, who bracketed the interviews data. This 
form of teamwork, on the basis of this experience during and after the analysis process, was the 
most inspiring experience. As a whole, the use of a variety of techniques and the possibility of using 
different approaches to view the data was a value in itself.  The results of this analysis process are 
presented in the next chapter. 
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7 RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The results are reported in this chapter.  The outcome of this study is a combination of the elements 
of the study linked together like clusters. The organisational parts connected to security issues 
bridged active interaction between the MOD staff and the researcher. Because of this interactive 
entity the procedure has not been linear and, thus, describing the results does not strictly follow the 
order of the research questions.  The results of the analysis of the separate study are reported in this 
chapter. The results are discussed in the order of the study questions in chapter 8, which already 
include interpretations and reflections of the previous parts of this report while modelling security. 
The process of implementing the results is presented in Figure 26.  
 
Figure 26. Process of implementing results. 
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7.1 Constructing the security model 
 
The context of this study comes from the Ministry of Defence (MOD) as a part of the Government 
with its status in European and Finnish society. The MOD participates in the development of the 
state administration that includes conceptions of learning, security and other strategic level features. 
The impact of the internal strategic perspective and, on the other hand, the organisational opera-
tional level approach shows a dualistic approach, that of strategic and operational levels to the re-
port of this study. The capabilities of learning to learn are key elements in future organisations also 
from the security perspective. 
 
The first finding was the perception that the task of the MOD applies to both strategic and opera-
tional levels, on an international level and in society, and also in the organisation. These levels are 
strongly integrated. This finding became stronger the more previous research, the theoretical back-
ground of security, international and national literature and governmental normative material was 
reviewed.  
 
Four aspects clarify the first finding. First, increased internationality, and international requirements 
of security demand a dynamic approach to the concept of security in Finland and, thus, changing the 
traditional concept of security in Finland and in the defence establishment is necessary. Second, the 
impact of security is horizontally breaking boundaries and security does not confine itself within 
national state borders, instead it influences all sectors of society and the defence establishment as 
well. Thus, the division between internal and external security is artificial, and the trend is towards 
a wide-range comprehensive strategic concept of security. The new ideas of Cohen (2002, pp. 13-
20) and Kaldor, et al. (2004) support this analysis, even though they use the term human security. 
Third, technical information security (www.mintc.fi) has lost its status as a separate driving actor of 
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security to the trend for comprehensive operational security. Fourth, security is more increasingly 
becoming a crucial factor of international and national competitiveness, which links security to the 
success factors and principles of a learning organisation and makes strategic planning one of the 
change actors.  
 
The second finding was that there is a need for a new security model. Since making the individual 
the object security issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of organisation 
theory. Nevertheless, the individual humanistic perspective has made little impact on academic se-
curity studies. As a result, attempts to rethink the notion of security and to clarify the needs for a 
new security model Walker focuses on in a text:  
“Uncertainty of certain things is, of course, precisely the problem. For in the end it has 
never been possible to pin security down to concrete practices or institutions with any 
gear precision, no matter how insistent the voices of military and defence establish-
ments might be. The whole point of concepts of security that are tied to the claims of 
state sovereignty is that they must expand to encompass everything within the state, at 
least in its ever potential state of emergency. So, in this context, broadening the con-
cept as such is not really the problem; difficulties arise only with the kind of broaden-
ing that is envisaged” (Walker, 2003, pp. 75-76).  
 
Modelling security helps people to understand the meaning and content of the term. On the basis of 
the previous chapters it became apparent that none of the security models described in the theoreti-
cal part of this study, in chapter 4, comprehensively met the demands for the security of a learning 
organisation. None of the security models fully responded to the new threats from the changing se-
curity environment as is necessary in the 21st century. Neither do they particularly consider the 
Government strategic level, and the MOD as its subordinate organisation, which simultaneously 
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operates on strategic and operational levels. As a response to the need for modelling comprehensive 
security on the basis of the literature review and theoretical studies, the conclusion for the structure 
of organisational security in the Strategic Security Model (SSM) is shown in Figure 27. 
  
Figure 27. Organisational security in the Strategic Security Model (SSM). 
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coalition of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, skills and behaviours. Previous pa-
rameters define what the attitude towards security management is, and how security leadership is 
conducted in an organisation and how successful, in practice, security is in an organisation. Com-
munication is based on the common trust and understanding of the meaning of the term security, as 
well as, on a belief in the effectiveness of predictive security. These are the characteristics of an 
organisation with a good and successful security culture. 
 
Operational security includes all those actions that detect, evaluate, identify and counter threats and 
risks that jeopardise the fulfilment of the mission. Operational security reduces the likelihood of 
faults, accidents and negative consequences. The emphasis is put on the actions that follow national 
and international principles of good governance. Confidentiality, integrity and availability of infor-
mation are protected against risks and threats caused by malfunctions of electronic equipment, sys-
tem disturbances, or against natural disasters and environmental accidents. Protection is also needed 
against different kinds of abnormalities, be they intentional or by accidental that may result in the 
materialisation of risks or threats.  
 
Information security means the proper protection of information, systems, services, and electronic 
and hardware in normal and in emergency situations. The measures used are both functional and 
technical. Information security includes all those functions that guarantee information, either pro-
duced within the organisation or from outside the organisation. That data must be reliable, confi-
dential, continuous, complete, and accessible to authorised users with the principles of meeting the 
security objectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Information security and the secu-
rity of information material is a concern of all personnel for its entire lifespan. It includes the secure 
handling of information and arrangements for the training of all personnel on the contents of the 
instructions for handling information.  
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The aim of physical security is to secure high security-level buildings where security control is a 
part of the organisation’s core tasks. Declarations, permits and certificates concerning security are 
the responsibilities of the head of security and these and other statutory certificates are documented 
in one common register. Physical security includes the control of visitors, controlling the movement 
of one’s own personnel, physical surveillance, technical surveillance and security equipment, build-
ing protection and special facilities. Personnel security means measures to reduce personnel-related 
risks, and to protect key personnel against threats and to secure operations and actions so that the 
threats against one’s own personnel are minimised. 
 
The MOD was a relevant subject for an empirical survey of security from the point of view of the 
SSM. The analysis of the literature review showed that the MOD has two overlapping security sec-
tors. The first is the strategic level, which includes international security issues and requirements, 
the national state legislation, the normative security level as a part of Finnish society, and the de-
fence establishment security guidance perspective. The second is the operational level, which in-
cludes security issues inside the MOD organisation, co-operation within the Government and co-
operation with partners such as the FDS.  
 
Changing the focus of security to the individual in the SSM paradoxically allows an appointment 
with the broadest global threats. Humanity arises as an issue when discussing treating individuals as 
decent persons, as citizens, or members of society, or as members of a global community. Making 
individuals as persons the object of security opens up the podium for critical scrutiny. Focusing on 
individuals as citizens illustrates a central dynamic in contemporary life.  Directed threats to per-
sons can move towards from the institutions of organised violence of their own state. A person as 
the object of security treats individuals as members of a human community with ordinary global 
concerns. Thus, the SSM serves both strategic and operational levels of an organisation.  
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In organisational security the SSM leadership refers to the organisation’s comprehensive leadership. 
Security leadership is a natural part of an organisation’s leadership, and it is adapted to the organi-
sation’s finance, operations and objectives and puts a special emphasis on identifying threats and 
risks. Leadership works out programmed actions supporting an organisation’s strategy, policies, 
principles and operations.  
 
As the model was purely theoretical it was tested in the MOD. The security analysis (Puolustusmin-
isteriö, 2004) process was applied as a tool, which had an instrumental role for this model develop-
ing process. The model was evaluated through the conceptions of security of the personnel, because 
in the construction phases of this SSM it had already been internationally compared to the European 
Union (EU), The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), The Organisation for Security Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) standards, in the national VAHTI directives (www.vahti.fi) and to Finnish national safety 
and security legislation. That is why conceptions of the MOD personnel are important in this study 
as well as in developing the process of the security of the MOD.  Thus, the findings of the empirical 
study are reported in the next section and in the next chapter the interpretations of the findings are 
discussed. The following remodelling has been made as a result of the previous empirical inquiry, 
security surveys and interviews, and the findings of the conceptions of security of the personnel.   
 
 
7.2 Conceptions of security of the personnel of the MOD 
 
In this section the findings are reported from the perspective of the SSM. However, this phase of the 
construction process emphasises the value orientation of the MOD, tasks of the MOD and the Gov-
ernment framework as a part of society added to the previous chapter’s theoretical analysis. The 
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questionnaire for the VEIVI survey is in Appendix 1 and the questionnaire for the strategic security 
survey is in Appendix 2. The statistics of the responses are presented in Figure 28.  
 
Figure 28. Statistics of the responses  
 
 N=58+50=108  SCALE 
ITEM 
Strongly 
disagree  
Somewhat 
disagree Undecided 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree SUM 
Security policy 9 20 68 66 11 174 
Security culture 4 10 23 107 204 348 
Security instructions 25 76 118 68 0 287 
Security control 12 46 83 86 58 285 
Information security 5 29 50 62 25 171 
Respond to threats 11 42 62 32 3 150 
React in crisis situation 3 43 28 15 11 100 
National defence 7 45 55 28 15 150 
Capability for changes 0 13 25 8 4 50 
Total 76 324 512 472 331 1715 
 
 
The most positive and encouraging finding of this study was the enthusiastic attitude of the person-
nel of the MOD expressing a strong motivation for improving the security system in the MOD. This 
finding was clearly visible in the VEIVI survey results when the strategic security survey and when 
the interviews were analysed. This provides an excellent opportunity for a successful security de-
velopment process. One positive indication of the enthusiasm about the security issues was the re-
sponse percentage of 47 % (N=58) for the VEIVI survey. Academically, this percentage is low, but 
in the especially passive and traditional cultural heritage of the security of the MOD it is good. With 
enthusiasm for security issues the interview results particularly expressed challenging expectations 
for the change process regarding security of the MOD. However, despite this crucial finding this 
research’s interpretations are challenged by inertia towards the security of the MOD and the results 
of this study revealed a great deal of complacency. The situation from the research point of view is 
 154 
interesting because, paradoxically, the study results show several discrepant situations, both on the 
strategic and operational levels. An indication of discrepancy from the previous positive result was 
the starting process of the interview week, when none of the departments or individual units reacted 
to the request signed by the Permanent Secretary.    
 
The strategic security survey (N=50) results showed a trend for participation of the personnel of the 
MOD, and as it is the same in different parts of the entire inquiry it allows the possibility of general-
ising. Therefore this statistic is not repeated again.  The results showed that experts (43 %) consti-
tute the largest group of personnel (mode [Mo]=2; median [Md]=2) (Heikkilä, 2004, pp. 84-89) in 
the MOD and 60 % have a Master of Arts degree of education (Mo=4; Md=4; mean=3,5). The Ad-
ministration Policy Department was most active (31 %) in responding (Mo=1). Of the personnel 58 
% have served over 10 years in the MOD (Mo=5; Md=4), and 35 % for less than six years. The 
statistics of correlations for both the VEIVI survey and the strategic security survey are presented in 
Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29. Statistics of correlations. 
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VEIVI survey         
Security policy 1                
Security culture -0,38 1              
Security instructions 0,73 -0,89 1            
Security control 0,92 -0,01 0,44 1          
Information security 0,95 -0,23 0,56 0,91 1        
Strategic security survey               
Respond to threats 0,66 -0,91 0,99 0,36 0,47 1      
React in crisis situation -0,09 -0,87 0,58 -0,46 -0,22 0,64 1    
National defence 0,47 -0,94 0,93 0,14 0,24 0,97 0,76 1  
Capability for changes 0,57 -0,78 0,90 0,33 0,30 0,93 0,53 0,94 1
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The results in Figure 29 show that security control and security culture in the VEIVI survey have 
low correlation (Pearson correlation=-0,01) and security policy in the VEIVI survey has no correla-
tion to reaction in a crisis situation in the strategic security survey (Pearson correlation=-0,09). On 
the contrary, security instructions in the VEIVI survey have high correlation with responding to 
threats in the strategic security survey (Pearson correlation=0,99).  
 
 
7.2.1 Conceptions of the operational level security 
 
The operational level security results are analysed from the VEIVI survey. Results of the VEIVI 
survey (N=58) showed that the security policy of the MOD was clear or partially clear for 34 % of 
the respondents (n=26; Mo=3; Md=3). A total of 45 % (n=32) thought that the security principles of 
the MOD were not clear or that there is a lot to do to make them clearer. The results showed that 90 
%  (n=52) were satisfied with the current security culture and thought that it is everyone’s business 
to see to the security of the workplace (Mo=5; Md=5). The statistics on the results of the VEIVI 
survey are presented in Figure 30.  
 
Figure 30. Statistics of the VEIVI survey  
 
 N=58 SCALE  
Item 
Scale 
Sum Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Standard 
Deviation Mode Median Reliability 
Security policy 174 3,32 0,12 0,88 3 3  0,96 
Security culture 348 4,45 0,11 0,8 5 5  0,87 
Security instructions 287 2,8 0.12 0.88 3 3  0,93 
Security control 285 3,51 0,14 0,83 4 4  0,88 
Information security 171 3,49 0,12 0,9 4 4  0,89 
 VEIVI 1265  3,51  0,12  0,85  4  4  0,90 
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Three percent (n=2) considered security to be mainly the matter of the security personnel.  An im-
portant finding from the results was that 97 %  (n=56) were either completely ready or at least ready 
to a great degree to change their habits, if reasonably required for security reasons (Mo=5; Md=5). 
The results showed that 71 %  (n=40) thought that there is hardly any control or that they were not 
certain whether or not the personnel were following the security instructions. The results showed 
that six percent (n=3) responded that there is no control over following security instructions in the 
MOD (Mo=4; Md=3). The results revealed that 41 % (n=24) held that the methods are not clear 
enough, but that there is some kind of system in the MOD for claiming and reporting, while 43 % 
(n=25) thought that there is no clear claim and report system for perceived abnormalities and com-
promise of security.  
 
The results showed that no one stated that personnel receive sufficient security education and train-
ing, or that security information would be well directed. Consequently, 35 % (n=20) answered that 
there is no security education and training in the MOD and that they have received very little in-
formation on security issues (Mo=4; Md=3).  
 
The results revealed that 72 % (n=41) believed that outdated classified documents are demolished 
quite safely (Mo=4; Md=3). Two percent (n=1) considered to master the information security in-
structions of the MOD. However, 67 % (n=38) only somewhat knew the information on security 
instructions (Mo=3; Md=3). There were no great differences between means, standard errors of the 
means and standard deviation, thus the data is significant. Information security was the greatest 
concern of the open questions and the written feedback mostly deal with that question. This item 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
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7.2.2 Conceptions of strategic level security 
 
The strategic level security results were analysed from the strategic security survey. The strategic 
security survey (N=50) results showed that 24 %  (n=12) were satisfied with the MOD’s capability 
to respond to changing threats at least “well” (Mo=3; Md=3), and 32 %  (n=16) considered that the 
MOD spends enough resources for monitoring threats and for surveillance. The results showed that 
38 % (n=19) thought that the threats affect actions in the MOD (Mo=2; Md=3). The statistics on the 
results of the strategic security survey are presented in Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31. Statistics of the strategic security survey 
 
N=50 SCALE 
Item 
 
Scale Sum Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Standard 
Deviation Mode Median Reliability 
Respond  to threats 150 3,01 0,13 0,93 3 3  0,95 
React in crisis situation 100 3,44 0,14 0,98 4 4  0,86 
National defence 150 3 0.14 1,02 3 3  0,94 
Capability for changes 50 2,94 0,12 0,87 3 3  0,90 
Strategic security 450 3,09 0.13 0,95 3 3  0,92 
 
The results showed that 48 % (n=24) believed that the MOD possesses the readiness to react effec-
tively in a crisis situation (Mo=2; Md=3), and 60 % (n=30) believed in its sustainability in a crisis 
situation (Mo=2; Md=2). The results showed that 36 % (n=18) believed that the MOD is capable of 
leading the national defence against a military threat in wartime conditions (Mo=2; Md=2). None-
theless, 70 % (n=35) believed that the nature of threats in recent years have influenced the MOD, 
and 50 % (n=25) from departments responsible for guiding the defence establishment shared a be-
lief in the need for an integrated total defence. However, the management personnel were the least 
likely to believe in this need for integration. There were no great differences between means, stan-
dard errors of the means and standard deviation, thus the data has significance. 
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7.2.3 Interviews  
 
The interviews (N=21) were conducted within a calendar week with separate semi-structured safety 
and security questionnaires. The safety questionnaire is presented in Appendix 3 and the security 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix 4. The results revealed strong positive motivation regarding 
security from the personnel. The results also showed that threats against the MOD were the internal 
management system of the MOD, leaking information, a confidence gap between persons, lack of 
capability to follow and react to changes in the environment, lack of capability for rapid flexible 
changes, overlapping duties within the organisation, accidents, stress, urgency, illnesses that soon 
reflect on the small resources, mischief, vandalism, strategic and operational outsourcing, bomb 
attack, and letter bombs. The threats at the top of the list were seriously linked to the strategic, top 
leadership performance level, and moving more towards the end of the list items were more and 
more linked with the operational, executive level. However, they have a strongly overlapping na-
ture. Additionally, accidents where linked to the bad physical shape of the MOD building and to the 
upcoming renovation of it. Another finding was that threats include both “hard” security and “soft” 
safety elements. A key issue with regards to threats was expressed in a response from person num-
ber three (interviewee 3= I 3) as follows: 
“… I assume that, anyway, the human being is the biggest risk in this house …” (I 3) 
 
The results showed that the assets to respond to threats were being allocated to information, organ-
isational image, personnel, environment and material. The interviewees emphasised that assets are 
tenaciously linked to each other even though information and image were emphasised. This finding 
was used in modelling security. 
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The results emphasised six key meaning units: security leadership, security culture, information 
security, operational security, personnel security and physical security. These were the key findings, 
but emergency planning and rescue security, as well, were raised. The descriptions of the last two 
findings were different, because emergency planning was linked to strategic level issues, while res-
cue security was linked to operational level of the performance of the every day life at the MOD. 
These findings were used in modelling security. 
 
The meaning units were described with different terminology. Security leadership was illuminated 
with terms and expressions like value-based leadership, task and aim-oriented, legislation-oriented, 
commitment, security strategy and security policy, security organisation and responsibilities, occu-
pational healthy and safety management, civil defence, comprehensive training program, security 
dimensioning, reporting system, comprehensive working order, exceptional conditions manage-
ment, crisis management, corporate governance, user administration, development discussion, bo-
nus-based pay system, and responsibility of an official for the above mentioned. The following re-
sponse shows conceptions of the security leadership: 
“… the leadership of this organisation should be involved in security and readiness is-
sues… as a constituent part of the entity…” (I 15) 
 
Security culture was described with terms and expressions like accepted values, comprehensive 
crisis concept (i.e. not only war), guests, handling groups of co-operation and partnership (mainte-
nance, cleaners, etc.), documentation handling, inconspicuous security principles, security image, 
reputation, serious and realistic attitude to security, anticipatory, behaviour, openness principles, 
administrative culture, security awareness, static and indifferent leadership, and concept of security, 
narrow/old vs. wide/comprehensive. The status of the security culture was repeatedly described as 
follows: 
 160 
“… we have a very open culture, and I can go to my neighbour’s office and … I can 
go to his file cabinet to look for a paper …” (I 3) 
 
Information security was described with terms and expressions like security of the information, us-
ability of information, credibility of information, availability of information, information classifica-
tion, loss and miss of classified information, life long log file surveillance, security arrangements, 
knowledge skills, competence area, information analysis, and intelligence and espionage detection. 
A reflection on information security is expressed in the next quotation:  
“… this kind of open preparedness should be aimed at … and still things ought not to 
be published too early … rumours, disinformation, wrong news, inconsiderate an-
nouncements, unprofessional communications, unskilled crisis communication are 
concrete threats …” (I 3) 
 
Operational security was described with terms and expressions like meeting arrangements, reserve 
system, groups of co-operation and partnership, instructions, operational user administration, em-
ployee lifelong career, initiation processes, control and inspections, identification, quality systems, 
post lifelong career, crisis information, exceptional conditions instructions, self-monitoring, out-
sourcing, corporate governance, security agreements, and administrative authority co-operation. 
Persons’ number 4 and 9 expressed examples from operational security: 
 “Security improvement is everyone’s duty… from my point of view the administra-
tive line of the organisation is responsible for security … we have to be involved as 
early as possible in security issues …” (I 4) 
 
“I would probably start from here - that our actions are based on trust – department … 
actions are based on trust but how it is earned is a mental picture … ” (I 9) 
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Personnel security was described with terms and expressions like rights and duties, pressure, stress 
– busy, schedule, lack of instructions, etc, security clarification, reserve system, employment – 
permanent/uncertain, people are the greatest risk, international interoperability, demographic struc-
ture, employee health care, debriefing system, occupational exhaustion, frustration, and legal cer-
tainty. Thus, reflecting on the above mentioned the situation is clarified by the following quotation: 
 “As far as I understand the MOD lacks consistent information security directives or at 
least they are not given of staff.” (I 1) 
 
Physical security was described with terms and expressions like information network safety (physi-
cal, firewalls, virus programs, etc), compartment system of a facility, locking system of a facility, 
loss of information, misinformation, safety and security surveillance systems, physical protection, 
access control system, environment, high standard equipment and systems, spatial planning, in-
truder detection systems, integrated and automatic information collection systems, and air-
conditioning. The following quotations describe the situation of physical security: 
“… in that sense it was previously an ‘open doors culture’, but later doors have been 
shut more and more …” (I 7) 
 
“… but as far as I am concerned it would be a good thing to lock your door always 
when you leave your room, because tables are full of papers, many times computers 
are on … because an outsider does not need to see those papers …” (I 6) 
 
Emergency planning was described with terms and expressions like readiness planning and readi-
ness training. Rescue security was described with terms and expressions like fire and safety rescue 
planning, fire and safety training, atomic, biological and chemical (ABC) defence system, and sud-
den health emergencies. The change process of security thinking can be seen in the following quote:   
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“… thinking has been changed in line with the strategy for securing the functions vital 
to society. Moving from one readiness condition to another can be flexibly executed 
and the process contains no more stages … The gradual approach is more legislative 
than authoritative …” (I 10) 
 
 
7.3 Modified security modelling 
 
The findings from the empirical study also lead to the re-modelling of the strategic security model 
(SSM). Three findings were bracketed: meaning units of threats against the MOD, five assets to be 
secured, and six key meaning units of security. The meaning units are presented in detail in section 
7.2.3. Modifying the SSM includes response to both “hard” and “soft” elements. The SSM ap-
proach involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach towards more interpretive 
and empathic modes of analysis. To be aware of security from a broader viewpoint means: that both 
intellectual and material objects have shifted; looking at the perceptions of threats to individuals; 
the ways in which the objects are protected; and at the obtainable tools of securing them. 
 
The crucial findings showed that those six key issues do not depend on the status of personnel; both 
strategic and operational levels should have the six key meaning units. They all are linked together, 
they are overlapping, they are competing with each other, and thus they create a cluster combina-
tion, where rescue issues from the operational level establish a concrete basis for the development 
of security and end with a high readiness of emergency planning capability to fulfil the rigorous 
demands of the worst case scenarios, i.e. war-time crisis. These extremes are tied together with stra-
tegic security clusters, not as a linear, but as a multidimensional coherent interrupted wave. Effi-
cient rescue readiness is a concrete every-day issue, real time effort towards a secure organisation, 
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which has a similar philosophical basis as emergency planning and which is much more abstract in 
a learning organisation. However, emergency planning is an essential part of the public authority 
task of the MOD. Thus, strategic security should be integrated into the every day procedures of the 
MOD, and not viewed as a separate part of the performance of the organisation. 
 
The strategic security role of the MOD is a vital element in the performance of the organisation. 
The MOD has two overlapping security sectors: the strategic level including international security 
issues and requirements, the national state legislation and the normative security level as a part of 
Finnish society, and the defence establishment security guidance perspective; and the operational 
level including co-operation within the Government and co-operation with partners such as the FDS 
and security issues inside the MOD organisation. Study findings, where a close group of people, 
organisations or things resembling each other and operating in the same area in interaction, compete 
and co-operate together and change together lead thinking to clusters because a cluster is under-
stood as combining knowledge. Renewing used resources and qualitative development is possible in 
cluster thinking.  
 
The agenda of strategic security is a wide-ranging understanding of security, and the overlapping 
connections between security levels are essential, such as those that cluster thinking has. Levels are 
divided into global, regional, national, organisational and individual levels. The organisational secu-
rity level may also include international features, not only national, even though the model places it 
between the individual and the nation. Sectors are divided as Buzan (1991, p. 363) does into politi-
cal, military, societal, economic and environmental sectors, which are bound together by the con-
cept of security. The model demands an integrative perspective and full understanding of each of 
these levels and sectors can be gained, if they are related to the others.  (Buzan, 1991, p. 363) This 
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demand is also shared with strategic and operational levels within an organisation because the indi-
vidual perspective is the basis for the ordering feature of both levels.  
 
Thus, the cluster thinking point of view brings the finding to the need to re-model the SSM. Cluster 
thinking more accurately describes the nature of multidimensional expanded security in a learning 
organisation, and especially includes leveraging security at the MOD. Security as a highly applied 
mechanism requires pro-activity, initiative, creativity, and ingenuity. Thus, the general model in-
cludes a security leadership cluster; a security culture cluster; an information security cluster; a per-
sonnel security cluster; a physical security cluster and an operational security cluster. Additionally, 
the MOD public authority model includes an emergency planning cluster and a rescue cluster.  
 
This model includes five assets to be secured: information, personnel, material, image and environ-
ment. These assets are not separate, but instead are all closely connected and linked to each other. 
However, as this is a model of organisational security the centre of assets is a kind of ideal goal, 
which differs from organisation to organisation. Thus, also the size, amount and content of different 
assets are flexible; such as is suitable for cluster thinking. According to the needs of an organisation 
clusters are also emphasised following the significance of assets to be secured, and resources to be 
used in accordance to the strategic planning in the organisation.  
 
Cluster discursion emphasises long-term competitiveness and knowledge of the organisations they 
create in clusters. A typical feature for clusters is their ability to live in close connection with their 
environment within a given time frame. At state level administration this means pro-activity on the 
part of the organisation to ensure the needs of stakeholders, and thus MOD security may be consid-
ered to consist of clusters. The MOD’s situation is modified according to the strategic security role 
in the organisation’s strategic planning in Figure 32. 
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Figure 32. Strategic security role in the organisation’s strategic planning 
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The changing environment challenges the existing knowledge paradigm, and the ability as well as 
willingness to share common knowledge is always a basic dimension of developing a cluster in se-
curity administration that emphasises the operational and structural flexibility of the clusters. The 
re-modelled Cluster Strategic Security Model (CSSM) is shown in Figure 33.    
 
Figure 33. The CSSM as an Organisational Cluster Security Model 
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phasis on identifying threats and risks. Leadership works out programmed actions supporting the 
organisation’s strategy, policies, principles and operations, and thus, the strategic security leader-
ship (SSL) is integrated to the organisation’s strategic decision-making process. Access control and 
user administration are the key elements of the strategic security leadership cluster functions. 
 
Security culture cluster means a coalition of individual and organisational values, attitudes, percep-
tions, skills and behaviours, committed and up-dated norms and directives, both professional and 
personal. The security culture cluster includes goal-oriented operations, where a person’s self-
assessment supports the strategic security of the organisation. In the organisational security culture 
cluster communication is based on common trust, a common understanding of the meaning of secu-
rity, and on the common belief for the effectiveness of predictive security.  
 
The operational security cluster includes all actions that detect, evaluate, identify and counter 
threats and risks jeopardising the fulfilment of the task of the organisation. The operational security 
cluster reduces the likelihood of faults and accidents and their consequences. The emphasis is put 
on the actions following international principles of good governance, usability, credibility and 
availability of information is protected from risks and threats caused by malfunctions in electronic 
equipment, system disturbances or natural disasters and environmental accidents. Protection is also 
needed against different kinds of abnormalities, be they intentional or accidental, which result in the 
materialisation of risks or threats.  
 
Information security cluster means the proper protection of knowledge, systems, services, hardware 
and electronic devices in normal and in emergency situations. The measures used are both func-
tional and technical. The information security cluster includes those functions that guarantee that 
the information is reliable, confidential, continuous, complete, and accessible for authorised users 
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with the principles of meeting the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
The information security cluster and the security of information material is a concern of all person-
nel for its whole lifespan. It includes the secure handling of information and arrangements for the 
training of all personnel on the content of the instructions for handling information.  
 
The aim of the physical security cluster is to secure high security-level buildings, and has security 
control as a part of the organisational core tasks. Declarations, permits and certificates concerning 
security are the responsibilities of the head of security, and these and other statutory certificates are 
documented in one common register. Physical security includes the control of visitors, controlling 
the movement of one’s own staff, physical surveillance, technical surveillance and security equip-
ment, building protection and special facilities.  
 
The emergency planning cluster means the readiness planning and preliminary preparations for it, 
to ensure that duties can be carried out with minimal disruption under exceptional circumstances. 
Preparations for exceptional circumstances are a continuous part of the every-day security functions 
of an organisation. Preparations emphasise continuity of functions in severe, exceptional situations, 
such like military threats. The rescue cluster means proactive planning and preliminary preparations 
like drills, excercises and so on to ensure that normal duties can be carried out with minimal disrup-
tion under exceptional circumstances. Preparations for exceptional circumstances, such as fire and 
bomb threats, are a continuous part of the every-day security functions of an organisation. The res-
cue cluster includes saving, or taking something or someone away from a dangerous or harmful 
situation. Preparations emphasise continuity of normal situation functions. A detailed categorisation 
of the elements of clusters is presented in Figure 34.  
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Figure 34. Categorisation of the elements of clusters in the CSSM. 
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As previously described this categorisation, and especially the content of the elements, are con-
structed in line with the phenomenografic approach from the responses of the personnel of the 
MOD in the VEIVI survey, the strategic security survey and interviews. The personnel security 
cluster means all measures reducing personnel-related risks, protecting key personnel from threats, 
and securing operations and actions so that the threats against one’s own personnel are minimised.  
 
The organisational security clusters create a continuum integrated into core functions of the organi-
sation from normal, every-day functions and operations to the worst-case scenario of threat, a war-
time situation. Successful strategic level implementation requires common processes and informa-
tion structures and strong human influence between different clusters, organisations, and different 
information contents. Preparations construct a continuum of actions based on prior activities. In 
other words, the organisational security cluster includes step-by-step planning and preparations for 
a variety of emergency situations so that during normal situation preparations are planned and exer-
cised and that all personnel know their tasks and actions in emergency situations, which are also 
exercised. Normal organisational security cluster thinking includes the continuum aspect, but emer-
gency planning has also been assigned to public authorities as a special mission. Organisational 
security cluster thinking includes integrated natural security participation for all functions of an 
organisation. The strategic security cluster concept supports comprehensive strategic planning and 
execution by merging the actions of all parts of an organisation around a common understanding of 
its goals, by facilitating the assessment, and by upgrading the strategy.  
 
The real power of the strategic security cluster occurs when it is transformed into a leadership sys-
tem. The strategic security cluster system provides the information age organisation with efficient 
planning tools because it aligns and supports the key processes. Clarifying the security of the MOD, 
both on the strategic and operational levels, and updating security strategy identifies and aligns stra-
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tegic security initiatives, links strategic objectives to long-term targets and annual budgets, aligns 
strategic and operational reviews, obtains feedback to learn about and improves the security of the 
MOD, as well as the internal, central government leadership system.  
  
 
7.3.1 Leadership of strategic security 
 
The three key approaches of this study, critical security, strategic planning and the learning organi-
sation, emphasise the importance of leadership. Thus, the strategic security leadership (SSL) model 
is described by modifying the Deep Leadership Model (DLM) which consists of the constructivist 
framework of leadership. The DLM has been selected as the basis for this approach, because it was 
developed in the Finnish defence establishment. It is a new model but it has still been successful in 
practice, and it shares the humanistic basic premises of this study. It is understood as a model for 
the constructive change actor, it includes the idea of a vision and uses a strategy to achieve that vi-
sion According to it both the vision and the strategy are communicated to people, the people under-
stand the goal and believe in the common goal. According to the DLM, working conditions stimu-
late and motivate people. As efficient DLM leadership creates change, it benefits the entire organi-
sation, and it properly fits into the framework of this study. The other dimensions and factors of the 
SSM are more deeply discussed later in this report including those dimensions that can be evaluated 
in a reliable manner with external feedback. 
 
The use of the term leadership instead of management describes the development process of an 
organisation. Thus, development of an organisation is defined as the learning process of the indi-
viduals, groups, leaders, organisation and partners. Additionally, strategic level planning combines 
strategic leadership and a comprehensive security approach with the learning organisation.  
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Leadership behaviour may be modelled with three dimensions that are deep leadership, controlling 
& correcting leadership, and passive leadership. Building trust and confidence, inspirational motiva-
tion, intellectual stimulation, and individualised consideration are four cornerstones of deep leader-
ship. (Nissinen, 2001, pp. 219-225) Professional skills involve knowledge and practical skills 
needed by a security leader in his assignment and they are only one part of the potential of a leader. 
Professional skills of a security leader are efficiency-wise a relative concept because they are a ba-
sic requirement of excellent leadership, even though the contents of the concept change according 
to the level of strategic or operational security leadership. In this sense the term professional skills 
involves the expanded perspective of practical skills, information and constructive leadership be-
haviour. In his own development process the SSL leader must aware of the requirements presented 
in the feedback on his values and attitudes. 
 
At the operational level the professional skills of security leadership have the greatest effect on 
practical activities, which, to be successful, demand sufficient practical security skills and physical 
performance potential. While moving more and more towards the strategic level of security leader-
ship, the demand for professional skills change, because the security leader can no longer control all 
details and, therefore, the ability to use the potential of and the development of his or her subordi-
nates’ individual skills is emphasised. At the strategic level of an organisation security leadership is 
based more and more on the conceptual thinking ability that emphasises strategic thinking, under-
standing and control of processes and entities with visioning capabilities. In the transfer of organisa-
tional values, visions and security strategy of the organisation and the efficiency to utilise the re-
sources and the coaching of subordinates is emphasised. The model of SSL involves three main 
dimensions and eight factors as shown in Figure 35.  
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Figure 35. The Strategic Security Leadership Model (SSLM), (modified Nissinen, 2001, p. 219) 
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crease the integrity of the security and of the organisation. Subordinates and customers are included 
in envisioning goals and they have confidence in the future, which strengthens their commitment 
and ability to function. Clear security rules and functional directives are set for the organisation; 
they are followed on a voluntary basis. The process of security goal setting is challenging and inte-
grates the strategic and operational goal setting of the organisation. By his own example the strate-
gic security leader expands the security awareness and behaviour of his subordinates, customers and 
the organisation and encourages the development of new, predictive ways for the best practices and 
for the efficient performance of the organisation.   
 
Intellectual stimulation of SSL encourages creativity and supports the innovation of subordinates 
and customers. This is showed by questioning basic assumptions and by seeking new solutions to 
problems and new approaches to work. In this approach mistakes in commonly agreed limits are 
seen as a natural part of the activities of a developing organisation and this approach can learn from 
the mistakes. SSL accepts the contributions of subordinate and customers ideas and their ideas are 
then included in the problem-solving processes. Thus, subordinates and customers are encouraged 
to try out new solutions and the approach also accepts disagreement. SSL emphasises the use of a 
wide-range feedback system, including giving and receiving positive and negative feedback. 
 
 Individualised consideration means a positive view of people and the genuine interest of the strate-
gic security leader in his subordinates and customers as human beings. The leader is a coach, who, 
through individual interaction, recognises the individual’s needs, development growth and also ac-
cepts individual differences. The SSL leader spends time with subordinates and customers, and in-
teraction occurs on an individual basis. This individualism is implemented when the leader knows 
individuals personally, recalls earlier conversations, treats people individually and is known as a 
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good listener through interpretation, appreciation, evaluation and response (Raiola, 1995, pp. 13-
15). The SSL leader has a supporting attitude towards subordinates and customers.  
 
The outcome of SSL is the strategic security of an organisation that is modelled in this study. The 
organisational SSL outcomes involve the productivity, effectiveness and efficiency of the entire 
organisation in which the strategic leader has influenced. This approach helps to achieve the set 
strategic goals and to expand security. Smooth and constructive co-operation, vigour and excep-
tional quality are the characteristics of an organisation following SSL principles. SSL integrated 
into the whole organisational leadership supports the qualitative approach and the individual’s atti-
tude towards self-development. With this shared strategic approach the efficiency of the organisa-
tion is productive.  
 
Strategic learning means the top leader’s learning, which greatly reflects on the satisfaction of the 
organisation, leaders and customers. This is so because the leader is able to flexibly change accord-
ing to the situation, and thus enables a foundation for success where subordinates feel that they have 
created the matters that breed satisfaction. Strategic learning is related to the efficiency, productiv-
ity, security and success of the organisation, as SSL is. Expanding security performance includes 
willingness on the part of subordinates and customers to commit to the work society, to the leader 
and to contribute to the strategic and operational goals of the organisation. Hence, people voluntar-
ily increase their work contribution.  
 
However, the next step in the strategic security cluster approach is the adaptation of the strategic 
planning process in four areas: impact, customers, including citizens, processes and personnel with 
innovation. Thus, the strategic security cluster approach starts from the organisation’s vision and 
strategies, where critical success factors are defined. Hence, the strategic security cluster is a strate-
 176 
gic leadership concept that helps managers at all levels monitor results integrated with security in 
key areas. In the MOD it should be integrated into the balanced scorecard (BSC) implementation. 
Thus, in the next section this implementation is presented. 
 
 
7.3.2 Planning the strategic security 
 
In this model strategic core areas are described according to the BSC model with cards. In the MOD 
this could include four cards: efficiency, processes and structures, resource leadership, renewal and 
functionality. The BSC framework includes both internal and external organisational processes. 
Internally, the main and supporting processes are activated to improve capability and to achieve 
efficiency and quality goals.  Externally, the goals are reached by reducing borderlines through co-
operation and by benefiting from the knowledge and skills of different actors.  
 
Because the BSC has been taken into use in the MOD as a strategic leadership and development 
system it has been used for modification, and in a general way has been presented to describe secu-
rity, to support decision-making, and to do strategic leadership and management by results.  This 
approach involves emphasising functions and performance according to strategic guidelines by op-
erationalising strategy; changing organisation support according to the strategy, making strategy a 
part of all staff work, implementing strategy as a continuous process and making the Permanent 
Secretary and the board of directors lead the change.  
 
Modelling security based on the BSC management by results tries to respond to the question: How 
do security issues affect the strategic directive and development processes of the defence establish-
ment? Thus, the management by results card could include critical core processes, such as, the 
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management by results is economical and efficient so that functions and processes promote and 
support the MOD’s strategy and goals. With management by result the performance of departments 
and individual units would become more efficient and productive. The criteria include the growth 
of efficiency, the growth of impact and the qualitative functionality of the management by results 
according to the feedback received. The evaluation criteria include both a period of several years 
and a yearly evaluation of established development projects. 
 
The BSC cards describe goal areas or separate goals with activities and projects focused on the 
goals and, additionally, on the realisation, which identified quantitative and qualitative gauges 
would achieve. The cards may be linked in and between organisations. Department or project areas 
may divide the cards of the MOD. Depending on the level and set approach the perspective may be 
the internal process, customer, impact, or employee learning and growth.  
 
The resources and processes perspective may set goals, for example, for a holistic virus detection 
and protection program, which is measured by the amount of interruptions of service or the protec-
tion coverage of workstations. Another goal to set may be one that requires online security organ-
isational capability, which may be gauged, for example, by the human resources of the security or-
ganisation and by security planning as well as the number of personnel trained for crisis events. 
Measuring is operationalised by numeric description. 
 
By combining the cards we get to the unit and individual level, for example, with annual appraisal 
procedure. This procedure clarifies practical actions and personal responsibilities. Leaders and su-
periors play the key roles when making the entity and the concrete goals of realisation. Strategic 
security modified to the BSC is shown in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36. Strategic security modified to the BSC (modified from Niven, 2003, p. 1) 
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strategy. The human resources card’s main aspect is the development of security knowledge and the 
competence of the personnel. This gives the possibility to define the goal of the vision and to com-
pare that to the realisation. Other things connected to this card are, for example, security leadership 
and security control with quantitative and qualitative gauges. 
 
 
7.4 Impact of the MOD 
 
This security updating launched the revision for a clear, structured security system, organisation, 
tasks and methods in the MOD. The board of directors and Permanent Secretary are the key players 
that can alter the new security paradigm of the ministry. The opportunity for a successful process of 
developing an efficient security system is there, because personnel have expressed strong motiva-
tion, a positive attitude and willingness for the improvement of the security of the ministry. The 
impact of the results and the process is discussed in the next chapter. 
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8 DELIBERATIONS OF THE RESULTS  
 
 
The general aim of the research was to the study the security phenomenon in the framework of a 
learning organisation. The critical security approach was the basis of the intervention with the help 
of the strategic planning perspective. The main focus of this research was on coming up with a stra-
tegic security model and leadership for strategic security. Examining the conceptions MOD person-
nel was a sub-focus and at the same time a means for developing the constructed models. Further-
more, the aim was to study what effect this process has both on models and on the security of the 
MOD. The key results of the different parts of the inquiry are equal without major discrepancies.  
 
This empirical inquiry in the MOD was an examination of an organisation made with a view to the 
status of security strengths and weaknesses that offer a concrete opportunity for the personnel to 
participate in developing security by sharing their conceptions on security. With the data collection 
and analysis process the security inquiry overlapped the statutory and normative regulations of the 
Government (VAHTI, 1/1999). Scheduling surveys into the MOD reorganisation procedures gave 
an integrated opportunity to evaluate the security of the MOD from the new critical security per-
spective. The results with proposals to proceed captured the attention of both management and per-
sonnel. This security analysis process offered significant opportunities for learning in the MOD. 
 
 
8.1 Modelling security in a learning organisation 
 
The research results on the concept of security showed that the nature of security is in turbulence, 
and that this turbulence leads to the path of the critical security approach. That is an important per-
 181 
ception, especially because the defence establishment is typically linked to the old-fashioned and 
narrow security concept. The theoretical philosophy that is particularly behind security studies is a 
new security paradigm, even though the term critical security is not always used. 
 
The results of the literature review illustrated the importance of defining and modelling the central 
concepts. In the research process it became obvious that the meaning of this phenomenon may be 
quite different to the different participants, or that it either plays no role at all or only a little role in 
an individual’s life, or that it takes a very different form. The topic of constructivist learning with 
phenomenography as the main methodology of the study is, after all, the participants’ security per-
ception in a learning organisation, i.e. issues that are relevant in their lives. But these findings con-
stitute neither flaw nor difficulty in the research. It is plain that for neither such participants’ secu-
rity nor a learning organisation is seen as the most meaningful subject to live with. The study inter-
vention constituted the most meaningful aspect of security or a learning organisation for the partici-
pants. Consequently, a strenuous endeavour to extract conceptions of security or of a learning or-
ganisation would have been ill founded. 
 
From the point of view of critical security the strategic security model (SSM) was developed cover-
ing both strategic and operational levels. Nevertheless, this model is more or less under criticism, 
because it is quite theoretical. However, the heuristic hypothesis is that the model may also be trans-
ferred to other state organisations and maybe to the private sector, also. In the SSM changing the 
focus of security to the individual paradoxically allows an appointment with the broadest global 
threats described by Krause and Williams (2003, pp. 43-46). Strategic planning is linked in the 
model with the balanced scorecard (BSC) because the MOD has adopted its use.  
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Strategic security leadership (SSL) is a natural part of an organisation’s leadership, and it carries out 
programmed actions supporting the organisation’s strategy, policies, principles and operations. Tra-
ditionally, security leadership has been separated from operational leadership, but Burns-Howell, 
Cordier and Eriksson (2003, pp. 13-15 and pp. 67-68) and Wyllie. (2000, pp. 6-11) has also been 
interpreted this study’s perspective on the integration of leadership. Building trust and confidence, 
inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualised consideration are four corner-
stones of the deep leadership model. (Nissinen, 2001, pp. 219-225) SSL is modified from the deep 
leadership model (DLM) in spite of the criticism presented in chapter 2. One critical factor is that 
the basic model of the DLM is based on the quantitative approach, which affects the concepts of 
learning, reality, human beings and information. They are narrower than the ones used in this study 
with the qualitative approach. To make a difference between DLM and SSL epistemology the onto-
logical and methodological premises are clearly described.  
 
The DLM may also be criticised from the controlling and corrective security leadership perspective, 
which leads to ostensible efficiency, where subordinates become passive, extra effort is reduced and 
initiative disappears. (Nissinen, 2001, pp. 219-225) This type of leadership may be seen to belong-
ing to a repairing organisation (Levä, 2003, pp. 146-147). SSL is the opposite of passive leadership, 
where the leader does not like to take a stand on anything, he is in no contact with people, he avoids 
responsibility, and thus, decision-making is difficult and late. (Nissinen, 2001, p. 223.) This kind of 
leadership may be categorised as typical for a reactive organisation (Levä, 2003, pp. 146-147). The 
leader receiving feedback must become aware of the demands presented by the feedback on the 
reviewing of his values and attitudes (Malmivuori, 2001, pp. 139-149). 
 
In the SSM emancipation opens up the opportunity of political programs, which relativists see as 
being against them; and static relativists pained by what is an essentially active model. One option 
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for this behaviour can be that traditional relativist theories emphasise power and order as the bases 
for security. Another can be that those theories are based on static concepts. 
 
 
8.2 Conceptions of security of the personnel of the MOD 
 
Launching the interview week’s program was presented in chapter 6. It addressed the functional 
problem of the organisation of the MOD, which may also be interpreted as a traditional inattentive-
ness attitude to security reflecting the status of the security culture in the MOD. What this phe-
nomenon revealed was a crucial factor in the way to achieve efficiency in MOD security. On the 
other hand, this finding itself already was valuable for this study, and gave the reason to finish the 
study. Particularly from this finding the crucial necessity to develop and improve the security of the 
MOD emerged, if the MOD intends to follow international demands and national regulations. 
(588/2004) The top-level and middle-level leaders are the most challenging area to engage in with a 
proper security in the MOD. Only once they take part in security activities efficiently, will the pro-
ductivity of the MOD improve. 
 
 
8.2.1 Positive motivation for reasonable security 
 
The results showed that the meaning of security as well as trust in the efficiency of predictive 
measures constitute the basis of a good security culture. The results inferred that personnel seem to 
understand the philosophical core of the expansive strategic security where security is everyone’s 
business. The results showed that there is a positive attitude towards changing habits when it is rea-
sonably required for the sake of security. The results on the security culture supported the continu-
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ous improvement of security systems, strategic planning, and the learning organisation. This is es-
sential from the learning perspective, because the motivation of personnel towards improvement is 
one of the corner stones of building a successful security system. The VEIVI survey’s results (per-
son 1, V 1) and the interview results interpreted strong positive motivation (V I and I 10): 
“Definitely. When some ‘procedure’ is operationally implemented then absolutely it 
will be followed. “ (V 1) 
 
“… we have to remember that it is not the building that does something for security, 
but the personnel. It is the standard of security of the personnel that counts…” (I 10) 
 
 
8.2.2 The silent killers phenomenon 
 
Results found the possibility for a phenomenon called silent killers (Beer & Eisenstat, 2000, pp. 29-
40) in the organisation of the MOD, i.e. the specific organisational dynamics that block the organi-
sation from learning about the organisation’s internal functioning. This finding is not unusual (Beer, 
2003). Consistent perceptions of barriers for organisational effectiveness by top team leaders and 
key lower-level managers are common. Lower level leaders have not communicated these barriers 
to top management, nor have top management taken action to confront them. The barriers were 
identified as follows: unclear strategy and conflicting priorities; an ineffective top team; a top-down 
or laissez-faire style of the general management; poor vertical communication; poor co-ordination 
across functions and insufficient leadership skills and development of down the line leaders. (Beer, 
2003, p. 315) The results of this study and others (Krogars, 2000; 2001; Väänänen, 2003) found 
identical features in the MOD, and, thus, it means the existence of a silent killer layer of top and 
lower level management resisting the change and development of the organisation. Especially 
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strongly has this phenomenon become visible in the interaction processes of the MOD’s organisa-
tional security elements. This finding also reflects on the security expert paradox explained later in 
this section. Because of its long-term findings this phenomenon indicates the status of the cultural 
development of the MOD. This means that from the credibility and transformability point of view 
of the SSM the MOD seems to somewhat, but not sufficiently meet the demands of efficient strate-
gic planning procedures and goals of the effective learning organisation process.  
 
The results produced another interpretation linked to the silent killers phenomenon that prevented 
employees in the MOD from speaking up: psychological safety; and a concern about the utility of 
honest feedback. (Edmondson, 1999, pp. 350-383.) Employees are afraid that telling the truth will 
negatively affect their acceptance and their future careers, and they protect themselves from the 
anxiety associated with providing feedback up the chain. The employees’ experiences tell that 
speaking up does not lead to change. (Beer, 2003, p. 319) This aspect was visible both in the results 
of the interviews and in the interaction with the organisational security elements. Additionally, the 
response activity reveals this same problematic situation, as in the strategic security survey, for ex-
ample, only 88 % (n=44) of the respondents were willing to state their position in the organisation, 
and only 84 % (n=42) mentioned his or her current department or unit. It is also remarkable that 14 
% (n=8) refused to give their service time in the MOD or their educational background.   
 
 
8.2.3 The conservative restoration phenomenon 
 
The results of the interviews, the results of the VEIVI survey and the results of the strategic security 
survey showed the similarity concerning the leaders’ inattention to security issues. Shor (1996) gave 
the title the “conservative restoration” to a phenomenon where power holders defend themselves 
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against social-change-oriented research and functions. This may be interpreted in many ways, be-
cause: the organisation of the MOD has traditionally been inattentive to security; the leaders have 
not seen it necessary; the MOD has not considered international security issues sufficiently enough; 
the leaders have not efficiently enough followed the change in the environment. If the leaders have 
noticed the changing environment; and the need to put more effort into the security; but have not 
done so, then they are not willing to change their style and the culture of the MOD. However, in an 
organisation like the MOD, this should not be the case, as the content of the issues of work are 
mainly, or at least should be, at the strategic level. If this is the case in the MOD it leads to the ques-
tions: “is this normal procedure in the defence establishment?”, or ”is this normal procedure in the 
state establishment?”  Relevance to this perspective comes from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) (Huittinen, 2005) report on security resources and leadership in the Tsunami –case. This 
finding is illuminated with the following quotation from the VEIVI survey (V 1) response:  
“For many years one emergency exit was locked, so that it would not have been pos-
sible to use it in a possible emergency situation if that would have happened; neither 
could the door be broken. I commented many times about the matter without any re-
sult.” (V 1) 
 
The results showed that the security of the MOD exend to both strategic and operational levels. 
Four aspects described in the beginning of chapter 7 clarify this finding. The new ideas from Cohen 
(2002, pp. 13-20) and Kaldor, et al. (2004) support these interpretations, even though they use the 
term human security or humanistic security. When comparing this finding to the current situation of 
the security in the defence establishment it revealed the lack of strategic level security. Finnish na-
tional legislation (588/2004) assigns the strategic level responsibility of security in the defence es-
tablishment to the MOD. Results showed that while the departments of the MOD are responsible 
for guiding an integrated defence 50 % (n=25) of the personnel from these departments share a be-
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lief in the need for an integrated total defence; and management personnel were least likely to be-
lieve in the need for integration. These findings are valuable because the results showed that the 
Finnish defence establishment as well as the MOD lacks organised strategic level security that 
meets with international requirements and national regulations.  
 
The MOD security process and the status of security in the defence establishment do not support 
the development process for strategic security from the viewpoint of continuous improvement, be-
cause the MOD lacks the principle of openness as indicated in the paradigms of strategic planning 
and critical security. The lack of security knowledge, the indistinctness of the principles of security 
and the vagueness of the security leadership are dashing the personnel’s trust in security. Therefore, 
this survey challenged the inertia over security in the MOD and the results of this survey revealed a 
great deal of complacency. The functional tradition of the MOD supports resistance against change 
and development. The security process of the MOD weakly supports the continuous improvement 
of a comprehensive strategic security because too many in the MOD do not understand that the lack 
of knowledge and lack of clarity of its security principles act contrary to the requirements of a good 
safety and security system. 
 
The results showed that the MOD personnel do believe that integration of national defence co-
operation is as easy as it was before the reorganisation of the MOD, and thus the reorganisation has 
not added any value to integration. When analysing the organisation of the MOD it was remarkable 
to find that the Decree on the Ministry of Defence assigns security to the Administration Unit, but 
does not assign strategic security responsibilities, or security guidance responsibilities of the de-
fence establishment to any department or unit. Additionally, in comparison with international or-
ganisations, such as the EU and NATO, the superior security authority of the defence establish-
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ment, Designated Security Authority (DSA), is at the Finnish Defence Staff (FDS), and not at the 
ministry. The following quotations clarify this aspect:  
“This means the change of the operational culture and functioning, which requires 
long-term, goal-oriented development. The relationship between the MOD and the 
FDS raises the greatest problem in the guidance of the defence establishment, because 
of the shadow of the `invisible wall´, which makes co-operation and interaction diffi-
cult. The problems of guidance include the lack of knowledge, the superiors’ lack of 
having the competence of their subordinates, the lack of trust, disproportioning of the 
resources, shortage of the personnel and lack of expertise.” (S 1) 
 
“Straightforward, everyday, normal dealings with the subordinate administration (the 
FDS) are difficult. Some kind of amazing lock or something else exists between the 
MOD and the FDS.” (S 1) 
 
“Strong FDS, overriding the MOD” (S 1) 
 
“The role of the MOD and the relationship with the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) 
and, especially, with the Chief of Defence of the FDF is not clear. The MOD has no 
authority.” (S 1) 
 
 
8.2.4 The optimistic paradox phenomenon 
 
The results implied that the personnel believed that things are in good order; but as a matter of fact, 
things are not in such excellent shape when compared to both international and national norms and 
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standards found in the literature review. This phenomenon is called an optimistic paradox. The op-
timistic paradox was found in the following areas: the level of contradictions between the beliefs 
and norms of security; the status of instructions; the amount of security education and training 
needed; the level of following security instructions; and the status of systematic data collection on 
information about abnormalities and the neglecting of security needs. All of these challenge the 
MOD. The optimistic paradox launched a need for evaluation, checking instructions and arranging 
education for personnel to avoid accidental problems. The next quotations from both the VEIVI 
survey and the interview results clarify the whole picture of the optimistic paradox entity: 
“Probably things are updated, but I because I have not read them for a long time I do 
not know.” (V 1) 
 
“I assume that this is the situation but I do not have the slightest idea about the matter, 
so I can not guess.” (V 1) 
 
“I have read the directives and other sound-bites but just now I do not recall all direc-
tives that I have read. However, I believe that I follow all of the principles that are 
meant here.” (V 1) 
 
“… let us say it this way, that I have a feeling that people are apparently aware of se-
curity issues. People imagine that things are in good shape… but as far I a am con-
cerned this is not at all the case.” (I 20) 
 
The optimistic paradox also interprets the status of the MOD from the learning organisation point of 
view. Results indicate that currently the MOD does not meet the standards of a learning organisa-
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tion (Alasoini, 1999; Sarala & Sarala, 2001), but that it needs additional efforts like education and 
new instructions on security to reach the capabilities needed in a learning organisation.  
 
Two critical aspects emerged from the VEIVI survey results: a lax attitude to safety and security 
instructions, and lack of confidence in the credibility of the functions of the information security 
system. Up-dating instructions and education seemed to arise as some of the most important aspects 
in the development of the security system. A lack of robust information security instructions and 
education is a critical aspect due to the fact that in a learning organisation, such as the MOD, safe 
and secure handling processes of all kinds of information are emphasised, and information security 
is one of the main areas of security, both from international and national perspectives. 
 
An illustrative example of the lack of credibility of the functions of information security is a phe-
nomenon called the technical information security paradox. This means when people expect that a 
technical information system will help in administrative issues when it is operational, but simulta-
neously the information technical experts then announce severe concern about the technical status 
of system. Additionally, technical experts express the low level of skills of the uses, and the low 
level of resources. (Puolustusministeriö, 2003) At the same time the VEIVI survey results and the 
interview results expressed a crucial lack of trust in the information security personnel, and in the 
level of secure functioning of the information system. (Puolustusministeriö, 2003) The phenomenon 
is clarified with the following quotations:  
“I do not know how well confidentiality is maintained at the level of the net system 
security administrator.” (V 1) 
 
“There have been some cases when another person’s password has been used with the 
results of serious damage, albeit by chance.” (V 1) 
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“… actually I do not have the resources and enough authority to see to the technical 
issues. The field of information technology is so wide that the existing manpower is 
hardly sufficient for successful situation handling …” (I 9) 
 
 
8.2.5 The security expert paradox phenomenon 
 
The results showed a phenomenon called the security expert paradox meaning optimism for a better 
security situation in the future. This may be interpreted to be a sign of the compliance of top leader-
ship at the MOD by which they pay attention to the security status at hand. It may also be inter-
preted to mean the manifestation of international influence and requirements and an indication for 
administration regulations for strategic level performance in the field of security. However, in this 
situation the result itself already brought about a reason for further research: to investigate whether 
this phenomenon is a general feature in the organisational culture of the MOD, in the organisational 
culture of the state administration, or whether this is a typical feature in the leadership procedure of 
the MOD or the state administration. However, the security expert paradox revealed the status of 
the attitude of the management towards security issues, the status of security in the MOD, the posi-
tion of strategic and operational security leadership, the standing of the security organisation and 
administration, the significance of security responsibilities, and the level of capability for informa-
tion security in the MOD. On the other hand, Flink (2004) came to the opposite conclusion when 
she came to the conclusion that the status of the security culture in the Finnish Defence Forces 
(FDF) was good. The following quotations illuminate both optimistic and security paradoxes: 
“A new chief of security has been nominated and from him we will get more informa-
tion on how everyone should act in different situations.” (S 1)  
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“The handling of security is going to be in better shape when we get an expert in our 
workplace.” (V 1) 
 
 
8.2.6 The human firewall phenomenon 
 
The results showed a phenomenon called the lack of a human firewall in the form of negative and 
suspicious conceptions of the personnel towards rapid reaction to threats, changes, international and 
internal interoperability and the capability of guiding the defence establishment. This is demanding 
for the organisation and the top management. Thus, either the organisation of the MOD lacks the 
resources or capabilities for responding to this challenge, or the need for these has not been notified, 
or the process of reorganisation has not been successful, or the attitude of the personnel is not fa-
vourable to this kind of mission for the MOD, or the personnel prefer to stay in old, traditional and 
stable tasks, or for some other reason the personnel strongly share this conception. A total of 50 % 
(n=25) had a clear view of the organisation’s capability to more actively follow the changes in the 
security environment and to be prepared to rapidly respond to external threats. On the other hand, 
the results showed that there were opinions that supported the idea of the significant effect of the 
changes in the security environment, as follows:  
“Changes in new security threats have a very great impact on the performance and 
functionality of the MOD, as well as on its public authority role. As long as a peaceful 
coexistence continues, there will be no functional changes, but as soon as there is a 
`crush´ around us it will affect, for example, special statutory activities et cetera, et 
cetera.” (S 1) 
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The human firewall at the strategic level was found to have the effects of changing the threat cate-
gory to “Lack of a human firewall” because the interpretation of the operation of the MOD is 
strongly traditional, stable, passive, and shows emphasis on the reactive policy, and is slow to 
change policy. This resistance emphasises reaction and, thus, the MOD is challenged with the need 
for more resources, research and information. On the other hand, the interpretation may be that 
there is a “Human firewall” that does not allow any new information to penetrate. However, the 
results showed some wider and more analytical conceptions about the effects of the changing secu-
rity environment: 
“Traditional security thinking concentrating around the national defence is only one 
(even though the central) part of the security arena in the changing environment. In 
the future horizontal administrative co-operation will achieve a more crucial status. 
Most likely, the need for research activities will increase.” (S 1) 
 
“There is an increased need for the capability to react and the ability to change and for 
more efficient follow-up on the situation picture.” (S 1) 
 
“Requirements for ever wider information expertise have increased and the MOD has 
to gradually tighten its security control.” (S 1) 
 
“How do you guide crisis and war time public authority tasks when you do not have 
gauges that are illustrative enough even in peace time? How are the responsibilities 
and resources shared with the responsible ministries designated for co-ordinating total 
national defence?” (S 1) 
 
 
 194 
8.2.7 The Impivaara isolation paradox phenomenon 
 
The results showed that the conceptions about new threats were critical, and only a few observa-
tions concerning new changing threats were found. This state-of-denial phenomenon was called the 
“Impivaara isolation paradox”. Impivaara is a far away and small place in Eastern Finland and it is 
thought to be isolated part of Finland. Additionally, new threats were not felt to have an influence 
on one’s own duties, which also indicates to Impivaara isolation paradox. This phenomenon may 
indicate a lack of willingness to change with the changing environment, or learn to learn from new 
things, or it may also indicate the culture of the MOD. From the Finnish national perspective this 
finding is clarified with the next quotations:  
“No effect at all. If it has any implications it is visible in the Defence Policy Depart-
ment, while the Administration Policy Department and the Resource Policy Depart-
ment continue overlapping functions with the FDS binding resources which ought to 
be in the use of the Defence Policy Department for defence policy preparations.” (S 1) 
 
“The question is very general, because the effect of the changing security environment 
probably occurs on a case-by-case basis depending on the seriousness of the threat. 
The changes in threats in the recent past have not had a remarkable effect on the func-
tioning of the MOD.” (S 1) 
 
“The change of security threats should have no effect on the functioning of the MOD. 
The MOD has to be operational independent from external circumstances and it is the 
authority that is the first to inform the top leadership of the republic on changing cir-
cumstances by describing the situation. The internal threats of the MOD are the most 
 195 
dangerous as `experts´ without enough competence and expertise destroy structures 
that are found good and functional.” (S 1) 
 
 
8.3 Re-modelling security 
 
The results raised two issues. First, the need to be careful with language because even though often-
used terms seem to be familiar they may have totally different meanings for different people. Sec-
ond, the pictures of the participants in the interview analyses bear a variety of relationships in this 
stage. The bracketed meaning units allowed flexibility in the presentation of the findings. The capa-
bility of learning to learn and the skills of interaction are the key elements in future organisations 
and in work and, thus, also in the SSM.   
 
The results emphasised two levels in the organisation of the MOD, strategic and operational, mean-
ing that the strategic deals with the top leadership level on international affairs, the Finnish statutory 
level, the strategic level of security issues in the Government, and the guidance of the defence es-
tablishment. The operational, executive level of the organisation of the MOD handles affairs inside 
the MOD and operational affairs inside the Government and the partnership security affairs of the 
MOD. The secured assets are information, personnel, image and material. Security is a part of the 
strategic level directive relationship between the MOD and its subordinate administration. The per-
formance of the subordinate and the higher administration has an overall approach with several dif-
ferent perspectives, for example, efficiency, quality, physical and mental resources. Thus, security 
strengthens good governance. This finding may be transformed to the SSM so that it also includes 
both strategic and operational levels. 
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The results showed the following assets of an organisation: information, image, personnel, envi-
ronment and material need to be secured. They did not support the division of the concept of secu-
rity into internal and foreign security but, on the contrary, meant that this division is artificial in the 
sense that the division has lost its meaning. This thus supports combining the execution of securing 
efforts. New thinking in Finnish society and in the defence establishment is required because, for 
example, in 2004 the Government gave separate internal and foreign policy reports. The move to 
combine these is even more radical when one considers that the Ministry of the Interior Affairs  
chaired the Internal Security Programme (ISP) report (Government report, 44/2004) in which by 
nine other ministries participated. The MOD was one of the key players in producing the Finnish 
Security and Defence Policy 2004 report (Government report, 6/2004), but the MOD did not par-
ticipate in the producing of the ISP. (Government report, 44/2004; Government report, 6/2004) 
 
Additionally, the idea of accepting these assets: of information, image, personnel, and material to be 
secured does not support the traditionally separate organisation of information security from strate-
gic security. Rather it is one, and only one, part of comprehensive security, and this is why one in-
tegrated security vision, policy, strategy and execution is needed. Thus, administrative directives 
should be established according to strategic security with a philosophy of an expansive and com-
prehensive nature and the traditional emphasis on techniques should be changed. A technique is a 
tool for the execution of security, not a separate security branch: even though as a theoretical and 
conceptual it is useful for categorising security. The situation is the same with the issues of interna-
tional security and national security, where the division is also artificial as previously described.  
Furthermore, new approaches for secured assets are described in these interview responses: 
“… as far as I think, we do not need to go far away today to find an example that it 
was not good for the image of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that those so-called se-
cret documents were taken away from there … “ (I 4) 
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Empirical research results confirm the hypothesis of a strong causal path between leadership behav-
iour and organisational effectiveness. (Bass & Avolio, 1998a, pp. 45-56) According to Nissinen 
(2001, p. 206) the DLM was developed from the transformational leadership model, which has 
strong correlation to efficiency, satisfaction and extra effort. Thus, leadership is emphasised in the 
SSM, in these study results and in modelling SSL.  
 
 
8.4 The future of the MOD 
 
The heuristic hypotheses were that 1) there is a need for a qualitative approach in the name of secu-
rity in the MOD, and 2) that developing the security of the MOD according to the strategic security 
model (SSM) is a change agent actor for better efficiency. The results in the MOD confirm both of 
these heuristic hypotheses. The survey is used as a tool for planning and leading security change in 
the MOD. A strategic concept of security was the basis for this study rather than a narrow historical 
realism concept of security. A large scale and horizontal approach to security is required, which is 
expansive and comprehensive in nature and which combines safety and security. Such a concept of 
strategic security has similarities with quality control thinking, it includes a wide range of philoso-
phical issues concerning security awareness and an individual’s personal responsibility. As a whole, 
the essential factor in the future of the MOD is operational security improvement through change in 
organisational culture. The “security is everyone’s business” -attitude is critical. 
 
The results have helped to launch a multilevel security programme to improve the situation of secu-
rity in the MOD, which has already produced the organisational security strategy, and comprehen-
sive education and training procedures. To succeed in changing the organisation a clear vision and 
willingness to conduct change is needed. Key players are the strategic leaders of the organisation. 
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Leaders ought to be able to “smell” organisational culture and focus on critical issues. Updating the 
security system of the MOD, from the perspective of the SSM paradigm, can be seen as a possibil-
ity to continue to challenge the reorganisation process of the MOD. This updating includes estab-
lishing a clearly structured security system, organisation, tasks and methods (Sonninen, 2005; Wyl-
lie, 2000) in all multidimensional levels of the ministry and the defence establishment and, thus, it 
also clarifies decision-making and executive capability. 
 
Because of the partially abstract nature of security, the most effective way to increase the security 
capability in an organisation is education, training, exercises and rehearsals on an annual, system-
atic basis. Additionally, the international society sector provides guidance in this direction, as its 
expanded exercise activities to include multinational exercises, which require interoperability from 
the MOD, both at strategic and operational levels, and not just within the FDF. To improve its 
awareness of security the MOD has arranged educational and training interventions for the entire 
personnel and for separate specialist groups. However, the successful implementation of security 
requires knowledge and skills development and networking.  
 
The researcher has now also been asked to assist in working on the learning atmosphere in the or-
ganisation. This has involved more extensive interviewing of employees to construct a view on how 
to improve the MOD’s capacity for ongoing learning in security issues. Again, we can see how 
models of learning with origins in social science circles can be applied to the local learning process, 
and the results are important factors in the assessment of the strength and value of academic find-
ings. 
 
Results showed the presence of the silent killers phenomenon presented in section 8.2. Preventing 
the existence of the silent killers phenomenon calls for the organisation to establish forums for 
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open, safe conversation, and then to do something about what they have learned. Open conversation 
means that the whole organisation, i.e. all relevant participants in the conversation, know the con-
versation is going on, receive clear signals from the leadership team that it wants candid feedback, 
have well-understood mechanisms for feedback up the chain, everyone learns about the actions the 
management is planning so that they can be discussed and modified if need be. The term safe here 
means that people believe that their status in the organisation will not be affected and that manage-
ment demonstrates that the bearer of negative feedback is not punished. (Beer, 2003, p. 319) This 
approach supports the operationalisation of the SSM. Nevertheless, it is an important point to re-
member those organisations’ members does not always resist change (Raelin, 2004), neither do all 
of those in the MOD. What they are more likely to resist, also in the MOD, is the imposition of 
change, because imposing change tends to cause people to feel of loss of control. The cautious 
change leader will, therefore, work hard to find ways to involve the organisation’s members in the 
change process. 
 
As a response to the results of the study after the interview’s the MOD established a top level 
Committee of Readiness chaired by the Permanent Secretary to handle security issues and guide-
lines, and to set security dimensions. Meeting on a monthly basis in a structured manner that helps 
the organisation to plan strategic security more intensively. This way security is better able to match 
the organisational development activity in an overall strategy program. In addition, the status of 
security improves when the leaders discuss security more intensively. Similarly, an active security-
training program was launched for the personnel.  The SSL program became an effort that enhanced 
the formal skill levels of the participants. 
 
Internationalisation and structural changes in the information society greatly affect Finland’s ability 
to secure its vital functions. In addition, the Government reports on Finnish Security and Defence 
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Policy in 2001 and in 2004 paid particular attention to the threats associated with further interna-
tional integration. Broadening the scope of security is needed in the MOD because the organisa-
tional security performance of the MOD corresponds to international requirements only slightly, 
partially, or not at all. This is also the case when it comes to national legislation norms and the 
wide-ranging task of the MOD of guiding the defence establishment. This strategic approach needs 
to be lead by the top leadership of the MOD because the strategic security perspective will affect 
the performance of the whole organisation, its partners and also its subordinate-organisations. The 
international role of the MOD, in the context of EU and NATO, brings special importance for this 
strategic procedure along with their partner organisations and their requirements for common secu-
rity standards. 
 
Results showed that especially international institutions’ emphasis on security issues will impact 
Finnish society and the MOD. According to international obligations and national legislation, 
Finland needs to secure classified information within international co-operation, and co-ordinate 
these responsibilities through the National Security Authority (NSA) structure. According to na-
tional requirements and arrangements a nation has the right to authorise the Designated Security 
Authority (DSA) to conduct NSA responsibilities and tasks. In Finland the Act (588/2004) desig-
nates the NSA to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the DSA to the MOD, the FDS and the 
Secret Police (SP).  The NSA/DSA performance, as with all security, is divided into strategic and 
operational levels, as described by an MOD report (MOD, 2004). The study about the effects of a 
possible membership in a military alliance on the development of the Finnish defence system and 
on the defence establishment was carried out by evaluating various sections of  the NATO Mem-
bership Action Plan (MAP), which is a procedure also used in the EU. Security agreements define 
detailed responsibilities between partners and national legislation supports the fulfilment of interna-
tional requirements and the national responsibilities by laying down wide-ranging regulations con-
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cerning security procedures. (Act 588/2004; NATO, 2001; MOD, 2004; Pekkola, 2002; 
2001/264/EY) Thus, strategic level security in the MOD includes the DSA activities with regard to 
international relationships, national strategic and Government relations, statutory security issues 
and normative defence establishment guidance. The FDS and the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) 
should retain the responsibility for the DSA’s operational functions.  
 
 The results showed that the national information security strategy (Government report 11 Nov 
1999; Government report 4 Sept 2003) as well as national legislation (588/2004) form a common 
basis for the comprehensive development of information security. The aim of this strategy is to en-
hance national and international information security, promote national competitiveness and eco-
nomical capabilities, improve information security risk management, protect human rights and na-
tional information recourses, and add security awareness and information. (Government report 4 
Sept 2003) In this sense information security is a part of the development of the MOD which em-
phasises the usability of services, basic human rights and good governance. With this interpretation, 
information security is a part of the MOD and its performance development, risk management and 
strategic directive leadership. These may use both qualitative and quantitative gauges and informa-
tion. The MOD should be aware of the need for security of information, information systems and 
networks, and that the organisation should act in a timely and co-operative manner to prevent, de-
tect and respond to security risks and threats. Security, security of information and networks should 
be compatible with the essential values of a democratic society. The MOD should formulate risk 
assessments in a sufficiently broad-based manner. (Burns-Howell, Cordier & Eriksson, 2003, pp. 
17-67; OSCE, 2003; VAHTI, 3/2003; VAHTI, 7/2003) This means that the MOD should review 
and reassess security, the security of information systems and networks, as well as make the appro-
priate modifications on security policies, practices, measures and procedures. (Wyllie, 2000, pp. 22-
50.) This will not happen without a comprehensive approach to security management. (FICORA, 
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2002; Hallituksen tietoyhteiskuntaohjelma, 2004; OECD, 2002) Thus, in the name of security the 
MOD must secure the performance of its core missions and tasks, and identify the guiding organ-
isational security policy.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting overall development in this project was how the leaders of the organi-
sation, the researcher and employee relationships developed. The top management is a strong sup-
porter of the fruitfulness of security that brings relevant knowledge to the organisation. While there 
is no reason to romanticise the situation with differences of opinions and interests that emerged, the 
status of security seems to be so robust that further development of security in the MOD is likely. 
There were many conflicts on issues of substance and authority during the process, and it was 
stressful for all involved. In the end, the Silent Killers -layer is not so easy to change but however 
things are moving in the right direction. Resistance for comprehensive security is experienced dif-
ferently in different parts of the organisation. Developing the security of the MOD through qualita-
tive research methodology allows the researcher to use his own security expertise and opens a wide 
spectrum of results from the analysis of data. Educationally, research itself adds awareness of secu-
rity as a part of the participants’ self-learning process. Yet, the process is still going on and security 
is under redesign in the MOD. 
 
 
8.5 Evaluation of the process 
 
There are many possible explanations for the study results. There might be a failure in the parame-
ters, or in the test battery, or in the analysis, or in the interpretations of the results. The latter expla-
nations are less obvious due to similar results with test triangulation. However, it is apparent that 
the process can never be successful if the management level of an organisation is not fully commit-
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ted to the goals of the organisation, in this case integrating a comprehensive security. Several tech-
nical parameters in the VEIVI survey (Cronbach alfa =0,90) and in the strategic security survey 
(Cronbach alfa=0,92) in chapter 7 added significance and reliability. Because of the small sample 
the results lose their significance, but nonetheless they may have a supporting role in the interviews 
in this study entity. The reporting system shows the validity of the research. 
 
Additionally, the reorganisation process of the MOD has not facilitated integration. In this sense, 
the process of reorganisation cannot be considered to be a success. On the other hand, the lack of 
resources may reflect resistance among personnel inside the MOD to comprehensive integrated na-
tional defence, or to what the reorganisation was designed to achieve; or to the lack of proper in-
formation on security; or perhaps because of the perceived resistance of the FDF. Nevertheless, the 
results support the perception that there is a lack of resources committed to fulfilling the mission of 
the MOD. Clearly, the results may be interpreted in multiple ways, but no interpretation can ade-
quately explain nor appropriately defend this short- and long-term inability to react effectively to 
security demands, threats and crises.  
 
This report is academically focused on the literature review, security surveys, interviews and on 
their results. However, the results of the other parts have affected the interpretations, decisions, and 
implementation of this research. Furthermore, only non-classified information in the MOD has been 
attached to this report. However, this does not have a declining, or positive lifting, effect on the 
conformability of this study. In this study the status of the sensitive nature and the lack of possible 
classification of information widely used in the defence establishment this phenomenon does not 
have an effect on the credibility or transferability of this study nor on the research results.   
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Triangulation is used to combine multiple data, methodological practices, theories and researchers. 
The aim was a strategy that would add breadth, complexity, richness and depth to the study. Trian-
gulation is not used as a tool for an alternative to validation. However, phenomenography was the 
main academic methodology used in this research. In this sense the study has used great variety of 
means to collect information. Both qualitative and quantitative means were accepted. Objective 
reality has been used as an object only through its interpretations. This study was mainly conducted 
using the methodology of qualitative research and, thus, the semi-structured interview is presented 
in greatest detail. Survey questionnaires were used in data collection with the instrumental role of 
supporting triangularisation. Thus, interpretations after the analyses processes were appreciated 
with a higher status than quantitative methodology. The meaning of interaction between subject and 
researcher is flexible. In this reporting the aim was to have transformability and credibility with 
interaction between reader and report. 
 
Semi-structured interview methodology was chosen, because an existing philosophical and meth-
odological alteration of knowledge about the human situation makes it possible for the researcher in 
the MOD to go beyond the contrasting alternatives of uncontrolled case reports. The methodology 
reveals from over-controlled experimental-statistical investigations of personnel of the MOD. The 
evaluation process was looking for exiting features about the difficult accessible sites.  Through the 
interviews the findings were discovered because of the deeper information of the interviewees. The 
fact that the researcher had deep information from the MOD organisation also helped to discover 
findings. Hopefully, this study also inspires other interview researchers to bold pursuits in new do-
mains. When analysing and comparing interview results to the other parts of this research it was 
unlikely that the results would have been significantly different, even though slight differences 
could have been possible. One hour per person showed to be an appropriate time for interviewing 
and the allotted time was understood to be flexible. 
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However, also short unrestricted written statements in the VEIVI survey and in the strategic secu-
rity survey were applied to ascertain conceptions of the personnel of the MOD concerning learning 
about security. This perspective enabled the extending of this research to a larger number of partici-
pants in the MOD, but it also produced responses that are more limited in scope, and which are dif-
ficult to contextualise within the participants’ life-worlds. This approach is entirely valid when tak-
ing a wide range security concept, such as the strategic security under investigation, or when apply-
ing particular categories of description, just as were used in the VEIVI survey and in the strategic 
security survey. Nonetheless, the ultimate circumstances are those in which an open technique for 
eliciting experience is anchored. 
 
It may be claimed that the qualitative semi-structured interview is not academic, but is only a re-
flection of common sense. On the other hand, an interview process may be criticised as not being 
objective, but subjectivity is here considered to be an advantage. Following this are arguments 
about a biased and a non-trustworthy method, including doubts about credibility, because the 
method rests upon leading questions. Inter-subjectivity, which is considered to be an advantage, 
may be accused of giving different meaning to different readers. As for being an accepted academic 
method the semi-structured interview may be claimed as being too individual-dependent and with-
out an academic hypothesis testing it may be seen as only explorative, without quantitative dimen-
sions and too qualitative. Very often a small amount of data leads to claims that with too few sub-
jects generalisation is not possible. Thus, qualitative interview methodology is claimed not to be 
valid, because it relies on subjective impressions. On the other hand, the chance for the risk of mul-
tiple false recourses, and having limited timing recourses, the possibility of increasing economical 
leverages and, especially, the risks of false analysis, interpretation and reporting is noted. Therefore, 
the semi-structured interview process is considered to be successful and a useful method in this re-
search process.  
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The often-stated intent of phenomenography is to find a range of experiences, and thus select inter-
viewees who seem intuitively likely to have different life worlds. That is why within these selected 
different experiences this research phenomenon is valuable. However, it depends on the assump-
tions built into the intuitive chances. Such assumptions were set aside by trying to identify them, 
while understanding the possibility that the assumptions might be false. Furthermore, to avoid mak-
ing assumptions the consultants for the interviews were used during the preparation period and dur-
ing the interviews.  Another reason for the use of consultants was that the personnel might consider 
the security personnel of the MOD as belonging too closely to the personnel. To be even more neu-
tral the interviews about security leadership and rescue perspectives were divided between to sepa-
rate consultants. The health and safety perspective focused on the rescue section with an experi-
enced specialist from the MOD’s occupational health care system. 
 
The interviewer is dualistically a participant and a researcher, and it is especially an advantage in 
this case that the researcher was experienced on the subject. On one hand, it is an advantage that the 
researcher comes from within the organisation, but at the same time it may be a negative thing be-
cause of his role in the organisation. From the security perspective the transformability and depend-
ability of the analysis and the report is improved by using face validity and by using in the different 
phases of the study an evaluation group of security experts of the Government and the Finnish De-
fence Staff to check the content of the text. 
 
Presuppositions may be implicit through the selection of participants for the interview and, thus, the 
idea was to select participants for the interviews by avoiding presuppositions about the nature of the 
phenomenon, or the nature of conceptions held by particular individuals. By trying to observe 
common-sense precautions a variety of experiences were maintained. Also, obtaining a cross-
section of participants, with equal numbers of male and female participants, or a range of grades, 
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was avoided, because this would illuminate the assumption that there may be a gender or ability 
aspect in the perceptions of the participants. Neither were the parameters of variation of experience 
known, indeed, it was realised that experience may well not have parameters in the mathematical 
sense. Thus, for this study it is incoherent to attempt anything like statistical sampling. For these 
reasons departments and individual units were requested three weeks in advance to nominate their 
representatives for the interviews (Puolustusministeriö, 2004h).  
 
The information and knowledge obtained from the interviews was ambiguous and put the researcher 
in a dilemma between academic and ethical considerations. This perspective raises the dilemma the 
researcher faces, i.e. wanting the interview to be as deep and penetrating as possible, albeit not tres-
passing on the person’s privacy. However, by using transcriptions of the interviews, and by the 
stimulated recall process this phenomenon was avoided. On the other hand, because of one’s 
awareness of the dilemma, respectfulness towards the interviewee was highly appreciated. Risks 
were taken in getting empirical material that only scratches the surface of the framework. However, 
there is also contradiction in pursuing academic knowledge and ethically respecting the integrity of 
the interviewee. The phenomenographic approach also supported this perspective because the con-
ceptions of the interviewee are important, instead of personal ambitions. 
 
Transferability and value of the research results are tested through collaborative insider-professional 
researcher knowledge generation and in application processes in projects of social change that aim 
to increase fairness, wellness, and self-determination. The importance of the creation of valid in-
formation in this social research is emphasised and in the study report it is explained with details of 
the study, which focus on security from many different perspectives. From the study perspective 
this process helps to achieve confirmation through the whole study and helps to secure the con-
formability, transferability and dependability of the research. In the analysis the object has been 
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studied both inductively from data premises and deductively from the security conception system. 
Especially in the interpretation of visible messages, expressions of the documentation and hidden 
messages has the researcher used his own experience, knowledge and security skills.   
 
The study and its credibility and transferability can be criticised from many perspectives. One way 
is to claim is that the sample is small, and that the survey has a narrow perspective. Another one 
may be the claim that the VEIVI survey lacked detailed background information on the participants, 
which means that the results are considered to be too general. However, during the lifelong evalua-
tion period of the survey it has been found that the background information in this kind of survey, 
as the VEIVI, does not play a critical role and it does not have importance in the sense of transfer-
ability and dependability on the results of this survey. That is because the evaluation results show 
that the management generally shares a more positive conception of the security situation of the 
organisation than the personnel dealing with security issues or of what the security situation is in 
reality. (Turvavironen, 2003; Vironen, 2003) Additionally, findings of the literature review showed 
that the VEIVI survey focuses more on a learning organisation’s operational level than on its strate-
gic level. The organisational security policy section of this survey, according to this interpretation, 
has a narrow perspective, yet still has the right direction and purpose. Consequently, the future re-
search might also study the possibility of modifying the VEIVI survey at the strategic level. 
 
Follow-up surveys could be done with a bit more specific background information, which would 
give more detailed and multidimensional information on the status of security inside the organisa-
tion. These follow-up surveys could be added as a part of the surveys and analysis based on legisla-
tion and the Government guidance and instructions of security. Evidently there is a place for studies 
of the security concept and security structure of the whole defence establishment from the perspec-
tives of new threats and critical security. The studies should probably conduct on a wider, horizon-
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tal international and national level, and not only inside the defence establishment. Another interest-
ing subject for follow-up research could be to study what lies behind the opinions of the personnel.  
 
Security model is seen as an agent for change in the sense that by implementing security the organi-
sation needs to change its policy, performance and practices. Leadership does matter, particularly in 
times of organisational change, just as in the MOD right now. Important characteristics of leader-
ship are things such as leadership being a mutual relationship between the leader and the follower, 
leadership being personal as well as leadership being an interaction between leader, follower and 
context. Leading organisational change may suggest that organisational change is planned linearly, 
but actually it occurs in a non-linear fashion. In the development of a security-oriented culture in 
the organisation of the MOD those who wish to make something happen should be able to do so 
openly, making their attempts obvious, not in secret by trying to keep their efforts out of sight or 
behind the scenes. 
 
The most stimulating way of reviewing the data were the conversations with expert colleagues and, 
especially, with the academic experts who bracketed the data. This form of teamwork, during and 
after the analysis process, was, in the researcher’s opinion, the most inspiring experience. As a 
whole, the use of a variety of techniques and the possibility for different approaches to review the 
data was valuable. However, this kind of face-validity approach, when used throughout the study 
process has advantages, also from the perspective that experts seldom see the picture of the whole 
as broadly as the researcher does. 
 
Totally 21 interviewees are covering sample for this study even though the happening of the starting 
process of the interviews described in chapter 6 reason this study. Previously the response percent-
ages for inquiries in the MOD has been between 40 to 50 percent (Väänänen, 2003). In the VEIVI 
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survey 47 % (N=58) and in the strategic security survey 40 % (n=50) responded, which can be in-
terpreted as being indicative. Reasons for the activity in this inquiry, in the perspective of the tradi-
tion of the MOD, may be connections to the results of the survey and the enthusiasm of the person-
nel towards security issues or simple because of the new topic of inquiry. One reason for the lack of 
responses may be the fact that during the reorganisation process of the MOD the staff have become 
weary with inquiries, or because the researcher is an insider, or even for a fear of lack of confidenti-
ality in the handling of responses, or because of the organisational culture of the MOD with its pas-
sive participation or the resistance towards the reorganisation process. Also, the lack of confidence 
in the information technology system of the MOD, or even the the lack of trust in the confidentiality 
of the handling of responses, which has been described in survey responses and repeated in the in-
teraction dialogues with, for example, the Occupational Health and Safety Committee and the Secu-
rity Team, may have affected the participation percentage. However, no one single reason may be 
found for the low participation and that is also why other means for collecting data have been used. 
The multiple data collection perspective also supports the efficiency of the study. When additional 
representative samples of participants participated in all elements of this inquiry and because the 
distribution of all personnel of the MOD in this study is the same as the distribution of the whole 
personnel the results and study process may be evaluated as being representative.  
 
Added value for this research comes from its connections to the real world, real objects, and indi-
viduals. The triangular approach, both from the theoretical and practical perspective, which aspects 
themselves already support the objective of recognising change, give a name to hidden phenomena 
and bring new ideas with a new approach to be considered. This approach develops individuals, 
academics and the organisation even during the process and has a continuing effect after publication 
of this report as well. 
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8.6 About the references 
 
At the research level the references can be criticised for being narrow, even though in this study. 
The researcher has referred to official international and national administration points of view.  The 
data from other researchers represent individual opinions from different, mainly post-modern tradi-
tions. However, these data have been collected both from domestic and foreign sources. This leads 
to an opportunity for criticism using the arguments of comparability and reference value of the in-
formation, researcher relations, and both value and attitude orientations, especially from the defence 
establishment’s point of view. On the other hand, it is impossible to fully avoid this kind of argu-
mentation, and it can even be seen as one aim of this study to raise this kind of discussion. The ref-
erence material includes new literature, both international and domestic, studies, journals and Inter-
net resources. Thus, for example, the strategic planning references are fresh and based on the latest 
research. Furthermore, from the domestic and military resources both American and Anglo-German 
references have been used. However, because the MOD belongs to the defence establishment the 
use of military-based information may be seen as reasoned. 
 
Official documents of the MOD and of other organisations normally have an angle, and many times 
an especially political angle for their information. Many terms used in this study, such as “security” 
and “safety”, have very sensitive meanings in the defence establishment due to the special status of 
security policy. This means that these terms cannot directly be translated from Finnish into English 
and may thus lead to inaccuracy in expression. The problem has been avoided by explaining the 
applied terminology. For general appraisal the data and references used in this study must be noted 
to be public in nature, relationships and meanings, because the public nature of data about the MOD 
may impact the credibility of information and, thus, practice may differ a lot from the theory pre-
sented in the text.  
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9 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
It is the objective of the Government to apply the learning organisation concept to the state admini-
stration, including the MOD. However, the concept’s vague contents and unclearness still requires 
additional study, also from the security perspective. For modelling strategic security the learning 
organisation is a useful theory for this study because of its post-modern framework and because the 
critical security approach, strategic planning, and the learning organisation all have a multidiscipli-
nary foundation. As such, they all have strong social and humanistic perspectives. The learning or-
ganisation theory may be a valuable structure even though being idealistic in nature. All these three 
aspects, critical security, strategic planning and the learning organisation, emphasise the importance 
of learning, leadership and culture. These features are the cornerstones of the strategic security 
model (SSM) and this study’s entity and establish an interesting although challenging constellation.  
 
 
9. 1 Theoretical framework 
 
According to the meaning of the SSM leaders of organisations create a vision that clarifies what the 
organisation stands for, highlights the organisation’s purpose for existing and outlines the values 
and beliefs that define the organisation’s culture. When the equal supportive dimensions and risks 
of the three theories were identified those three theories were chosen as the basis of the empirical 
study. The study is considered to be a change agent concept in the MOD and in Finnish Society. 
 
The choice of the qualitative approach and its instruments has an important effect on the credibility 
of this study’s findings. Thus, methodological selection becomes even more crucial when the ob-
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served indicator is presumed to represent a hidden construct. By using phenomenography as the 
procedure for investigating the conceptions of the personnel on security and as a method for practi-
cal application the generality of the results can be challenged. Having the researcher as observer 
while being himself inside the object of study is more challenging, especially as the aim is to report 
academically relevant findings. An added value of the methodological credibility comes from the 
content analysis and from the use of statistical quantitative methodology in an instrumental manner. 
However, in the planning phase of the research process it was noticed that the choice of studying 
security as a new discipline would challenge the hegemony of the professional organisation and the 
academic division of disciplines, both of which notoriously difficult to change.  
 
Social inquiry is a distinctive praxis, a kind of activity, like teaching. In other words, when engag-
ing in the “practical” activities of generating and interpreting data to answer research questions 
about the meaning of what others do, the inevitable consequence is a “theoretical” concern about 
knowledge. While transforming that understanding into public knowledge it consequently leads to 
concerns about what constitutes knowledge and how it is to be justified in the nature of social theo-
rising. Thus, to understand a practical social action, for example, teaching security, the meanings 
constituting action must be grasped. Saying that human action is meaningful means claiming that it 
has a certain intentional content indicating the kind of action it is. On the other hand, an action’s 
meaning may only be grasped in terms of a contextual system of meanings.  
 
From the perspective of an individual as well as of an organisation or of a more extensive social 
community, observation is one part of knowledge and experience is another part of learning and the 
formation of knowledge. The world of experiences is important because it helps people understand 
the paradoxical basic nature of security as, in a way, security involves both the inside and outside of 
a person’s world of experiences. As the study of strategic security proceeded it became obvious that 
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there really are social phenomena that are both latent and universal in nature. Because human be-
ings are genetically different, universality can take place only through collective consciousness, 
which is not necessarily tied to culture. Studying security, including meaning perspectives, would 
thus require a phenomenological research orientation, because security is comprehensive interaction 
that is not necessarily totally dependent on language and context.  
 
The research orientation is the formation of a model and the construction of individual theoretical 
assumptions (Niiniluoto, 1983, p. 167) that offers a stimulating theoretical framework for further 
research both nationally and internationally. Constructing a theoretical framework around strategic 
planning in the framework of a learning organisation and, especially, the development of security, 
requires not only basic study but also a wider approach and the synthesizing of information based 
on existing information. On the other hand, the logical-empiricist approach orientation is not exten-
sive enough because security includes phenomena that cannot be directly observed. 
 
This study has parts that are typical to action research, due to the fact that the researcher is studying 
his own workplace and has plenty of material related to it, that is, an official security analysis of the 
MOD. Therefore, achieving neutral objectivity is not possible. It is difficult to convince everyone 
that the study is completely value-free – some people will think that this weakens the academic 
value of the study. Thinking more prudently that: “There is no value-free science” (Denzin & Lin-
coln, 2003, p. 9), the researcher leaves the evaluation of the value of this study to the reader. None-
theless, even though the empirical data would make a tremendously pragmatic elation possible, it 
has not been done.  Hopefully the study will emit energy into the attractive sphere of security.  
 
This study is a “slice-of-life”, which lead to the production of a text that gives the researcher-as-
author the authority to represent the subject’s narrative using the language of ordinary people. 
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(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, pp. 3-4, p. 16 and pp. 21-22) As for the theme, it tentatively identified 
broad objectives of the research, the phenomenon under investigation, appropriate academic onto-
logical, epistemological and methodological premises, and recognised varieties of this area by 
studying previous research results, conducting a literature review and investigating both interna-
tional and domestic norms of security, strategic planning and the learning organisation. Narratives 
can be described as sociological stories, cultural discourse or historical settings. Narratives are a 
way of making sense of the world through “human knowledge as a composition of narratives, which 
is perpetually being constructed in the process of social interaction” (Heikkinen, 2002, p. 14).  
 
Positive idealism is a paradox because it may be an advantage or a weakness of this study, but 
without this idealism this research would not have started, nor completed. The humanistic tradition 
and the andragogic, adult education, theoretical framework emphasise participants as adult human 
beings who are self-directive and responsible learners. As a learner, a human being is eager to learn 
new thing, and willing to develop skills and knowledge about security and of an organisation. As a 
researcher, on the basis of the value world and the concept of human beings, it is comfortable to 
study learners on these same bases. It includes high idealistic enthusiasm for the subject. However, 
loyalty to academic ethics forces an attempt to use the critical approach, both in activities and when 
reporting. This easily causes a kind of blindness, which is not easy to recognise. This idealism may 
hinder covered wishes or seeing possible frustration times or overlapping eagerness now and then. 
 
 
9.2 About the study process 
 
Qualitative interview study should pay serious attention to the potentialities of a research method, 
and thus in this case one can draw the philosophical analysis of the last three years about knowledge 
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of the human security situation linked to organisational development in order to articulate and 
elaborate on the nature of the knowledge produced in the inquiries. Security organisational devel-
opment can benefit from the use of interviews as a research method. In particular, this concerns the 
influence of the interpersonal interaction of the interview situation through the construction of 
knowledge. It further concerns the importance of extensive knowledge on the subjects and their life 
situations over longer periods of time to be able to make sound interpretations. Additionally, for 
critical validation interpretations of the subjects’ statements achieve the most efficient outcome for 
individual lifelong learning, and strategic security learning, and learning of an organisation.  
 
The intent is not to point out the irrelevance of this study for practice, but instead it is an attempt to 
overcome the gap between research and practice in security in the MOD through an analysis of the 
nature of knowledge about security. Thus, this is an attempt to develop the epistemology of security 
practice from modern approaches to knowledge. The aim of this study was not to conduct funda-
mentalist research on underlying truths in the universe, but an attempt to collect, organise, and suc-
cessfully communicate forms of practice that lead to the intended purposes.  
 
In this study report phenomenography finds its basic material for analysis in the life-world of the 
participant. Consequently, bracketing or looking for meaning units, should be accompanied by em-
pathy as a part of the analysis process, along with the use of a variety of techniques. Thus, methodo-
logical credibility included content analysis and the use of statistical quantitative methodology in a 
triangular manner. The requirement of engaging and empathising with the life-world of the partici-
pant may involve the avoidance of the espoused objective of phenomenography; the production of 
categories of description. To conclude, phenomenography, in actual research practice, cannot be 
seen as the application of a set of rules of procedure. This study report demonstrated some practical 
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approaches to the issues of technique. To be academic about subjectivity demands a certain fellow 
feeling rather than technical rationality.  
 
There is a difficulty of bracketing and the value of the process of empathy used in parallel to brack-
eting as part of the effort to enter the experience of the participant with the use of a variety of tech-
niques. These guidelines provide a theoretically sound framework within which a phenomenogra-
pher may provide an account of nine research procedures. This demonstrated approach has also 
provided a mechanism to learn from the procedure, and it offers a mechanism through which others 
might collegially learn from each other.  
 
The role of researcher and participant having interaction with other participants could be problem-
atic and is at the least a multidimensional role, i.e. researcher, participant, learner, inventor and ac-
tive leader. The key problem is simultaneously delivered information; give an objective and estab-
lish new information in interaction with the participants. It is challenging to simultaneously handle 
multidimensional information, even classified information, and to take care of official security offi-
cer duties as well as academic researcher tasks. On the other hand, the aim was to broaden and de-
liver personal understanding and theoretical information to the organisation. This task in the MOD 
is not easier as a means or a tool neither for security information nor as a change agent. As men-
tioned above there are simultaneously numerous different roles to be taken care of. However, in the 
end the reader in interaction with the text decides whether it has been a success, or not. 
 
This study follows the constructivist approach (Greenwood & Levin, 2003, p. 145) and supports the 
learning organisation paradigm. Thus, the transferability and value of the research results are tested; 
through collaborative insider-professional researcher knowledge generation and the application 
processes in projects of social change that aim to increase fairness, wellness, and self-
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determination. The importance of the creation of valid knowledge in social research is emphasised, 
and in the study report is details of the study are explained, with the focus on security from many 
different perspectives. From the study’s perspective this process helped to achieve confirmation 
throughout the whole study and helped to secure the conformability and transferability and depend-
ability of the research. In the analysis the subject was studied both inductively from data premises 
and deductively from the security conception system. The data was pulled apart using the phe-
nomenographic approach to find showed messages, expressions of the documentation and also hid-
den messages. Especially in the interpretation of hidden messages has the researcher used his own 
experience, knowledge and security skills.   
 
The credibility and transferability of the study was improved by using face-validity, an evaluation 
group of security experts from the Government to check the content of the text. The evaluation 
group analysed the material and the results of the survey. A negative point of face-validity is that 
experts cannot figure the study the same way as the researcher does. By far, the most stimulating 
part of the data review was the conversations with expert colleagues and, especially, with the aca-
demic experts who bracketed the data. As a whole, the use of a variety of techniques, and the possi-
bility of using different approaches to examine the data was valuable. However, although this kind 
of face-validity approach used throughout the study process has its advantages, it also has the 
weakness. Experts seldom share the picture of the study entity as broadly as the researcher does. 
 
The study and its credibility and transferability can also be criticised from many perspectives. One 
is to claim that the survey has too narrow perspective partially because of small sample.  Qualitative 
research will harbour critical voices that challenge reliability on this study. The modern academic 
requirement for developing context-independent knowledge, which is ideally in the form of univer-
sal laws of human behaviour, is in contrast to this study’s post-modern approach emphasising that 
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information gained within one context is not necessarily transferable. Neither is it necessarily trans-
latable to, nor commensurable with the knowledge of other contexts. This lead this study to an in-
terest in contextualised local and narrative knowledge. 
 
Added value for this research is gained by ecological relevance, meaning that the phenomenon is 
studied in a natural context or in a natural ecology, i.e. such as they appear in reality and, thus, this 
research has ecological transferability. The research was conducted in real life, with real objects and 
individuals, with a triangular and multi-disciplinary approach both from the theoretical and practical 
perspectives. These aspects themselves already support the object to recognise change, give names 
to hidden phenomena and bring new ideas with new approaches to be considered. This approach 
develops individuals and the organisation already during the process and the study also continues to 
affect even after this report is published. 
 
 
9.3 Strategic planning perspective to learning organisation  
 
Instead of the traditional learning organisation theory, the strategic planning paradigm was used to 
achieve more competence for the theoretical context. Yet, the strategic planning approach supports 
the learning organisation thinking, which is actually a new generation modification of the tradi-
tional learning organisation theory. The balanced scorecard (BSC) approach also supports the learn-
ing perspective of an individual as a part of strategic leadership. And, when the term strategic is 
understood as the learning of the top leaders, strategic security means organisational learning and 
the top leaders learning of security. Thus, developing security is developing the operational func-
tions of an organisation and the learning of individuals that will together be a driving force of the 
learning organisation.  And so, to create a challenging learning environment, the future learning 
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organisation has to: bury bureaucracy, bury rigid hierarchy, attract real talents, create a continuous 
learning environment, reward performance, remove socio-ethnic barriers, and create a non-
threatening and secure atmosphere.   
 
By the end of the 20th century participative strategies were noticed to be inadequate in meeting new, 
rapidly changing challenges, as these strategies were slow, and often did not deal with the basic 
issues standing in the way of flexible, proactive, resources deployable organisations. As a result 
there was increasing support for organisational transformation change and for a strong leadership. 
This critical philosophy and methodology transformation came to form an increasing link to organi-
sation strategy and, thus, strategy orientation increased vitally. 
 
Organisational performance as a whole became the imperative thrust of organisation change agents, 
in spite of the increase in job security and work satisfaction. This was a controversial move for 
socio-technical practitioners to make, and has been criticised as selling out on humanistic values. 
On the contrary, it has had the consequence of making people’s humanist issues critical to the 
agenda of strategic change. In the humanist and social approach strategic change has also created a 
new profession of security leaders increasingly represented on senior executive teams and boards. 
The role of the 21st century security leader is more and more the change agent of an organisation, 
instead of to the historically traditional chief of security. As a change agent the security leader is in 
the centre of the renewal and controlled change of an organisation, with the focus on strategy orien-
tation and the organisation learning process. Additionally, the strategic security model places con-
siderably great emphasis on traditional safety and psychologic-sociologic dimensions. In the begin-
ning of the 21st century, thanks to the link to strategy, the strategic security model practitioners are 
becoming heretics outside the organisation installations, in the community and society and are oc-
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cupying an influential place in the organisation boardroom. Additionally, comprehensive strategic 
security is more likely to become a confessed strategic change practice of a variety of organisations.   
 
Development and the developing procedure are learning processes for both the individual and the 
community, meaning that the structure of the a learning organisation is flexible and it can include at 
the same time chaos and order. The learning organisation makes the structure flatter and aims at 
reaching a common vision for the education of personnel. This is so because the learning organisa-
tion focuses on openness, horizontal structure, self-evaluation, feedback and on making sure that 
the skills and competence of the organisation are widely understood. In the 21st century an organisa-
tion must create a constant learning environment, a non-threatening working environment where 
people can communicate and collaborate with one another, a diversified environment for people to 
think differently and value each other’s thinking, new ways of looking at problems, and a culture 
that effectively leverages talent. Continuous global transformation, mounting technological en-
hancements integrated with organisational learning does not clarify the concept of the learning or-
ganisation. 
 
Partly as a result of this change, in most leading organisations the old bureaucratic security struc-
tures have been stripped down, hierarchies of entire organisations have been lowered and turned 
into networks, decision-making processes have been sped up with a high level of security involve-
ment introduced, flexible teamwork has been set in place, enlightened safety and security resource 
processes with high levels of employee involvement have been introduced. The world of security is 
substantially different from what it was around the middle of the previous century. The value driv-
ers, however, have been more instrumental than humanistic ones. 
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9.4 Strategic security 
 
Strategy is at the core of the strategic security model (SSM) system. Strategy constitutes the broad 
priorities that an organisation plans to pursue in order to fulfil its mission. The priorities must be 
consistent with the organisation’s unique situation and fit with one another in an effort to respond 
effectively to challenges and opportunities. The strategic security leadership (SSL) system centred 
on expansive security must overcome the organisational inertia that tends to immobilize virtually 
any change program. Strategic security is a development model for the organisations for strategic 
level leadership. Potential signifies a dimension reflecting total personal capabilities in the devel-
opment of a learning organisation. According to the constructivist conception of learning, the proc-
ess in which the potential is utilised, or enlarged is merely intra-personal.  
 
The nisus of the model is the strategic security vision of the organisation. Without a clear under-
standing of the strategic vision, development of indicators for the SSM is fruitless. All perspectives 
must relate to the strategic vision, and each perspective relates to the others through the central vi-
sion driving the organisation. As tactics are described, the data collected in the SSM reflects the 
organisation’s progress toward achieving the goals delineated by the strategic vision. A well de-
signed SSM bridges the gap between long-term strategies and day-to-day action by aligning per-
formance measures with the critical perspectives of the organisation. The SSM provides senior ex-
ecutives and leaders with the ability to track performance against established strategic and opera-
tional goals. The SSM takes the strategy of the organisation, converts it into a form that everyone 
understands, and communicates the plan and its requirements to everyone in the organisation. 
 
The new concept of Strategic Security Leadership (SSL) of a learning organisation attempts to 
move the emphasis of leadership from ordering and strict control to leadership that makes subordi-
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nates commit to it. Shifting the emphasis does not change the leader-centricity of decision-making 
and responsibility, but requires the leadership to behave with increasing flexibility and emotional 
intelligence. The requirements are justified with the fact that with the commitment of the subordi-
nates the situational sensitivity and efficiency of the entire organisation improves. 
 
Leadership is a non-hierarchical concept and, thus, SSL should be found throughout the organisa-
tion, as should acknowledgment of the significance of encouraging leadership behaviour at all lev-
els of an organisation. The mission of key security leadership is the maintenance and modification 
of culture to an organisation’s changing environment. The culture is based on a contingency model 
and consequently the role of security leaders is to be the embodiment of the culture, because their 
behaviour is closely observed. The results of this study showed this to be the case in the MOD. Ad-
ditionally, it is one of the most admirable human qualities when people can identify the difference 
between what others say and what they do. It becomes clear that the role of the leader is to be an 
example of the security culture, crucial to both the continuance of appropriate elements of the secu-
rity culture, and equally significant in the process of constant adjustment in response to a changing 
external environment. 
 
Strategic security as a high leverage mechanism requires pro-activity, initiative, creativity, and in-
genuity. The strategic security cluster requires a rigorous process and commitment, but its benefits 
are worth the costs. Even if only a few of the elements of the strategic security cluster are adopted, 
the research suggests that a competitive advantage is to be gained. Best of all, much of the strategic 
security cluster is simple common sense: getting agreement on vision, strategy, strengths, and 
weaknesses; measuring essential performance numbers; and focusing not just on financial outcomes 
but also on the issues that will affect the future outcomes. The strategic security cluster leverages 
common sense into a substantial competitive advantage. Successful performances turn to indicators 
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measuring their success. For a strategic security cluster gauge, which offers a relevant and accurate 
picture of an organisation’s health, the organisation may leverage additional important indicators of 
current and future performance. A strategic security cluster measurement is not complete without 
strategic performance measures of shareholder, employee and customer satisfaction. These indica-
tors often detect the warning signs of trouble early enough to take corrective action before core per-
formance begins to suffer.  
 
The risks of the SSM are, for example, that the commitment of the top leadership is not strong 
enough, huge amounts of data is collected, short term and day-to-day metrics are overemphasised 
and the organisation chooses the wrong indicators. Additionally, the risks include that the organisa-
tion sets unrealistic goals, the data to be measured is difficult to collect, the organisation lacks 
communication, the SSM creates an enormous amount of resistance, change is performed too 
slowly and the organisation may have too many overlapping systems or that the framework has the 
wrong strategy basis. 
 
 The SSM responds to the challenges of the MOD. However, the heuristic hypotheses are that this 
model may also be transferred elsewhere in state organisations and that it may be adopted in the 
private sector, too. In a flexible manner it can be used at all levels and sectors of an organisation 
and it can conceptualise security at both strategic and operational levels inside a sector or level even 
though this report concentrates on the environment of the MOD organisation. Nevertheless, this 
model is more or less under criticism, because the basis is very much theoretically emphasised.  
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9.5 Generalisation    
 
Generalisation of knowledge has been a persistent problem in the modern academic world. The 
transferability of generalisation depends on the relevance of the terms being compared. Relevancy 
depends on the exact narrative of the study, in the sense that the generalisation of the knowledge is 
more dependent on the receiver than on the resource of the knowledge. In the traditional academic 
research approach the responsibility of the generalisation is set to the researcher. In this study, gen-
eralisation is the responsibility of the researcher to produce enough information for the receiver to 
make a decision concerning the generalisation. Generalisation about individuals is of value, but it is 
important that the individual’s unique experience is not lost. The individual profile is a necessary 
background against which the meanings of quotations will be viewed, because it provides a neces-
sary counterbalance to any tendency to attribute meaning out of context.  
 
The transfer of the information of this study rests on transferable generalisation, which involves a 
rational judgement about the amount to which the findings from this study may be used in other 
situations. Successful generalisation of the information of this research on human behaviour de-
pends on extensive documentation and argumentation. In this case it is the preceding holder, which 
has the most similar attributes to this actual case, and which is selected as the most relevant prece-
dent that is the most equivalent. The transferability of the generalisation hinges on the extent to 
which the attributes from this study compared to others are relevant. On behalf of what was just 
mentioned generalisations include a process of reflection rather than a structure of rule-based inter-
pretations. Knowledge is context-bound and, therefore, generalisation is an active process of reflec-
tion; concerned actors decide whether or not the actual information is useful in the new context. The 
level of participation in this study enables the generalisation of results to cover the whole MOD.  
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9.6 Conclusions 
 
Previously job security and work satisfaction were emphasised, but organisational performance as 
developed as the key driver for organisation change agents. Thus, the new challenge for change 
agents is to provide security leaders with a design for the way forward while redesigning organisa-
tions for the 21st century. The SSM may be explored as having the potential for sustainable prac-
tices for recovering organisational actions, the construction of human capability, contributing to 
community expansion and renewing the biosphere. This new approach for change agents may be 
seen as a new role for SSL; to assist in the redesigning of the organisation to accomplish excep-
tional performance that, in fact, contributes to meeting human needs as well as the goals of a 
healthy organisation. With the help of the SSM, the organisation’s human sustainability initialises 
the capabilities of its personnel, creates a healthy workplace, and contributes to the welfare of the 
surrounding community. By taking care of the security issues of the organisation, the use of the 
SSM simultaneously develops the comprehensive performance of the organisation pro-actively, and 
more smoothly prepares for the changing threats in the environment as well as the inner cohesion of 
the organisation with openness and wide-range social interaction.  
 
The study process in the MOD showed that there are several steps that must be taken to limit the 
dangers of the reluctant compliance syndrome: explain change, agree on new measures, maintain a 
longer-term vision, watch out for silos, measure cooperation, repeat collective purpose, tolerate mis-
takes but not poor performance; and do not grind down. Once created, the expansive SSM should 
become a part of the organisation’s every day life. It should be embedded into an organisation’s 
operations as a standard decision-making tool. The strategic security cluster makes the results of 
changes measurable. Organisation can learn what models yield the best long-term results, other 
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words, what works and what do not. The strategic security cluster can give warnings about prob-
lems ahead or signal opportunities. It should also be used as the focus of continuous improvement.  
 
Contents-wise the expansive paradigm of the strategic security cluster does not bring any real, new 
information to the study of security, rather vice versa; the paradigm strengthens and clarifies those 
cornerstones that security, with excellent results, has always been based on. However, elevating 
emancipative security to the starting point of modelling and learning for security is new. This ex-
pansive paradigm of security is not an academic theory, but it is a model that produces excellent 
learning results in organisational security and in organisational change development. The heritage 
of the realistic tradition is that it is a weakness to change one’s mind. Organisational change is the 
condition of post-modern life in reality and, thus, critical security gives room for change. 
 
This study emerged out of a desire to contribute to the development of a self-consciously critical 
perspective within security studies in Finland. Simply bringing together some of the perspectives of 
strategic security, the strategic security model (SSM) and strategic security leadership (SSL) serve 
to make challenges to orthodoxy more clear, and to signal that critical approaches to the learning 
organisation, strategic planning and critical security studies are more than a passing fad entertained 
by a few scholars. Still, undoubtedly, some important perspectives have been left outside.  
 
While emphasising interaction, the critical security approach also supports multidimensional exper-
tise and the systematic research approach. Follow-up surveys could be done with a bit more specific 
background information on sample, which would give more detailed and multidimensional infor-
mation on the status of security inside the organisation. Evidently there is a place for multidiscipli-
nary studies of the security concept of the whole state administration from the perspectives of new 
threats and critical security. It should probably be conducted with a wider horizontal, international 
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and national, or state level framework, and not only inside Finnish society. Another interesting sub-
ject for follow-up research would be to study what is behind the conceptions of the personnel, and 
what kind of psychological aspects are effective in the construction of the concept of security. 
 
The outcome of this study will be expanded when the importance of strategic security in conceptu-
alising dynamic organisational change in a changing environment is understood. Certain subjectiv-
ity, which is unavoidable in this kind of qualitative research where the researcher is practically ex-
perienced in the area, should be reasoned. The triangular method was used in order for subjectivity 
not to affect the results of this study. Empirical study has aspects typical to action research, due to 
the fact that one’s own work was being studied.  From this perspective achieving total objectivity 
was not possible.  
 
The level of difficulty brought on by the vastness of the topic in relation to its academic depth is 
visible. Each topic in each chapter could probably serve as an exhaustive framework per se. Ac-
cording to the academic view, the formation of a theory is still one of the most important ideals of 
the academic world. It is possible to define the theoretical context for strategic security so that it 
passes the critical scrutiny of the academic community. The feedback information accumulated for 
several years on the strategic security of the MOD showed the practical value of feedback, and its 
efficiency as the basic solution for the strategic security approach.  
 
Individuals share different preferences in their way of shaping information. Personal epistemologi-
cal orientation is strongly iconic, as the many figures and pictorial presentations illustrate. The main 
purpose of the figures in the text is to help the reader to clarify the ideas and concepts. Thus, as an 
entity each part of the research supports the other elements and on the other hand creates the basis 
for lower-level analysis in the hierarchy of the tools. The results of the empirical part of the research 
 229 
are important, both for the participants and especially for the researcher. The input of the whole 
process for personal learning as a researcher, a person and as a strategic security leader cannot be 
emphasised too much. However, even more important is the development of the concept of security 
and the effectiveness of the strategic security process in the organisational system of the MOD. 
 
This study concentrates on normal conditions of society, even though as a public authority the 
MOD has readiness responsibilities in disruptive and exceptional situations (European Union, 2004; 
the Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991); the State of Defence Act (1083/1991). However the prin-
ciple of having the organisational functions, structures and procedures be the same both in normal 
situations and in exceptional situations does not make vital difference in the perspective of this re-
search. The proper response to the epistemological, ontological and methodological issues that were 
raised is to reconstruct relationships between the new conceptions of security among the strategic 
stakeholders in a learning organisation. Acting and thinking, practice and theory are linked in a con-
tinuous process of critical reflection and transformation, both in the organisation under survey and 
for the researcher as a human being. 
 
 
9.6.1 Practical implementation 
 
The strategic concept of security has several practical implementations. Increased international re-
quirements of security set a requirement for a dynamic approach to changing the concept of security 
in Finland and in the defence establishment.  The impact of security is horizontally breaking barri-
ers and security does not follow national borders, but is influencing all sectors of society. Thus, the 
division between internal and external security is artificial and the trend is towards a wide-range 
comprehensive strategic concept of security. Technical information security has lost its status as a 
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separate driving actor of security to the trend of comprehensive operational security. Security is 
increasingly becoming a crucial factor of international and national competitiveness, linking secu-
rity to the success factors and to the change actors. However, in order to change conceptions of se-
curity new modelling for structuring the concept of security is necessary as is free open discussion 
of the strategic concept of security. 
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    APPENDIX 1 
VEIVI SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE    
 
The survey consists of 22 statements, which are divided into five sectors. Every statement offers an 
opportunity for the respondent to insert his own comments. The last statement in the questionnaire 
is reserved for free personal comments, information and feedback. 
 
Response scale: 
1) strongly disagree with the statement 
2) somewhat disagree with the statement 
3) undecided 
4) somewhat agree with the statement 
5) strongly agree with the statement  
 
Security policy  
A.  I know the security principles of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
B. There are clear security principles (security policy) in the MOD 
C. Occupational health and safety are well taken care of 
 
Security culture 
D. It is everyone’s business to take care of the security of his work place 
E. I understand what the security arrangements of my work place are aimed at 
F. The guidance of guests has to be improved in advance, for example, in the invitation 
G. Guests must be escorted to and from the reception area 
H. When you pass through a door in the building you must always check that it is locked 
I. I am ready to change my habits if it is reasonable and needed for security reasons 
 
Security instructions 
J. The personnel security instructions are updated  
K. There is follow-up and control over the following of security instructions  
L. I know the emergency instructions (including fire, bomb threat, break-in, suspicious pack-
age, threatening behaviour, etc) 
M. There is a system to inform the authorities about abnormalities and the neglect of security  
N. Enough attention is paid to security issues  
 
Security control 
O. It is always easy to notice who is a stranger and who your own personnel are 
P. You must always wear your identification card visibly at work  
Q. You always ask from a lone stranger where he is going  
R. Deliveries are controlled properly (for example, cleaners and service people) 
S. Security control is good enough  
 
Information security  
T. Useless and unnecessary classified documents (paper, hard copy and electronic ) are always 
destroyed safely  
U. The passwords in our office are truly secret  
V. I am completely aware of the information security instructions  
 
W. Free personal comments, information and feedback 
 
 2 
The VEIVI security survey definitions    
 
The five sectors of the VEIVI survey are the security policy of the organisation, security culture, 
security regulations, security control, and information security. In the VEIVI survey analysis organ-
isational security policy differs from the general meaning used by the MOD (2004e), meaning a 
plan of security action, or statement of ideas adopted by the board of the MOD. It includes the goals 
of organisational security, functional principles of security and procedures, and contacts for dealing 
with enquiries. Occupational health and safety consist of both the psychological and physical secu-
rity of the personnel. Security culture means the security customs and social institutions of the per-
sonnel of the MOD, and how organisational security policy has been practically implemented. Se-
curity culture includes security principles and how they are conducted, in terms of co-operation, 
openness and trust. (Turvavironen, 2003) 
 
The VEIVI’s information security definition follows both Kerko (2001, p. 83) and NATO (2001, p. 
83) definitions with the meaning of a proper protection of information, information systems, com-
munication and services both in normal and crisis situations using legislation and other protection 
methods. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of information are protected against threats 
and losses caused by hardware and software malfunctions, natural catastrophes, and acts of hateful, 
careless or unqualified people. Information security means that functions are conducted according 
to the principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability whilst at the same time trustworthiness, 
liability and availability of knowledge are protected from risks and threats caused by malfunctions 
of electronic equipment, system disturbances, or natural disasters and environmental accidents. Se-
curity control means that functions are conducted according to existing and accepted security plans 
and instructions. Access control is needed to minimize security risks and to develop existing secu-
rity activities.  
 
The VEIVI’s personnel security definition follow Kerko (2001, p. 83) by defining activities that 
aim at controlling prescribed risks and threats that are a risk either for the personnel generally or 
their capability and resources to perform their work. Personnel security also means protection from 
threats to organisational vulnerabilities by securing the functional performance of the organisation. 
The same concern is shared with clients, partners and other interested outsiders. The principle of 
personnel security is continuousness and it supports occupational health and safety. The aim of per-
sonnel security is to proactively manage risks by identifying positive means to control work proc-
esses, work administration and business using good corporate governance procedures.  
 
The VEIVI’s physical security definition follows both Kerko (2001, pp. 84-92) and VAHTI 
(01/1999) definitions and means high-level facility security and includes security control as a part 
of organisational functions. Declarations, permits and certificates concerning security are the re-
sponsibilities of the Head of Security and these and other legally required certificates are docu-
mented in a common register. Physical security includes the control of clients, controlling the 
movement of personnel, physical surveillance, technical surveillance and security equipment, build-
ing protection and special facilities.   
 
The VEIVI’s occupational health and safety confirms and guarantees the security and health of the 
personnel in all circumstances. It includes active efforts to keep up the capability of personnel to 
work and, when needed, improve that capability. To establish and maintain security and favourable 
work practices demands a process of focusing on the self-perception of the work place and aiming 
at continuous improvement. (Turvavironen, 2003) 
 APPENDIX 2 
STRATEGIC SECURITY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
The survey consists of statements as questions to generate comments. An open question at the end 
offers the opportunity to insert personal comments, information and feedback 
 
Response scale: 
1) strongly disagree with the statement 
2) somewhat disagree with the statement 
3) undecided 
4) somewhat agree with the statement 
5) strongly agree with the statement  
 
 
Capability to respond to threats 
A. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) spends enough resources on the surveillance of the change of 
threats?  
B. The MOD is able to respond to the change of threats? 
C. The change of threats affects the actions of the MOD? 
 
Capability to react in a crisis situation 
D. The MOD organisation has great readiness to react effectively in a crisis situation? 
E. The MOD has a sustainable and great readiness performance capability in a crisis situation? 
 
Comprehensive national defence 
F. From the point of view of total national defence the organisation of the MOD is functioning ef-
fectively? 
G. The integration of the total national defence is under the control of the MOD?  
H. After the reorganisation process of the MOD control over the integration of total national de-
fence is easier than before? 
 
Capability for rapid changes within the organisation  
I. The structure of our organisation can be rapidly changed to respond to incoming challenges? 
J. Free personal comments, information and feedback. 
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    APPENDIX 3 
SAFETY INTERVIEW STRUCUTRED QUESTIONNAIRE     
 
The interview consists of five safety schemas, which are divided into an equal amount of sectors. 
Every schema and sector offers an opportunity to the interviewee to insert his own comments. 
 
1. Threats 
1.1  Threat analysis in the MOD and in the interviewee’s department 
- What analyses exist? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the threat and risk analyses? 
1.2  Threats in normal situations 
- Threats in the facility? 
- Staff health emergencies? 
- Threats and risks from outside of the facility? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the threats in normal situation? 
1.3  Threats in disturbing and exceptional situations 
- Threats requiring covert activities? 
- Special threats concerning one’s own department/unit? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of threats in disturbing and exceptional situations? 
 
2. The performance of MOD personnel in avoiding threat situations and in decreasing 
risks 
- Safety and security awareness in the MOD? 
- Arrangements for visitors? 
- Physical situation? 
- Defence against intelligence and surveillance? 
- Reporting systems? 
- Safety and security directives? 
- Responsibilities? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the performance of MOD personnel in avoiding threat 
situations and in decreasing risks? 
 
3. The performance of MOD personnel in threat situations 
- Alarm systems? 
- Rapid reactions and first-aid systems? 
- Safety and security trained personnel in the MOD? 
- Debriefing systems? 
- Co-operation with other authorities? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the performance of MOD personnel in threat situa-
tions? 
 
4. The organisation of MOD safety and security 
- Threat, risk and safety statistics and analysis systems? 
- The role of management? 
- The comprehensive safety leadership system? 
- Organisation of rescue procedures in the MOD? 
- Surveillance systems in the MOD? 
- Occupational health and safety issues in the MOD? 
- Occupational health care in the MOD? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the organisation of MOD safety and security? 
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5. Safety and security training and education 
- First-aid training? 
- Rapid reaction rescue training? 
- Other safety and security training? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of safety and security training in the MOD?
  
APPENDIX 4 
STRUCTURED SECURITY LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE   
  
 
The interview consists of five security schemas, which are divided into an equal amount of sectors. 
Every schema and sector offers an opportunity to the interviewee to insert his own comments. 
 
6. Framework 
6.1  The vision, mission and strategic goals of the MOD? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the vision, mission and strategic goals of the MOD? 
6.2  The values of the MOD?  
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the interim values of the MOD?  
 
7. Personal aspects of the interviewee  
- Task and the status in the organisation? 
- Links to the organisational security issues? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the performance of MOD security?  
 
8. Threats 
- Responsibilities for security issues in the MOD from the point of view of the inter-
viewee?  
- The security directives, responsibilities, and arrangements? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the threats to the MOD?  
 
9. The future of the MOD from the point of view of security 
- The importance of security in the MOD? 
- The status of security in the MOD? 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the future of security in the MOD? 
 
10. Additional issues according to the interview 
- Interviewee’s own conceptions of the affairs that need to be handled? 
 
 
